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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Luisa Corrado (University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Pierluigi Conzo (Dept. of Economics and Statistics "Cognetti de Martiis", University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | We provide non experimental evidence of the relevance of sociability on subjective wellbeing by investigating the determinants of life satisfaction on a large sample of Europeans aged above 50. We document that voluntary work, religious attendance, helping friends/neighbours and participation to community-related organizations affect positively and significantly life satisfaction. We illustrate the different impact that some sociability variables have on eudaimonic versus cognitive measures of subjective wellbeing. Our empirical findings discriminate among other regarding and self-regarding preferences as rationales explaining such behaviour. We document that different combinations between actions and motivations have different impact on life satisfaction thereby providing support for the relevance of these specific "contingent goods" and to the literature of procedural utility. Our findings are confirmed in robustness checks including refinements of the dependent variable, instrumental variables and sensitivity analysis on departures from the exogeneity assumption. |
| Keywords: | Tsunami, sociability, altruism, other-regarding activities, other regarding motivations, life satisfaction, subjective well-being |
| JEL: | A13 D13 D64 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp49&r=soc |
| By: | Giraud, Gaël (Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES)); Renouard, Cécile (ESSEC Business School, IRENE); L’Huillier, Hélène (ESSEC Business School, IRENE); de la Martinière, Raphaële (ESSEC Business School, IRENE); Sutter, Camille (École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (Ensea ParisTech)) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores some of the dimensions related to poverty and exclusion, by defining a Relational Capability Index (RCI) which focuses on the quality of relationships among people and on their level of relational empowerment. This index is rooted in a relational anthropology; it insists on the quality of the social fabric and of interpersonal relations as a key aspect of human development. As a multidimensional index, the RCI includes integration into networks, private relations and civic commitments. We provide an axiomatization of a family of multidimensional indexes. This axiomatic viewpoint fills the gap between theories of justice and poverty measurements. By means of illustration, we apply three different versions of the RCI, which are elements of this family, to the measurement of the impact of oil companies on local communities in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) and to national surveys (Afrobarometer). |
| Keywords: | Sciences de l'Homme et Société Economie et finances; Sciences de l'Homme et Société Sociologie |
| JEL: | I30 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13006&r=soc |
| By: | Marc Sangnier (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS); Yanos Zylberberg (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) |
| Abstract: | Leaders’ misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader’s action from which citizens extract information on the country’s institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader’s type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others. |
| Keywords: | Social conflicts, norms of cooperation, trust, institutions. |
| JEL: | D74 D83 H41 O17 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1328&r=soc |
| By: | Giuseppe Albanese (Bank of Italy); Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy); Paolo Sestito (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the role of preferences in explaining trust. By using the Bank of ItalyÂ’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the paper shows that time preferences and risk preferences are key covariates of self-reported trust. They both predict negatively a measure of generalized trust; however, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index of particularized trusting behaviour (which refers to family and friends). Moreover, the results are robust to using a different data source to gauge the role of social preferences and personality traits. The study highlights that neglecting preferences when analysing the role of trust in explaining socio-economic outcomes might pose serious challenges in terms of omitted variables. |
| Keywords: | trust, preferences, survey data |
| JEL: | D1 D8 Z1 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_911_13&r=soc |
| By: | Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Parma, Department of Law); Fabio Sabatini (Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law) |
| Abstract: | We use a unique dataset to study how participation in two specific types of nonprofit organizations, i.e. social welfare associations and social cooperatives, affects individual social capital. A descriptive analysis shows that both the types of organization have a positive impact. The econometric analysis reveals that social welfare associations play a significantly greater role in the development of volunteers' networks of cooperative relationships, favouring the creation of weak ties which are used to exchange information and advice, and offering the opportunity to establish stronger ties entailing concrete mutual support. Within social cooperatives, workers develop their individual social capital to a greater extent than volunteers. |
| Keywords: | volunteering, nonprofit organizations, cooperative enterprises, social cooperatives, social capital, social networks |
