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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Fabien Moizeau (CREM CNRS UMR 6211, University of Rennes 1, Condorcet Center and Institut Universitaire de France (IUF)) |
| Abstract: | We study how in a city either opposite social norms remain or a particular code of behavior spreads and ultimately prevails. We develop a multicommunity model with overlapping generations. When young, an individual chooses the level of educational e¤ort. The crucial feature is that her decision is inuenced by peers living in the area who favor either a social norm valuing education or a social norm discrediting education. When an adult, an individual who cares about her o¤springs expected income chooses the familys location. Endogenous location leads to di¤erent patterns of social norms in the city. We identify two types of urban equilibrium: a culturally-balanced city where social norms are distributed evenly among urban areas and the rate of education is the same in each urban area and a culturally-divided city where urban areas oppose on their prevailing social norm and exhibit di¤erent rates of education. We then study the dynamics of social norms. We show that there are multiple long-run patterns of social norms. A particular steady state is achieved depending on the initial distribution of social norms support in the population. Finally, we show that the public policies promoting social integration can lead in the long run to a population unanimously discrediting education and getting less education than letting the culturally-divided city arise. |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201315&r=soc |
| By: | Pierre M. Picard (CREA, University of Luxembourg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain); Pascal Mossay (Department of Economics, University of Reading and CORE) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study social interactions between two populations of individuals living in a city. Agents consume land and benefit from intra- and inter-group social interactions. We show that in equilibrium segregation arises: populations get separated in distinct spatial neighborhoods. Two- and three-district urban structures are characterized. For high population ratios or strong inter-group interactions, only a three-district city exists. In other cases, multiplicity of equilibria arises. Moreover, for sufficiently low population ratios or very weak inter-group interactions, all individuals agree on which spatial equilibrium is best. |
| Keywords: | social interaction, segregation, multiple centers, urban districts |
| JEL: | R12 R14 R31 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:13-03&r=soc |
| By: | Nizar Allouch (Queen Mary, University of London) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public provision, the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either increase or impede voluntary contributions. Moreover, although efficiency concerns generally provide a rationale for government intervention, surprisingly, little light is shed in the literature on the potential effectiveness of such intervention in a segregated society. This paper first develops an index based on social interactions, which, roughly speaking, measures the welfare impact of income redistribution in an arbitrary society. It then shows that the proposed index vanishes when applied to large segregated societies, which suggests an "asymptotic neutrality" of redistributive policies. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, Segregated society, Private provision, Networks, Bonacich transfer index |
| JEL: | C72 D31 H41 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp703&r=soc |
| By: | Joysankar Bhattacharya; Sarmila Banerjee |
| Abstract: | The paper aims at isolating the effect of group-participation on women empowerment using primary data on 1500 individual women collected during 2007-08 from two districts of West Bengal, India, namely Hooghly and South 24-Parganas. Since the impact evaluation exercise typically suffers from the problem of counterfactual, in the absence of biologically identical observations proxy has been constructed in terms of pairing of statistically identical observations by applying matching techniques based on propensity-scores. It is observed that mere inclusion in a SHG is not sufficient for any woman to enjoy the benefits of better connectivity with the social capital. Here both the duration of membership and the quality of participation matter. Moreover, in terms of a comparison of the probability of inclusion in the program with the proportion of actual inclusion for subjects with same p-scores, the extent of program mismatch has been assessed. This indicates a bias from the supply side where the more likely agents are being included in the absence of special effort to reach out the relatively more vulnerable ones. |
| Keywords: | Women Empowerment, SHG-Microfinance, Propensity Score Matching, Quality of Participation, Program Out-reach |
| JEL: | C21 H43 I38 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:675&r=soc |
| By: | Uwe Dulleck; Jonas Fooken; Yumei He |
| Abstract: | Due to economic and demographic changes highly educated women play an important role on the Chinese labour market. Gender has been shown to be an important characteristic that influences behaviour in economic experiments, as have, to a lesser degree, academic major, age and income. We provide a study looking at trust and reciprocity and their determinants in a labour market laboratory experiment. Our experimental data is based on two games, the Gift Exchange Game (GEG) and a variant of this game (the Wage Promising Game, WPG) where the employer's wage offer is non-binding and the employer can choose the wage freely after observing the workers effort. We find that women are less trusting and reciprocal than men in the GEG while this cannot be found in the WPG. Letting participants play the GEG and the WPG, allows us to disentangle reciprocal and risk attitudes. While in the employer role, it seems to be that risk attitude is the main factor, this is not confirmed analysing decisions in the worker role. |
| Date: | 2013–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp012&r=soc |
