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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Tortosa-Ausina Emili (INSTITUTO VALENCIANO DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONÓMICAS (Ivie) UNIVERSITY JAUME I); Peiró Palomino Jesús (Universidad Jaime I) |
| Abstract: | This working paper analyzes the impact of social capital on economic growth in Spain during the 1985-2005 period. The literature in this context is virtually nonexistent and, in addition, whereas most studies, regardless of their context, have used survey data in order to measure social capital, we use a measure whose construction is based on similar criteria to other measures of capital stock. In addition, compared with more standard measures of social capital and trust, the measure we use is available with a high level of disaggregation, and with annual frequency for a long time period. Following a panel data approach, our findings indicate that social capital has a positive impact on GDP per capita growth in the context of Spanish provinces, implying that social features are important for explaining the differences in wealth observable across Spanish provinces. Following some recent contributions, we also explore the transmission mechanisms from social capital to growth, finding a highly positive relation between social capital and private physical investment. |
| Keywords: | Growth, physical capital investment, province, social capital |
| JEL: | Z13 O18 R11 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fbb:wpaper:2012122&r=soc |
| By: | Timothy C. Salmon; Danila Serra |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the extent to which social obervability of one's actions and the possibility of social non-monetary judgment affect the decision to engage in rule breaking behavior. We consider three rule bfeaking scenarios - theft, bribery and embezzlement - in the absence of any formal enforcement mechanism. By involving a student sample characterized by cultural heterogeneity due to immigraiton of ancestors to the US, we are able to investigate whether the effectiveness of informal social enforcement mechanisms is conditional on the cultural background of the decision-maker. A total of 52 countries are represented in our sample, ranging from Low Rule of Law countries such as Liberia and Nigeria to High Rule of Law countries such as Sweden and Norway. Our data provide evidence that people with different cultural backgrounds do respond differently to increased social observability of their actions. In particular, while subjects that dientify culturally with a High Rule of law country respond to social obervability and judgment by lowering their propensities to engage in rule breaking, subjects that identify with Low Rule of law countries do not. Our findings suggest that development policies that rely purely on social judgment to enforce behavior may not work with Low Rule of Law populations |
| Keywords: | Theft, corruption, social enforement, culture, experiemnts |
| JEL: | C90 D73 K42 Z10 |
| Date: | 2013–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/2013-05&r=soc |
| By: | Ljunge, Martin (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | I establish a positive relationship between family ties and civic virtues, as captured by disapproval of tax and benefit cheating, corruption, and a range of other dimensions of exploiting others for personal gain. I find that family ties are a complement to social capital, using within country evidence from 83 nations and data on second generation immigrants in 29 countries with ancestry in 85 nations. Strong families cultivate universalist values and produce more civic and altruistic individuals. The results provide a constructive role for families in promoting family values, which challenge an ‘amoral familism.’ Moreover, strong families are complementary with more developed and democratic institutions. The results provide a constructive role for families in promoting family values that support successful societies with a high state and fiscal capacity. |
| Keywords: | Family ties; Civic; Family values; Cultural transmission; Altruism; Social capital |
| JEL: | A13 H26 P16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–06–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0967&r=soc |
| By: | Brady, Gerard |
| Abstract: | Using data from the International Social Survey Programme 2008 this paper tests empirically the effects of network social capital on Irish employment outcomes, while controlling for possible endogeneity. We allow the effects of social networks to vary for different groups and across different localities. We also test the hypothesis that network social capital works as a complement to human capital in the labour market, rather than as a substitute. We find that social participation and employment are not endogenous and that ‘weak ties’ matter for employment outcomes, whereas ‘strong ties’ are less important. The effects, however, vary across age and location. We also find that social and human capital may be substitutes rather than complements when it comes to the labour market. These findings are discussed with relevance and examples for policy. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital, Networks, Ireland, Employment, Labour market |
| JEL: | J64 J68 |
| Date: | 2013–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47391&r=soc |
