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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Attanasi, Giuseppe; Casoria, Fortuna; Centorrino, Samuele; Urso, Giulia |
| Abstract: | In this paper we show how the investment in cultural events may encourage the building of social capital and foster the development of local communities. We rely on a casestudy that we conducted about the socio-economic impact of the Festival “La Notte della Tarantaâ€, the most important European music festival dedicated to traditional music (about 170.000 participants per year), on the sub-region of southern Italy where it is held. Our evidence is based on a large survey, consisting of nearly 10.000 interviews to Festival participants over a span of five editions (2007-2011). A primary result is that the initial economic investment in the Festival has brought a short-term return in terms of touristic attraction worth more than two times as much. More importantly, our results indicate that a cultural festival, despite being a mass gathering, is able to create strong bonds among its participants and between them and the area where the event takes place. Although these bonds are “instantaneousâ€, i.e. temporally restricted to the duration of the event, they are positively correlated with the economic impact of the event on the territory. |
| Keywords: | Cultural event, economic impact, social capital, greatly motivated tourist |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:25737&r=soc |
| By: | Georgarakos, Dimitris; Haliassos, Michalis; Pasini, Giacomo |
| Abstract: | Debt-induced crises, including the subprime crisis, are usually attributed exclusively to supply-side factors. We examine the role of social influences on debt culture, emanating from perceived average income of peers. Utilizing unique information from a household survey, representative of the Dutch population, that circumvents the issue of defining the social circle, we consider collateralized, consumer, and informal loans. We find robust social effects on borrowing - especially among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers - and on indebtedness, suggesting a link to financial distress. We employ a number of approaches to rule out spurious associations and to handle correlated effects. |
| Keywords: | consumer credit; household debt; Household finance; informal loans; mortgages; social interactions |
| JEL: | E21 G11 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9238&r=soc |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University) |
| Abstract: | A model is set up where migrants must choose a level of social traits and consumption of ethnic goods. As the consumption level of ethnic goods increases, the migrants become ever more different to the local population and are less assimilated. Less assimilation affects the reaction of the local population to the migrants and their willingness to accept the newcomers. This social phenomenon and affects wages and unemployment. We show that the growth in the unemployment and social benefits of legal migrants increases the consumption of ethnic goods, thus creating a trap wherein the willingness of the local population to accept the migrants into the economy decreases. This process also increases the probability of the migrants' dependence on the welfare state. On the other hand, illegal migrants could play an important role in the assimilation of the legal migrants. |
| Keywords: | Welfare state, Social benefits, Ethnic goods, Social trait, Assimilation, Unemployment. |
| JEL: | F22 O15 D6 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2012-12&r=soc |
| By: | Andreas Wagener (School of Economics and Management, University of Hannover) |
| Abstract: | Concert etiquette demands that audiences of classical concerts avoid inept noises such as coughs. Yet, coughing in concerts occurs more frequently than elsewhere, implying a widespread and intentional breach of concert etiquette. Using the toolbox of (behavioral) economics, we study the social costs and benefits of concert etiquette and the motives and implications of individually disobeying such social norms. Both etiquette and its breach arise from the fact that music and its "proper" perception form parts of individual and group identities, convey prestige and status, allow for demarcation and inclusion, produce conformity, and affirm individual and social values. |
| Keywords: | Concert etiquette, social norms, music |
| JEL: | Z11 Z13 D02 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cue:wpaper:awp-05-2012&r=soc |
| By: | Natalia Letki (PGPE Project, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw); Mierina, I. (Inta) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we treat social networks as a resource of individuals, that is used in conjunction with other types of capital, and similarly to other types of capital, its use is context-specific. We propose a conditional mechanism for how context determines networks use: not only does context affect network mobilisation, but that it affects behaviour of different groups differently. We test this proposition on the example of social and economic polarisation influencing probability of turning to networks for help by different income groups. Our findings show that although the poor have the greatest need to turn to networks to compensate for the shortage of other forms of capital, when context becomes adverse, in comparison with other groups they are always disadvantaged in terms of networks mobilisation. |
| Keywords: | social capital, networks, inequality, income, post-communist, Central Eastern Europe |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:45&r=soc |
| By: | Marlis Monsberger |
| Date: | 2012–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwneu:neurusp154&r=soc |
| By: | Gioia de Melo (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence on peer effects in standardized tests by exploiting a unique data set on social networks in Uruguayan primary schools. The identification method enables one to disentangle endogenous from contextual effects via instrumental variables that emerge naturally from the network structure. Correlated effects are controlled for via classroom fixed effects. I find significant endogenous effects in reading and math: a one-standard deviation increase in peers's scores increases own scores by about 40 percent of a standard deviation. Simulation exercises show that, when schools are stratified by socioeconomic status, peer effects may amplify educational inequalities. |
| Keywords: | Peer effects, Education, Networks, Inequality. |
| JEL: | I21 I24 O1 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-15-12&r=soc |
