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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Barnett, Andy (Auburn University); Yandle, Bruce (Clemson University); Naufal, George S (American University of Sharjah) |
| Abstract: | Despite being a fixture of everyday life in the Arab world, wasta, which may be thought of as special influence by members of the same group or tribe, has received little attention from social scientists. Our casual empiricism suggests that wasta is an important determinant of how economic activities are organized and resources are allocated in Middle Eastern societies, yet economists, even those who specialize in work related to the Middle East, have not addressed the issue of wasta. With this paper we provide a modest beginning to filling that void. Specifically, we use the history of wasta, Hayek's concept of extended order and Coase's work on the nature of the firm to draw inferences regarding the existence of wasta and its persistence in Arab societies. |
| Keywords: | cronyism, wasta, firm, Hayek, Coase, Middle East, social capital |
| JEL: | D21 K20 N45 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7201&r=soc |
| By: | Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol |
| Abstract: | This paper exploits variation between and within countries to examine the legacy of recorded conflicts in Africa in the pre-colonial period between 1400 and 1700. There are three main findings. First, we show that historical conflict is correlated with a greater prevalence of post-colonial con.ict. Second, historical conflict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity and a weaker sense of national identity across countries. Third, historical conflict is negatively correlated with subsequent patterns of development within countries. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, Trust, Identity |
| JEL: | N47 O43 O55 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:312&r=soc |
| By: | Jonathan Gheyssens (ETH Zürich); Isabel Günther (ETH Zürich) |
| Abstract: | On the basis of a conditional contribution experiment conducted in Benin and Uganda, we argue that a conditional u-shaped profile exists, at least in poor communities. Under this profile, individuals invest considerably in public goods when nobody else does, reduce their commitment in reaction to positive group participation and turn into conditional cooperators after a threshold of others’ participation is reached. For the understanding of the dynamics of repeated cooperation the implications of this group of u-shaped cooperators might be important. |
| Keywords: | Conditional cooperation; Public goods; Experiments; sub-Saharan Africa |
| Date: | 2013–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:gotcrc:135&r=soc |
| By: | Cristina Bodea; Adrienne LeBas |
| Abstract: | How do social contracts come into being? This paper argues that norm adoption plays an important and neglected role in this process. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, we examine why individuals adopt norms favoring a citizen obligation to pay tax where state enforcement is weak. We find that public goods delivery by the state produces the willingness to pay tax, but community characteristics also have a strong and independent effect on both social contract norms and actual tax payment. Individuals are less likely to adopt pro-tax norms if they have access to community provision of security and other services. In conflict-prone communities, where “self-help” provision of club goods is less effective, individuals are more likely to adopt social contract norms. Finally, we show that social contract norms substantially boost tax payment. This paper has broad implications for literatures on state formation, taxation, clientelism, and public goods provision. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2013-02&r=soc |
| By: | Moschion, Julie (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research); Tabasso, Domenico (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the respective influence of intergenerational transmission and the environment in shaping individual trust. Focusing on second generation immigrants in Australia and the United States, we exploit the variation in the home and in the host country to separate the effect of the cultural background from that of the social and economic conditions on individual trust. Our results indicate that trust in the home country contributes to the trust of second generation immigrants in both host countries, but particularly so in the United States. Social and economic conditions in the host country, such as crime rate, economic inequality, race inequality and segregation by country of origin, also affect trust. Evidence for first generation immigrants confirms that the transmission of trust across generations is primarily important in the United States, and, that differences in trust levels between the two host countries increase with acculturation. |
| Keywords: | trust, migration, culture |
| JEL: | J15 O15 Z10 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7203&r=soc |
| By: | Stefano DellaVigna; John List; Ulrike Malmendier; Gautam Rao |
| Abstract: | Do men and women have different social preferences? Previous findings are contradictory. We provide a potential explanation using evidence from a field experiment. In a door-to-door solicitation, men and women are equally generous, but women become less generous when it becomes easy to avoid the solicitor. Our structural estimates of the social preference parameters suggest an explanation: women are more likely to be on the margin of giving, partly because of a less dispersed distribution of altruism. We find similar results for the willingness to complete an unpaid survey: women are more likely to be on the margin of participation. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00380&r=soc |
| By: | Michael A. Valenti; Olivier G. Giovannoni |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a review of the literature on the economics of shared societies. As defined by the Club de Madrid, shared societies are societies in which people hold an equal capacity to participate in and benefit from economic, political, and social opportunities regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, language, gender, or other attributes, and where, as a consequence, relationships between the groups are peaceful. Our review centers on four themes around which economic research addresses concepts outlined by the Club de Madrid: the effects of trust and social cohesion on growth and output, the effect of institutions on development, the costs of fractionalization, and research on the policies of social inclusion around the world. |
| Keywords: | Shared Societies; Economic Inclusion; Institutions; Economic Growth; Income Distribution |
| JEL: | D31 O11 O43 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_755&r=soc |
| By: | Nicoletta Balbo; Nicola Barban; Melinda Mills |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to investigate whether friends’ and peers’ behavior influence and individual’s entry into marriage and parenthood during the transition to adulthood of young, U.S. adults. After first studying entry into marriage and parenthood as two independent events, we then examine them as interrelated processes, thereby considering them as two joint outcomes of an individual’s unique, underlying family-formation strategy. Using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we engage in a series of discrete time event history models to test whether the larger the number of friends and peers who get married (or have a child), the sooner the individual gets married (or has a child). Results show strong cross-friend effects on entry into parenthood, whereas entry into marriage is only affected by peer effects. Estimates of a multiprocess model show that cross-friend effects on entry into parenthood remain strongly significant even when we control for cross-process unobserved heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | Social interactions, peer effects, fertility, marriage, multiprocess, event history analysis |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:don:donwpa:056&r=soc |
| By: | A. Gentili |
| Abstract: | International migration is an expensive form of investment, that only households relatively better off can afford. However poorer households have the higher incentive to migrate. Migration decision is conditional on the entry cost, expected returns and risks of migration. This paper, using data from Mexican rural and urban areas, examines the relation between household and community networks and costs and risks of migration focusing on the optimal investment in migration. To investigate an household optimal number of migrants this paper introduces a Three Step procedure to solve simultaneously for the endogeneity of network size and possible selection of migrants. The analysis confirms the inverted U-shaped relation between wealth and migration, stressing the importance of networks particularly in facilitating the migration of social strata belonging to the left tail of the income distribution. Moreover, in presence of sunk costs and/or high initial investment, household and community networks accomplish different functions. |
| JEL: | O15 J11 J61 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp867&r=soc |