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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Christophe Muller (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics, EHESS & CNRS.); Marc Vothknecht (German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of violent conflict on social capital, as measured by citizen participation in community groups, defined by four activity types: governance, social service, infrastructure development and risk-sharing. Combining household panel data from Indonesia with conflict event information, we find an overall decrease in citizen contributions in districts affected by group violence in the early post-Suharto transition period. However, participation in communities with a high degree of ethnic polarization is less affected, and is even stimulated for local governance and risk-sharing activities. Moreover, individual engagement appears to depend on the involvement of other members from the same ethnic group, which points toward building of intra-ethnic social networks in the presence of violence. Finally, our results show the danger of generalization when dealing with citizen participation in community activities. We find a large variety of responses depending on the activity and its economic and social functions. We also find large observed and unobserved individual heterogeneities of the effect of violence on participation. Once an appropriate nomenclature of activities is used and controls for heterogeneity are applied, we find that the ethnic and social configuration of society is central in understanding citizen participation. |
| Keywords: | Violent Conflict, Citizen Participation, Local Public Goods |
| JEL: | D74 H42 O11 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1306&r=soc |
| By: | Cristina Bodea; Adrienne LeBas |
| Abstract: | How do social contracts come into being? This paper argues that norm adoption plays an important and neglected role in this process. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, we examine why individuals adopt norms favoring a citizen obligation to pay tax where state enforcement is weak. We find that public goods delivery by the state produces the willingness to pay tax, but community characteristics also have a strong and independent effect on both social contract norms and actual tax payment. Individuals are less likely to adopt pro-tax norms if they have access to community provision of security and other services. In conflict-prone communities, where "self-help" provision of club goods is less effective, individuals are more likely to adopt social contract norms. Finally, we show that social contract norms substantially boost tax payment. This paper has broad implications for literatures on state formation, taxation, clientelism, and public goods provision. |
| Date: | 2013–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/2013-02&r=soc |
| By: | Weng, Qian (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as important means to reduce free riding and to promote cooperation in teamwork settings. This paper examines the relative importance of these two mechanisms, as well as the importance of income distribution in team cooperation. In a repeated public good experiment, conditions vary among different combinations of homogenous or heterogeneous endowment, strong or weak identity, and absence or presence of peer punishment. We find that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative impact of endowment heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases cooperation irrespective of income distribution and identity strength, and cooperation is similar across all treatments with punishment. These findings provide important implications for management policy makers in organizations: implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams should be done with caution, and a very strong peer punishment mechanism is more effective in enhancing cooperation over common identity when both are viable.<p> |
| Keywords: | Endowment distribution; identity; punishment; cooperation; public goods experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D63 H41 M54 |
| Date: | 2013–01–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0551&r=soc |
| By: | Cowan, Robin (UNU-MERIT/MGSoG, Maastricht University, and BETA, Universite de Strassbourg); Kamath, Anant (UNU-MERIT/MGSoG) |
| Abstract: | This is a model of knowledge exchange by means of informal interaction among agents in low technology clusters. What this study seeks to do is to colour these exchanges by placing them in an environment of complex social relations, test whether the small-world network structure is the most favourable for knowledge exchanges in these environments, and explore the influence of social relations and network distance. These enquiries are the contribution of this model to the existing series of studies on efficient network structures for knowledge diffusion. We find that the small-world network structure may not be the best network structure for highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, when knowledge exchanges are undertaken in environments of complex social relations. Also, we confirm that the highest and most equitable knowledge distribution is achieved when there is perfect affinity among the agents. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge Exchanges, Small-Worlds, Social Networks, Complex Social Relations |
| JEL: | D85 O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2013004&r=soc |
