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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Tristan Reed; James A. Robinson |
| Abstract: | The lowest level of government in sub-Saharan Africa is often a cadre of chiefs who raise taxes, control the judicial system and allocate the most important scarce resource - land. Chiefs, empowered by colonial indirect rule, are often accused of using their power despotically and inhibiting rural development. Yet others view them as traditional representatives of rural people, and survey evidence suggests that they maintain widespread support. We use the colonial history of Sierra Leone to investigate the relationships between chiefs' power on economic development, peoples' attitudes and social capital. There, a chief must come from one of the ruling families recognized by British colonial authorities. Chiefs face less competition and fewer political constraints in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families. We show that places with fewer ruling families have significantly worse development outcomes today - in particular, lower rates of educational attainment, child health, and non-agricultural employment. But the institutions of chiefs' authority are also highly respected among villagers, and their chiefdoms have higher levels of "social capital," for example, greater popular participation in a variety of “civil society" organizations and forums that might be used to hold chiefs accountable. We argue that these results are difficult to reconcile with the standard principle-agent approach to politics and instead reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs. Rather than acting as a vehicle for disciplining chiefs, these organizations have been structured by chiefs to control society. |
| JEL: | D72 N27 O12 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18691&r=soc |
| By: | Saich, Tony (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Are China's citizens sufficiently satisfied to reduce potential challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule? It is reasonable to assume that if a significant percentage of citizens are more satisfied with government performance and the provision of public goods, the government will have a greater capacity for policy experimentation and enjoy a residual trust that may help them survive policy errors. This paper asks three sets of questions. The first set asks about the general levels of satisfaction with government across different levels. Second, we ask about how citizens view the performance of local officials in dealing with the public and in implementing policy. Third, we look at the level of satisfaction with the provision of a number of specific goods and services, with a more in-depth look at dealing with corruption. In particular, we compare responses among those who live in major cities, small towns and townships, and villages. Findings are based on a survey that was conducted together with Horizon Market Research Company in the fall of 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. The survey is a purposive stratified survey ranging from 3,800 to 4,150 respondents selected from three administrative levels: city, town, and village. Rather than a nationwide probability sample, the survey comprises a number of sites selected on the basis of three variables: geographic location, average per capita income, and population. Survey findings reveal that the new leadership that takes power through late-2012 and 2013 is likely to inherit a mixed situation. There is clearly much dissatisfaction with the performance of local government and its officials; very few have faith that the government can deal effectively with the problem of corruption. Yet, there is still good will towards the Central government that is not identified with the problems that are seen to blight the performance of those levels of government closer to the people. The surveys confirm the view of others that Chinese citizens do "disaggregate" the state and would appear to retain faith in the central government. In addition, the satisfaction with all levels of government has risen since we began the surveys in 2003. This may give the Central leadership some cushion if it makes policy errors in the future. However, as we have seen in the recent past, seemingly stable authoritarian regimes can unravel quickly, and citizen frustration can spill out onto the streets. Our survey also suggests that citizens feel that local officials are not very effective in promoting the interests of ordinary folk, but are quite adept at pursuing their own interests. It will be a notable challenge for the new leadership to bring about significant improvement in those areas of public service citizens deem most important without increasing transparency and accountability in local government. |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-051&r=soc |
| By: | Pascal Billand (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France.); Christophe Bravard (Université Grenoble 2 ; UMR 1215 GAEL, F-38000 Grenoble, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Marie Sudipta Sarangi (DIW Berlin and Louisiana State University) |
| Abstract: | We study the formation of mutual insurance networks in a model where every agent who obtains more resources gives a fixed amount of resources to all agents who have obtained less resources. The low resource agent must be directly linked to the high resource agent to receive this transfer. We identify the pairwise stable networks and efficient networks. Then, we extend our model to situations where agents differ in their generosity with regard to the transfer scheme. We show that there exist conditions under which in a pairwise stable network agents who provide the same level of transfers are linked together, while there are no links between agents who provide high transfers and agents who provide low transfers. |
| Keywords: | Mutual insurance networks, Pairwise stable networks, Efficient networks |
| JEL: | C72 D81 D8 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1234&r=soc |
| By: | Aperjis, Christina (HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA); Miao, Yali (Jane Street Capital, Tokyo); Zeckhauser, Richard J. (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the players meet but once. One player--the truster--decides whether to trust, and the other player--the temptee--has a temptation to betray when trusted. The strength of the temptation to betray may vary from encounter to encounter, and is independently distributed over time and across temptees. We refer to a recorded betrayal as a black mark. We study how trusters and temptees interact in equilibrium when past influences current play only through its effect on certain summary statistics. We first focus on the case that players only condition on the number of black marks of a temptee and study the different equilibria that emerge, depending on whether the trusters, the temptees, or a social planner has the ability to specify the equilibrium. We then show that conditioning on the number of interactions as well as on the number of black marks does not prolong trust beyond black marks alone. Finally, we consider more general summary statistics of a temptee's past and identify conditions under which there exist equilibria where trust is possibly suspended only temporarily. |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-055&r=soc |