| By: | Gaël Giraud (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Cécile Renouard (ESSEC Business School - ESSEC Business School); Hélène L'Huillier (ESSEC Business School - ESSEC Business School); Raphaële De La Martinière (ESSEC Business School - ESSEC Business School); Camille Sutter (ENSAE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - ENSAE ParisTech) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores some of the dimensions related to poverty and exclusion, by defining a Relational Capability Index (RCI) which focuses on the quality of relationships among people and on their level of relational empowerment. This index is rooted in a relational anthropology; it insists on the quality of the social fabric and of interpersonal relations as a key aspect of human development. As a multidimensional index, the RCI includes integration into networks, private relations and civic commitments. We provide an axiomatization of a family of multidimensional indexes. This axiomatic viewpoint fills the gap between theories of justice and poverty measurements. By means of illustration, we apply three different versions of the RCI, which are elements of this family, to the measurement of the impact of oil companies on local communities in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) and to national surveys (Afrobarometer). |
| Keywords: | Multidimensional poverty; geometric mean; maximin solution; utilitarian solution; coherence; Nigeria; oil compagny |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00827690&r=soc |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi; Pierpaolo Battigalli; Elena Manzoni |
| Abstract: | In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore an incomplete-information methodology is called for. We take a first step in this direction, focusing on models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game. We consider two alternative modeling assumptions: (i) guilt aversion depends on the role played in the game, because only the trustee can feel guilt for letting the co-player down, (ii) guilt aversion is independent of the role played in the game. We show how the set of Bayesian equilibria changes as the upper bound on guilt sensitivity varies, and we compare this with the complete-information case. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help organize experimental results in the Trust Game. |
| Keywords: | Psychological games, Trust Game, guilt, incomplete information |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:246&r=soc |
| By: | Jeffrey V. Butler (EIEF); Pierluigi Conzo (University of Turin); Martin A. Leroch (University of Mainz) |
| Abstract: | Third party punishment is crucial for sustaining cooperative behavior. Still, little is known about its determinants. In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate a long-conjectured interaction between group identification and bystanders' punishment preferences using a novel measure of these preferences. We induce minimal groups and give a bystander the opportunity to punish the perpetrator of an unfair act against a defenseless victim. We elicit the bystander's valuation for punishment in four cases - when the perpetrator, the victim, both or neither are members of the bystander's group. We generate testable predictions about the rank order of punishment valuations from a simple framework incorporating group-contingent preferences for justice which are largely confirmed. Finally, we conduct control sessions where groups are not induced. Comparing punishment across treatment and control suggests that third-party punishers tend to treat others as in-group members unless otherwise divided. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1316&r=soc |
| By: | Cassi, Lorenzo; Plunket, Anne |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how network relations, proximity and their interplay affect collaboration and their inventive performance. Using patent citations as a proxy for patent quality, we investigate how the network and proximity characteristics of co-inventors enable them to access different sources of knowledge, in different geographical and organizational contexts, and finally affect the quality of inventive collaboration. Our findings enable to address the proximity paradox, which states that proximity facilitates collaboration and knowledge sharing, but it does not necessarily increase innovative performance, too much proximity may even harm innovation (Boschma and Frenken, 2009; Broekel and Boschma, 2011). |
| Keywords: | Social networks, geographical proximity, technological proximity, co-patenting, network formation. |
| JEL: | D85 L65 O31 O33 R11 |
| Date: | 2013–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47388&r=soc |
| By: | Molina, José Alberto (University of Zaragoza); Gimenez-Nadal, Jose Ignacio (University of Zaragoza); Cuesta, José A. (University of Zaragoza); Garcia-Lazaro, Carlos (University of Zaragoza); Moreno, Yamir (University of Zaragoza); Sanchez, Angel (University of Zaragoza) |
| Abstract: | Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyze the role of gender in repeated Prisoners' Dilemma played by Spanish high-school students in both a square lattice and a heterogeneous network. We find that female students have a higher probability of cooperation than male students. |
| Keywords: | high school students, cooperation, gender differences, prisoners' dilemma |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C93 D03 J16 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7421&r=soc |