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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Georganas, Sotiris (Royal Holloway, University of London); Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton) |
| Abstract: | Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each other's work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we randomize subjects into three groups: in the first one subjects are observed by another subject, but do not observe anybody; in the second one subjects observe somebody else's performance, but are not observed by anybody; in the last group subjects work in isolation, neither observing, nor being observed. We consider both a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on the performance of other team members. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed increase productivity at least initially when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see in a non-linear but monotonic way when compensation is based only on own performance. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, piece rate, team incentives, real-effort experiment |
| JEL: | D03 J24 M52 M59 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7523&r=soc |
| By: | Felipe Balmaceda; Juan Esconar |
| Abstract: | This paper studies which social networks maximize trust and cooperation when agreements are implicitly enforced. We study a repeated trust game in which trading opportunities arise exogenously and the social network determines the information transmission technology. We show that cohesive communities, modeled as social networks of complete components, emerge as the optimal community design. Cohesive communities generate some degree of common knowledge of transpired play that allows players to coordinate their punishments and, as a result, yield relatively high equilibrium payoffs. Our results provide an economic rationale for the commonly argued optimality of cohesive social networks. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edj:ceauch:295&r=soc |
| By: | Hans Pitlik; Ludek Kouba |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses empirically determinants of individual support for the Welfare State. We examine the interrelation of informal institutions with the perceived quality of a country's institutional framework. As a proxy for informal institutions, we concentrate on three core beliefs (trust in other people, perceived control over one's own life, and religiousness) which reflect different aspects of the way people feel about internal and external constraints in managing their own lives. To analyze preferences we follow a comprehensive concept of the Welfare State, measuring attitudes toward its two basic roles, (income) redistribution and government intervention. For this purpose the paper uses survey data from the World Values Survey/European Values Study as well as different indicators for governance quality. Our results indicate that people who interpret their life course as being not at their own disposition report a substantially more positive attitude toward income equalization and government interventions. A higher quality of public administration and low confidence in major private companies amplify preferences for redistribution and intervention of people under such an external locus of control. Social trust is generally associated with higher support for redistribution and government intervention only if perceived quality of administration is high and confidence in companies is low. People who assert themselves as religious are less favorable toward income equalization. While variation in administration quality does not appear to have an impact on the relationship between religiousness and income equalization preferences, religious people are substantially less supportive of redistribution and government intervention especially if confidence in major companies is high. |
| Keywords: | Political economy of policy reform, welfare reform, welfare state |
| JEL: | D74 D78 P35 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feu:wfewop:y:2013:m:8:d:0:i:38&r=soc |
| By: | Byung-Yeon Kim; Syngjoo Choi (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London); Jungmin Lee (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Arkansas); Sokbae 'Simon' Lee (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Seoul National University); Kyunghui Choi |
| Abstract: | The Cold War division of Korea, regarded as a natural experiment in institutional change, provides a unique opportunity to examine whether institutions affect social preferences. We recruited North Korean refugees and South Korean students to conduct laboratory experiments eliciting social preferences, together with standard surveys measuring subjective attitudes toward political and economic institutions. Our experiments employ widely used dictator and trust games, with four possible group matches between North and South Koreans by informing them of the group identity of their anonymous partners. Experimental behaviour and support for institutions differ substantially between and within groups. North Korean refugees prefer more egalitatian distribution in the dictator games than South Korean students, even after controlling for individual characteristics that could be correlated with social preferences; however, the two groups show little difference in the trust game, once we control for more egalitarian behaviour of North Koreans. North Korean refugees show less support for market economy and democracy than South Korean subjects. Attitudes toward insitutions are more strongly associated with the experimental behaviours among South Korean subjects than among North Korean subjects. An online appendix to accompany this publication is available here |
| Keywords: | social preferences, experiment, institutions, market economy, democracy |
| JEL: | C92 C93 D03 P20 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:35/13&r=soc |
| By: | Beugnot, Julie (Université Laval); Fortin, Bernard (Université Laval); Lacroix, Guy (Université Laval); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | This paper extends the standard work effort model by allowing workers to interact through networks. We investigate experimentally whether peer performances and peer contextual effects influence individual performances. Two types of network are considered. Participants in Recursive networks are paired with participants who played previously in isolation. In Simultaneous networks, participants interact in real-time along an undirected line. Mean peer effects are identified in both cases. Individual performances increase with peer performances in the recursive network. In the simultaneous network, endogenous peer effects vary according to gender: they are large for men but not statistically different from zero for women. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, social networks, work effort, piece rate, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 J16 J24 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7521&r=soc |
| By: | Sjaak Braster (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Jaap Dronkers (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | According to Robert Putnam (2007) ethnic diversity in cities and neighborhoods does not lead to an increase of trust and social capital as previously predicted by intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998); instead it triggers a reaction of hunkering down that leads to a decrease in trust and social capital of both in-group and out-groups. But what happens if we focus on youngsters that are growing up in a multi-ethnic metropole, that are considering ethnic diversity as a something "normal", and that are bridging their ethnic differences by sharing a common street culture and language? In this article we use data about 905 pupils, 41 classes and 11 schools in a European metropole to confirm the hypothesis that in this specific context ethnic diversity in classrooms does lead to positive effects on educational performance. |
| Keywords: | ethnic diversity, educational performance, classroom effects, multi-ethnic cities |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1318&r=soc |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Cooperating and trusting behavior may be explained by preferences over social outcomes (people care about others, are unselfish and help- ful), or attitudes to work and social responsibilities (plans have to be carried out, norms have to be followed). If the first hypothesis is true, Agreeable- ness, reporting stated empathy for others, should matter most; if the second, higher score in traits expressing attitude to work, intrinsic motivation (Con- scientiousness) should be correlated with cooperating behavior and trust. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis when subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing by whether others' payment is affected. |
| Keywords: | Personality Traits, Cooperation, Effort Provision |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:142&r=soc |
| By: | Caria, Antonia Stefano; Hassen, Ibrahim Worku |
| Abstract: | In this study we focus on exclusion from job contact networks, which constitutes a major disadvantage for labor market participants in settings where referral hiring is common and information about jobs hard to obtain. In a mid-size town in northern Ethiopia, where these mechanisms are at work, we observe that many individuals do not access local job contact networks. Models of strategic network formation and behavioral decision theory suggest that given the right incentives, job contact networks should be more inclusive. On these grounds we hypothesize that workers would link to peripheral peers when this maximizes their chances of referral and when self-regarding concerns are absent due to social preferences. |
| Keywords: | social network, Labor market, field experiment, |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1282&r=soc |
| By: | S. Bortolotti; M. Casari; F. Pancotto |
| Abstract: | Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an experiment with two subject pools sharing the same geographical and cultural origins, we show that opportunities for peer punishment increase cooperation among students but not in the general population. In previous studies, punishment magnified the differences across societies in peoples ability to cooperate. Here, punishment reversed the order: with punishment, students cooperate more than the general population while they cooperate less without it. Our results obtained with students cannot be readily generalized to the society at large. |
| JEL: | C72 C90 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp898&r=soc |