| By: | Matteo. Ploner (University of Trento, CEEL, Italy); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In our experiment, a dictator game variant, the reported outcome of a die roll determines the endowment (low/high) in a subsequent dictator game. In one treatment the experimenter is present and no cheating is possible, while in another subjects can enter the result of the roll themselves. Moral self-image is also manipulated in the experiment preceding ours. The aim of this experimental set up is to analyze dynamic aspects of moral behavior. When cheating is possible, substantially more high endowments are claimed and transfers of high-endowed dictators are bigger than when cheating is not possible (mediated by the preceding moral self-image manipulation). The preceding manipulations also have a direct effect on generosity, when subjects have to report the roll of the die truthfully. Moral balancing appears to be an important factor in individual decision making. |
| Keywords: | honesty, moral balancing, self-image, dictator game, experiments, ethical behavior |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–01–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-002&r=soc |
| By: | Jan A. Lipski; Ryszard Kutner |
| Abstract: | The three-state agent-based 2D model of financial markets in the version proposed by Giulia Iori in 2002 has been herein extended. We have introduced the increase of herding behaviour by modelling the altering trust of an agent in his nearest neighbours. The trust increases if the neighbour has foreseen the price change correctly and the trust decreases in the opposite case. Our version only slightly increases the number of parameters present in the Iori model. This version well reproduces the main stylized facts observed on financial markets. That is, it reproduces log-returns clustering, fat-tail log-returns distribution and power-law decay in time of the volatility autocorrelation function. |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1301.1824&r=soc |
| By: | Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Matthew W. McCarter (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | A common finding in social sciences is that member change hinders group functioning and performance. However, questions remain as to why member change negatively affects group performance and what are some ways to alleviate the negative effects of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of newcomers on a group’s ability to coordinate efficiently. Participants play a coordination game in a four-person group for the first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust among group members and this decrease in trust negatively affects group performance. Knowing the performance history of the arriving newcomers mitigates the negative effect of their arrival, but only when newcomers also know the oldtimers performance history. Surprisingly, in groups that performed poorly prior to the newcomers’ arrival, the distrust generated by newcomers is mainly between oldtimers about each other rather than about the newcomers. |
| Keywords: | coordination, group performance, oldtimers, newcomers, trust, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-02&r=soc |
| By: | Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Jingjing Zhang (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases efficiency from 44% to 68%. |
| Keywords: | three-player trust games, experiments, reciprocity, communication |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-03&r=soc |
| By: | Pier-Andre Bouchard St-Amant (Queen s University) |
| Abstract: | I examine an environment where advertisers can "seed" word-of-mouth advertising by providing initial information about a product to specific users of a social network. Discussion over a social network generates spillover effects for firms when consumers can use the social network to inform each other about products. When a firm can exploit a social network's structure, it can increase its sales. However, when the network formation process is costly, firms free-ride on such costs at the expense of agents on the network. If agents can form coalitions, I show that they can recoup the value of this externality by charging a toll. When users actively modify the information, generating word-of-mouth advertising about a product provides a "social value." This social value stems from the discussions that agents have about the product, without any intervention. Since this process occurs regardless of the firm's actions, the firm cannot capture such valuation. The opinion leaders, or highly regarded agents on the network, play a key role in the formation of this social value. |
| Keywords: | Network, Word of Mouth, Externalities, Social Value |
| JEL: | D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1301&r=soc |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in daily life, when individuals interact for an extended period of time, punishment can be retaliated. We use a design that imposes minimal restrictions on who can punish whom or when, and allows participants to employ a wide range of punishment strategies including retaliation of punishment. Similar to previous research, we find that, when punishment cannot be avenged, peer punishment leads to higher earnings relative to a baseline treatment without any punishment opportunities. However, in the more general setting, we find no evidence of group earnings increasing over time relative to the baseline treatment. Our results raise questions under what conditions peer punishment can be an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation. |
| Keywords: | altruistic punishment , counter-punishment , public good game , feuds |
| JEL: | C92 D70 H41 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:32651&r=soc |
| By: | Isabella Santini; Anna de Pascale (Department of Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome (Italy)) |
| Abstract: | It is widespread opinion that the concept of poverty, as well as measures of the extent of poverty at national or local level, cannot be entirely linked to income and assets but because of its multidimensionality necessarily involves a variety of individual/household characteristics (age, gender, education level, employment status, household size and so on) and several territorial and societal level aspects. Social capital plays a crucial role, here. According to the most widely accepted definition suggested by the World Bank Social Capital Initiative Program research group, social capital INCLUDES THE INSTITUTIONS, The relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people And contribute to economic and social development. This definition encompasses economic, social and political aspects and implies that socio- institutional relationships can foster economic development and improve both the quality of the territorial context where households live and the welfare of the whole population. However, empirical research designed to test the relationships between social capital and household poverty in Europe is almost rare because of reduced data availability. The EU-SILC survey and the Eurostat statistic database certainly offer a new opportunity for research in this specific field. As a matter of fact, they represent an important reference source for comparative studies whose purpose is to assess the determinants of household poverty because they provide comparable and high quality cross-sectional indicators for all the EU countries. Taking these observations into account, this paper aims to assess the potential of EU-SILC survey and Eurostat statistic database in describing the relationships between social capital and household poverty in Europe. In particular, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been performed on two sets of variables: a set of active variables proxy for community and household social capital endowment and a set of supplementary variables describing household economic well-being. Results show that there is a strong association between social capital and household economic wellbeing especially as far as poverty perception is regarded. Implications for public policies are also discussed. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital, Household poverty, European Union, EU-SILC |
| JEL: | I32 D10 I38 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsq:wpaper:14/12&r=soc |