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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University and University of Basel); Marco Casari (University of Bologna); Maria Bigoni (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play. |
| Keywords: | coordination, cheap-talk, deception, repeated game, social norms |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-27&r=soc |
| By: | Maria Bigoni (University of Bologna); Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University and University of Basel); Marco Casari (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available. |
| Keywords: | Non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-29&r=soc |
| By: | Anh Duc Dang |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I investigate the origins of social trust within Vietnam. By combining a unique contemporary survey of households with historical data on weather variation, I show that individuals who are heavily threatened by negative weather fluctuation exhibit more trust in neighbours and others within their close group. The evidence indicates that the effects of weather variation on social trust are transmitted through strengthening the cooperation among village peasants as they cope with risk and uncertainty. The results also show that households with higher proportion of agricultural income tend to trust people more. However, the increased strengthening of the village relationships does not erode family ties. |
| JEL: | O13 O53 Z13 Q54 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-596&r=soc |
| By: | Gaetano Lisi |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to provide a thorough theoretical formalisation of the ‘slippery slope’ framework in order to highlight the effects and the macroeconomic implications of the dynamics between power and trust. In particular, the proposed model is able to differentiate between coercive and legitimate power, thus elucidating the dynamics between power and trust and its influence on tax climate and tax compliance. Also, by introducing trust in tax authorities as a determinant of tax compliance, the decision to under-report income is no longer based on expected profits maximisation and thus the tax compliance problem can not be explained by a pure economic approach. The main results of the model are the following: (i) trust-building actions are better than deterring measures for overall tax compliance, since they establish a cooperative tax climate and lead to a legitimate power, while too much power corrodes trust; (ii) in a society where trust is maximised and tax authority benefits from a legitimate power, both employment and economic growth are higher since tax evasion and shadow economy are lower and the level of taxation can be reduced. |
| Keywords: | trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities, tax compliance, tax evasion macroeconomics variables. |
| JEL: | A12 A13 E26 H26 K34 K42 |
| Date: | 2012–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_21&r=soc |
| By: | François-Charles Wolff (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272, INED - Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques Paris - INED) |
| Abstract: | Using French data collected in 2007 from a sample of about 2,000 elderly people living in nursing homes, this paper investigates the role that individual characteristics play in satisfaction with life and depression. Following psychological studies that have highlighted the benefits of social interactions on individual well-being, I focus in particular on the role played by making friends in the nursing home. Results from random effect ordered Probit models show that both satisfaction with living conditions and feeling of depression are much more influenced by making friends in the institution than by visits from family and relatives or other individual background characteristics. These findings may be interpreted as evidence of a relational return to friendship within nursing homes. |
| Keywords: | friends; institutionalized elderly; living conditions; nursing home; relational goods |
| Date: | 2012–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00759187&r=soc |
| By: | Thorat, Amit |
| Abstract: | In the factors that affect income and poverty outcomes, there are some features unique to India. Caste, ethnicity, religion and even regional origins all influence income outcomes. Therefore while examining individual poverty, the influence of social belongings on the level and the nature of access to economic endowments and the individual’s ability to utilise them freely are of considerable significance. This paper examines to what extent some ethnic,religious and caste minorities suffer from chronic impoverishment, especially in rural India. What economic endowments are owned by whom and by how much? What is the level of education and occupational skill across different social groups? The analysis is based on the 61st round (2004-05) of the National Sample Survey Organisation’s Consumption-Expenditure Survey. |
| Keywords: | India; Income; Poverty; caste; ethnicity; religion; minorities; NSSO ; social groups |
| JEL: | D31 I32 |
| Date: | 2010–12–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43030&r=soc |
| By: | d'Agostino, Giorgio; Scarlato, Margherita |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the theoretical and empirical foundations of the links between inclusive institutions, innovation and economic growth. Its first contribution to the literature is to provide a non-scale R&D-based growth model incorporating negative externalities linked to low institutional quality that not only affect the productivity of private and human capital, but also constrain the diffusion of existing technological knowledge. In turn, these negative externalities reduce economic growth. The second contribution of this paper is to run estimates for a sample of European Union countries. Empirical analysis based on pooled long- and short-run estimates confirms the importance of private capital and technology as instruments to increase economic growth in European countries and suggests the existence of a positive relationship between inclusive institutions, innovation and economic growth. The estimates also show that market failures linked to the degree of market competition and to the level of network interaction in the economic system significantly condition the influence of formal institutions on private capital, technology and GDP growth. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; economic growth models; institutions and growth |
| JEL: | O41 O43 O30 C23 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43098&r=soc |
| By: | Anita Kopayni-Peuker (University of Amsterdam); Theo Offerman (University of Amsterdam); Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We consider the possibility that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma is fostered by people's voluntarily enhancement of their own vulnerability. The vulnerability of a player determines the effectiveness of possible punishment by the other. In the "Gradual" mechanism, players may condition their incremental enhancements of their vulnerability on the other's choices. In the "Leap" mechanism, they unconditionally choose their vulnerability. In our experiment, subjects only learn to cooperate when either one of these mechanisms is allowed. In agreement with theory, subjects aiming for cooperation choose higher vulnerability levels in Gradual than in Leap, which maps into higher mutual cooperation levels. |
| Keywords: | D03; D81; D83 |
| Date: | 2012–12–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120132&r=soc |
| By: | Eiji Yamamura |
| Abstract: | The Japanese General Social Survey was used to determine how individual preferences for income redistribution are affected by family structure, such as the number of siblings and birth order where individuals grow up. After controlling for various individual characteristics, the important findings were as follows. (1) The first-born child was less likely to prefer income redistribution when the child was male. However, such a tendency was not observed when the child was female. (2) The larger the number of elder brothers, the more likely an individual preferred income redistribution. However, the number of elder sisters did not affect the preference. (3) The number of younger siblings did not affect the preference for redistribution regardless of the sibling’s sex. These findings regarding the effect of birth order are not consistent with evidence provided by another study conducted in a European country. |
| Keywords: | Inequality aversion; Redistribution; Family structure; Birth order; Siblings. |
| JEL: | D19 D30 D63 J13 |
| Date: | 2012–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_23&r=soc |
| By: | Dawes, Christopher T. (Department of Politics); Johannesson, Magnus (Stockholm School of Economics); Lindqvist, Erik (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Loewen, Peter (Department of Political Science); Östling, Robert (Institute for International Economic Studies); Bonde, Marianne; Priks, Frida |
| Abstract: | We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education. |
| Keywords: | Generosity; Altruism; Political Preferences; Size of Government; Public Goods; Dictator Game; Ingroup Effect; Political Partisanship |
| JEL: | H11 H40 |
| Date: | 2012–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0941&r=soc |