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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Binzel, Christine (Heidelberg University); Fehr, Dietmar (WZB - Social Science Research Center Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects – friend versus stranger – and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find – consistent with Leider et al. (2009) – that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual's intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. |
| Keywords: | social distance, reciprocity, giving, networks, sorting |
| JEL: | C93 D64 L14 O12 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7516&r=soc |
| By: | Vicente Calabuig (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia); Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia); Gonzalo Olcina (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment by the proportion of the allocator’s payoffs that the investor can destroy. We find that punishment fosters trust when the capacity of punishment is high (i.e., when the cost of punishing is relatively low). Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior, crowding out intrinsic motivation to trust. Trustworthiness is higher with punishment than without punishment, except if investors have a high capacity of punishment |
| Keywords: | Trust game, punishment, crowding-out, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 D69 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0413&r=soc |
| By: | Maria Zumbuehl; Thomas Dohmen; Gerard Pfann |
| Abstract: | We study empirically whether there is scope for parents to shape the economic preferences and attitudes of their children through purposeful investments. We exploit information on the risk and trust attitudes of parents and their children, as well as rich information about parental efforts in the upbringing of their children from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study. Our results show that parents who invest more in the upbringing of their children are more similar to them with respect to risk and trust attitudes and thus transmit their own attitudes more strongly. The results are robust to including variables on the relationship between children and parents, family size, and the parents’ socioeconomic background. |
| Keywords: | parental investments, risk preferences, trust, intergenerational transmission, cultural economics, family economics, social interactions |
| JEL: | D80 J12 J13 J62 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp570&r=soc |
| By: | Quang NGUYEN (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 637332, Singapore); Marie Claire VILLEVAL (University of Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE, 93, ChemindesMouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany); Hui XU (University of Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE, 93, ChemindesMouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France. Beijing Normal University,19 XinjiekouWai Street, Beijing 100875, P. R. China.) |
| Abstract: | This study incorporates risk, time, and social preferences. We conduct a field experiment in Vietnamese villages and estimate the effect of the Cumulative Prospect Theory and of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences parameters on trust and trustworthiness. We find that both probability sensitivity and risk aversion are not related to trust. Yet, more risk averse and less present biased participants are found to be trustworthier. People with longer exposure to a collectivist economy tend to have a lower level of trust and trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Trustworthiness, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Risk preferences, Time preferences, Quasi–hyperbolic preferences, Vietnam, Field experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1301&r=soc |
| By: | Giovanna Aguilar (Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú); Jhonatan Claussen (Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) |
| Abstract: | This study aims to assess the social efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs) —regulated and non-regulated— in Peru. Social efficiency is referred to the capacity of MFIs to produce more social outputs —number of poor clients and women served— without using more resources. The Data Envelopment Analysis methodology is used to carry on efficiency analysis. Additionally, we analyze the potential determinants of social efficiency of MFIs through a Tobit regression analysis in the context of panel data, in order to investigate whether differences related to the institutional nature of MFIs explain differences in social efficiency achieved by them. The study period covers the years from 2007 to 2011. The results show that non-regulated MFIs are socially more efficient. On the contrary, those MFIs which are within regulatory scheme, shown in most cases, distant positions to the efficient frontier. Regression analysis shows that being a regulated MFI negatively affects social efficiency levels, a greater presence in rural area positively affect social efficiency levels. Although there is evidence that financial returns could relate positively to social efficiency, this result does not seem to be as robust. At the other extreme, the lending technology does not seem to be relevant to explain social efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Microfinance, Social Efficiency, Efficiency frontiers, DEA analysis |
| JEL: | G21 O10 O16 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00358&r=soc |
| By: | El Fasiki, Hamza |
| Abstract: | The way a family business functions is greatly influenced by the structure of the society it originates from. A wide range of literature has recently attempted to emphasise that it is, therefore, not possible to create global family business theories without taking into consideration the remarkable differences that cultural and traditional context can make. Our attention is drawn to the role that collectivism plays in influencing family culture and the way in which it manifests in entrepreneurial activity throughout family generations. Collectivist societies and the family culture experienced by its individuals can have an important influence on the family business and the entrepreneurship it fosters. The term “collectivist society” describes how individuals often behave while following imposed sets of social patterns. On a smaller scale the same paradigm applies to family businesses where the family and the business life cycles complete each other. Hamza El Fasiki, Head of Research and Studies at the Moroccan Center for Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship, describes the impact of the collectivist society on the family business paradigm and explores how organisational and family culture become one, and the power hierarchy that ensures. |
| Keywords: | Family Business, Family Culture, Collectivism, Organisational Culture, Culture |
| JEL: | A39 M0 Z10 Z19 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48857&r=soc |
| By: | Raul V. Fabella (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman) |
| Abstract: | We give the conditions for the attainment of self-enforcing Pareto efficiency under complete effort non-observability, strict agent rationality and global budget balance among teams involved in a winner-takes-all contest for a prize. Employing Nash conjectures and fixed fee financing of the prize, we characterize the competitive environment that allows teams to overcome the moral hazard problem and induce self-enforcing egalitarian outcomes. If the number of identical teams is finite, the production technology is restricted to factor symmetric ones. When the number of identical teams becomes unbounded, the restriction on the production technology vanishes and there always exists a fee level that supports a self-enforcing Pareto efficient solution as long as member utilities over own share are identical and obey the Inada conditions. Some form of membership symmetry cannot be ruled out for Pareto efficiency. |
| Keywords: | social dilemma, rational egoist, cooperation, Ostrom threshold |
| JEL: | C72 D01 D02 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phs:dpaper:201309&r=soc |
| By: | Averett, Susan L. (Lafayette College); Terrizzi, Sabrina (Moravian College); Wang, Yang (Lafayette College) |
| Abstract: | Eating disorders affect 12-25% of college women. Previous research established a positive correlation between sorority membership and eating disorders. We investigate a possible causal link between sororities and weight-related behaviors and eating disorders using data from the American College Health Association. Using Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable methods, we confirm that sororities exert a negative effect on the weight-related behaviors of their members. However, females who are more resilient to these outcomes self-select into sororities, implying that females in sororities are less adversely affected by them than a female who was randomly selected to join a sorority would be. |
| Keywords: | obesity, underweight, BMI, sorority, anorexia, bulimia, eating disorders, weight control |
| JEL: | I12 I18 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7512&r=soc |