| By: | Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Abstract: | In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly influence the recipient’s behavior in favor of the gift giver, in particular when a third party bears the cost. Subjects are well aware that the gift is given to influence their behavior but reciprocate nevertheless. Withholding the gift triggers a strong negative response. These findings are incon-sistent with the most prominent models of social preferences. We propose an ex-tension of existing theories to capture the observed behavior by endogenizing the “reference group” to whom social preferences are applied. We also show that dis-closure and size limits are not effective in reducing the effect of gifts, consistent with our model. Financial incentives ameliorate the effect of the gift but backfire when available but not provided. |
| Keywords: | corruption; externalities; gift exchange; lobbyism; reciprocity; social preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D62 D73 I11 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9230&r=soc |
| By: | Vincent Boucher; Yann Bramoullé; Guy Lacroix; Bernard Fortin |
| Abstract: | We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model when individuals interact in groups. Assuming sufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control for correlated effects at the group level and to solve the simultaneity (reflection) problem. We clarify the intuition behind identification of peer effects in the model. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in French, Science, Mathematics and History in secondary schools in the Province of Québec (Canada). We estimate the model using conditional maximum likelihood and instrumental variables methods. We find some evidence of peer effects. The endogenous peer effect is large and significant in Math but imprecisely estimated in the other subjects. Some contextual peer effects are also significant. In particular, for most subjects, the average age of peers has a negative effect on own test score. Using calibrated Monte Carlo simulations, we find that high dispersion in group sizes helps with potential issues of weak identification. <P> |
| Keywords: | peer effects, student achievement, reflection problem, |
| Date: | 2012–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2012s-31&r=soc |
| By: | Bigoni, Maria (University of Bologna); Camera, Gabriele (University of Basel); Casari, Marco (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available. |
| Keywords: | non-standard subject pools, prisoner's dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7051&r=soc |
| By: | Gioia de Melo (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Matías Piaggio (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía) |
| Abstract: | We provide a model and experimental evidence on the effects of non-monetary punishment (NMP) by peers among communities of Uruguayan fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We find a) experimental groups composed of fishers from different communities (out-groups) who are sometimes in conflict over fishing territories did not overxploit the resource more than gropus from a single community (in-groups) and, unlike in-groups, out-groups reduced their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment; b) cooperative individuals punished free riders while a substantial amount of punishment was targeted by free riders on cooperators, who [in turns] responded by increasing their exploitation of the resource; and c)wealthier individuals practiced greater overexploitation of the resource. Our results suggest that the relevance of in-group favoritism in promoting cooperation due to social preferences may be overrated, and that the effectiveness of peer punishment is greater when individuals are motivated by social preferencies and also that coordination is required to prevent anti-social targeting and to enhance the social signal conveyed by the punishment. |
| Keywords: | Non-monetary punishment, In-group bias, Frame field experiment, Social preferences, Common pool resource |
| JEL: | D03 O12 C93 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-16-12&r=soc |
| By: | Kris De Jaegher; Britta Hoyer |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a game-theoretic rationale for the beneficial effect of a common enemy on cooperation. In a defence game against a common natural threat, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the sum of the players' defensive efforts. The game therefore takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma, leading to free-riding. When the same defence game is played against a common enemy, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the smallest defensive effort. The game now takes the form of a stag hunt, so that a cooperative equilibrium becomes possible. For this reason, an informed and benevolent government may not want to inform the public that it is facing a common natural threat rather than a common enemy. At the same time, the common enemy has an incentive to mimic nature, and perform only random rather than targeted attacks. |
| Keywords: | Common Enemy Effect; Defence Games; Prisoner's Dilemma; Stag Hunt. |
| JEL: | D74 H41 C72 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1224&r=soc |
| By: | Krautheim, Sebastian; Verdier, Thierry |
| Abstract: | The process of globalization is characterized by an impressive growth in global value chains, as well as the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interacting with production and sourcing decisions of multinational firms. In this paper, we present a simple North-South model of international trade allowing for the joint emergence of firm offshoring to South and NGO activism financed by donations from the civil society. In our model northern consumers care about unobservable “credence” characteristics of goods such as the environmental and social impact of production. The analysis highlights a complementarity between the growth of global value chains and the emergence of NGOs: for a range of trade costs potential NGO emergence allows firms to capture gains from globalization, which would otherwise be unattainable. We show that, somewhat paradoxically, when offshoring triggers NGO emergence, this can be at the expense of the consumers, who for a range of trade costs, would be better-off in a world without NGOs. In an extension we show that NGOs may also crowd out investment in regulatory capacities in low cost countries, as consumers in North have a willingness to fund NGOs providing a substitute for regulation in South. |
| Keywords: | Globalization; Multinationals; NGOs; Regulation |
| JEL: | F23 L31 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9232&r=soc |