| By: | Matthew W. McCarter (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Anya C. Samak (School of Human Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison); Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | It is common in organizational life to be simultaneously involved in multiple collective actions. These collective actions may be modeled using public good dilemmas. The developing social dilemma literature has two perspectives – the “divided loyalties” and “conditional cooperation” perspectives – that give opposite predictions about how individuals will behave when they simultaneously play two identical public good games. The current paper creates consensus between these social dilemma perspectives by examining cooperative behavior of participants interacting in two public good games with either different or the same group members. In each round, individuals have a common budget constraint across the two games. In support of the conditional cooperator’s perspective of social dilemmas, we find that playing two games with different, rather than same, group members increases overall contributions. Over the course of the experiment, participants playing two games with different group members shift their contributions significantly more often toward more cooperative public good games than participants playing with the same group members. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, conditional cooperation, public good, experiments, group composition |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-08&r=soc |
| By: | Bezu, Sosina (School of Economics and Business Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Holden, Stein T. (School of Economics and Business Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Field experiments combining dictator games with stated preference questions are used to elicit within subject and between subject sharing behavior with known family members and anonymous villager. A simple theoretical model incorporating social preferences, social distance and inter-dependent preferences is developed. The results show that generosity in form of probability of giving and amounts given are much lower towards anonymous villagers than to known family members. The probability of giving to the spouse is positively correlated with probability of giving to anonymous villager. Husbands and wives receiving positive amounts from their spouses (without knowing), were also more likely to give positive amounts to their spouses than those that received nothing from their spouses. Receiving positive amounts from spouse was uncorrelated with giving behavior towards anonymous villager. How sharing behavior is correlated with marriage type (parental arrangement, parental and bride agreement, love marriage, and kidnapping marriage), and other socioeconomic characteristics was assessed separately for husbands and wives to explore the sensitivity of responses to such socio-economic characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Generosity; social distance; within-family generosity |
| JEL: | C93 D03 O12 |
| Date: | 2013–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2013_001&r=soc |
| By: | Gail Pacheco (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Law, Auckland University of Technology); Barrett Owen |
| Abstract: | This study empirically explores the determinants of political participation. Using recent data from the European Social Survey (2010/2011), we investigate the relationship between political participation and personal values, via use of the Schwartz (1992) values inventory. Political activities are categorised into levels of participation (none, weak, medium, strong) based on the cost of participating and how unconventional the activity is. A generalised ordered logit model is applied, and finds that individuals that are more open to change and more self-transcendent, are more likely to participate. Furthermore, the patterns of influence (with respect to the majority of individual characteristics) are not monotonic in nature, as you rise through the levels of political participation, highlighting some key areas that future research could tackle. These findings are important for researchers and policy makers who may be interested in understanding determinants of, and/or enhancing the level of political participation in an economy. |
| Keywords: | personal values, political participation |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aut:wpaper:201302&r=soc |
| By: | Pablo Branas-Garza (Business School, Middlesex University London, London, UK and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Jaromir Kovarik (Dpto. Fundamentos Analisis Economico I & BRiDGE, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain); Levent Neyse (GLOBE: Department of Economics, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain) |
| Abstract: | Gene-culture co-evolution emphasizes the joint role of culture and genes for the emergence of altruistic and cooperative behaviors and behavioral genetics provides estimates of their relative importance. However, these approaches cannot assess which biological traits determine altruism or how. We analyze the association between altruism in adults and the exposure to prenatal sex hormones, using the second-to-fourth digit ratio. We find an inverted U-shaped relation for left and right hands, which is very consistent for men and less systematic for women. Subjects with both high and low digit ratios give less than individuals with intermediate digit ratios. We repeat the exercise with the same subjects seven months later and find a similar association, even though subjects' behavior differs the second time they play the game. We then construct proxies of the median digit ratio in the population (using more than 1000 different subjects), show that subjects' altruism decreases with the distance of their ratio to these proxies. These results provide direct evidence that prenatal events contribute to the variation of altruistic behavior and that the exposure to fetal hormones is one of the relevant biological factors. In addition, the findings suggest that there might be an optimal level of exposure to these hormones from social perspective. |
| Keywords: | Altruism, Prosociality, Prenatal Sex Hormones, Digit Ratio, Genoeconomics |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-09&r=soc |