| JEL: | L31 L33 P13 Z1 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp48&r=soc |
| By: | Uri Gneezy; Alex Imas; Kristóf Madarász |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic model where people decide in the presence of moral constraints and test the predictions of the model through two experiments. Norm violations induce a temporal feeling of guilt that depreciates with time. Due to such fluctuations of guilt, people exhibit an endogenous temporal inconsistency in social preferences—a behavior we term conscience accounting. In our experiments people first have to make an ethical decision, and subsequently decide whether to donate to charity. We find that those who chose unethically were more likely to donate than those who did not. As predicted, donation rates were higher when the opportunity to donate came sooner after the unethical choice than later. Combined, our theoretical and empirical findings suggest a mechanism by which prosocial behavior is likely to occur within temporal brackets following an unethical choice. |
| Keywords: | Emotions, Temporal Brackets, Deception, Prosocial Behavior |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stitep:/2012/563&r=soc |
| By: | Korenok Oleg (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Edward L. Millner (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Laura Razzolini (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business) |
| Abstract: | We answer the question: Is giving equivalent to not taking? We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoffs. We find that the recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data. |
| Keywords: | Dictator Game; Impure Altruism; Taking |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D64 H30 H41 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1301&r=soc |
| By: | Kim-Leong Chung (University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics); Joerg Freiling (University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics & ZenTra); Sven M. Laudien (Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg & ZenTra) |
| Abstract: | Due to their particular characteristics, transnational companies (TNC) face numerous challenges, in particular dealing with uncertainty in both external and internal transactions. In this paper, we investigate whether and how far individual and inter-personal interactions among members of the internal units of TNC influence their transactional relationships. We develop the proposition that social relatedness is a crucial means to cope with transactional uncertainty in crossâ€border relationships within organizational boundaries. Our empirical study provides first support of this causality. |
| Keywords: | informal governance, social relatedness, transactional uncertainty, transnational companies |
| JEL: | D83 F23 L14 M16 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zen:wpaper:15&r=soc |
| By: | Ernest Miguelez (World Intellectual Property Organization, Economics and Statistics Division, Geneva, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to assess the influence of spatial mobility of knowledge workers on the formation of ties of scientific and industrial collaboration across European regions. Co-location has been traditionally invoked to ease formal collaboration between individuals and firms, since tie formation costs increase with physical distance between partners. In some instances, highly-skilled actors might become mobile and bridge regional networks across separate locations. This paper estimates a fixed effects logit model to ascertain precisely whether there exists a ‘previous co-location premium’ in the formation of networks across European regions. |
| Keywords: | inventors’ mobility, technological collaborations, co-location, European regions, panel data |
| JEL: | C8 J61 O31 O33 R0 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:7&r=soc |
| By: | Raluca Prelipceanu (University of Evry and University of Paris Est Créteil) |
| Abstract: | Our paper sets forth two possible explanations for the fall in female labour force participation in Romania. The first explanation focuses on the increase in temporary labour migration rates, while the second relies on the existence of gender norms. We consider the existence of a social norm that sets the participation of women into household production. We test these assumptions on a 10 percent sample of the Romanian 2002 census. The results show the existence of important differences between women who do not work at all, those who do not move in the labour market and those who move for work, be it within the country or abroad. They also prove the importance of social norms for women who work in their residential locality and for those who temporarily migrate abroad for work. |
| Keywords: | Labour market, Household production, Social norms, Temporary international migration, Internal labour mobility |
| JEL: | D13 J16 J22 J61 R23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eve:wpaper:13-08&r=soc |
| By: | Mark Pauly; Ashley Swanson |
| Abstract: | This note considers a relatively new form of financing for social services, the "Social Impact Bond." Proponents of Social Impact Bonds argue that they present a solution to several problems in funding social services, including performance measurement and the distribution of risk. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that Social Impact Bonds have many features present in standard financing arrangements. They will lead to greater program success when investors’ effort can positively influence outcomes, but are unlikely to do so otherwise. We conclude that the value of this funding innovation will be strongly context-dependent. |
| JEL: | H0 H51 I1 I10 I18 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18991&r=soc |