| By: | Anil Alpman (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new formulation of the theory of social norms. The theoretical model explores the interrelation between individuals' income, time-use and consumption decisions on the one hand, and the determinants of their decision to conform or not to social norms on the other. It is shown that rational consumers will obey inefficient social norms, which in turn will slow economic development. An empirical test of the model is performed for different categories of countries using a voluminous cross-country micro dataset. The results yield the gain and the cost of disobeying inefficient social norms, the latter of which can be used as a freedom indicator regarding social pressure. |
| Keywords: | Consumer theory, social norms, social interactions, household production model, economic efficiency. |
| JEL: | D11 D12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13038&r=soc |
| By: | Asongu , Simplice A.; Kodila-Tedika, Oasis |
| Abstract: | The paper extends Breggren et al. (2008, EE) on ‘trust and growth: a shaky relationship” by incorporating recent developments in the trust-growth literature and using a robust methodological underpinning that accounts for the presence of outliers. The empirical evidence is based on 63 countries. Two main findings are established. Firstly, the substantially documented positive trust-growth nexus is broadly confirmed. Secondly, when initial levels of growth come into play in determining the relationship, only 0.25 and 0.90 quantiles confirm the positive nexus. The results suggest that the trust-growth nexus cannot be generalized for all countries as some previous studies have concluded. Accordingly, blanket trust-growth policies may not succeed unless they are contingent in existing levels of development and tailored differently across rich and poor countries. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Growth; Conditional Effects |
| JEL: | A13 O40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:46865&r=soc |
| By: | Wang, Xin; McIntosh, Christopher S.; Watson, Philip; Zhang, Hua; Lu, Qian |
| Abstract: | Increased attention has recently been given to technical efficiency of small-scale irrigation to achieve food security and increase agricultural development. In this paper, the authors classify irrigation supply management methods as cooperative or non-cooperative, introduce social capital by four dimensions (social network, social trust, social reputation, and social participation), and highlight the impacts of both social capital and cooperative agreements on technical efficiency in the context of small-scale irrigation management. Efficiency is assessed using data envelopment analysis (DEA), and the impact of cooperative agreements and social capital on efficiency is estimated using path analysis. The result of DEA indicates that cooperative and social capital can improve technical efficiency of irrigation. Results of path analysis show that the presence of a cooperative has a positive, significant and direct impact on efficiency. Additionally, the effect of social capital on efficiency is estimated to be reinforced via participation in cooperative methods. |
| Keywords: | Technical efficiency, Cooperative agreement, Social capital, Small-scale irrigation, Consumer/Household Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:148070&r=soc |
| By: | Garcia, Jorge H.; Wei, Jiegen |
| Abstract: | A prevailing view in the literature is that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the (Bayesian) model introduced here shows that imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other fi?ndings, draws a distinct line between social and moral sanctions, both of which may depend on others' ?behavior but not on action observability. |
| Keywords: | social interactions, social norms, asymmetric information |
| JEL: | D82 K42 L51 |
| Date: | 2013–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-13-04-efd&r=soc |
| By: | Humpert, Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with the effects of social participation activities on life satisfaction. Using the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) for 2010, I present gender specific differences for several social activities, such as club memberships of political, welfare, health or more leisure time orientated groups. These activities have different impacts on male or female satisfaction. While sports and civic engagements improve only female life satisfaction, men are more affected by charity organizations or leisure time activities, such as hobbies. It is an interesting result that political activities and trade unions have no, or even negative effects on life satisfaction. |
| Keywords: | Subjective Well-Being; Social Participation; German General Social Survey (ALLBUS); |
| JEL: | D60 I31 O52 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–05–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:46775&r=soc |
| By: | Fabian Winter (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena) |
| Abstract: | Cooperation norms often emerge in situations, where the long term collective benefits help to overcome short run individual interests, for instance in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. Often, however, there are different paths to cooperation, benefiting different kinds of actors to different degrees. This leads to payoff asymmetries even in the state of cooperation, and consequently can give rise to normative conflicts about which norms should be in place. This norm-coordination problem will be modeled as a Battle of the Sexes game (BoS) with different degrees of asymmetry in payoffs. We combine the PD and the BoS to the 3×3 Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma (BOPD) with several asymmetric cooperative and one non-cooperative equilibria. Bame theoretical and "behavioral" predictions are derived about the kind of norms that are likely to emerge under different shadows of the future and degrees of asymmetry and tested in a lab-experiment. Our experimental data show that game theory fairly well predicts the basic main effects of our experimental manipulations, but "behavioral" predictions perform better in describing the equilibrium selection process of emerging norms. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, normative conflict, Prisoner's Dilemma, coordination, experiment |
| JEL: | Z13 C92 C72 D31 |
| Date: | 2013–04–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-016&r=soc |
| By: | Castilla, Carolina |
| Abstract: | I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree |
| Keywords: | incomplete information, income-hiding, non-cooperative family bargaining |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2013-007&r=soc |