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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Jan Fidrmuc |
| Abstract: | Formal and informal institutions are often thought of as being highly persistent, with historical events such as conflicts, authoritarian regimes or colonization having a long-lasting effect on their quality. To analyze the persistence of social capital, I look at regions which have experienced large-scale population displacements some 50-60 years ago. As social capital is embedded in relationships, regions that were repopulated by migrants are likely to start off with little inherited social capital. My analysis suggests that, with a lag of approximately two generations, the inhabitants of these regions display similar stocks of social capital as their counterparts in regions unaffected by population transfers. Hence, contrary to the Putnamesque view, much of the present-day social capital appears to have been formed in recent past rather than attributable to long-term historical legacies. |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edb:cedidp:12-04&r=soc |
| By: | Paolo Buonanno; Ruben Durante; Giovanni Prarolo; Paolo Vanin |
| Abstract: | This study explains the emergence of the Sicilian mafia in the XIX century as the product of the interaction between natural resource abundance and weak institutions. We advance the hypothesis that the mafia emerged after the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom in a context characterized by a severe lack of state property-right enforcement in response to the rising demand for the protection of sulfur - Sicily's most valuable export commodity - whose demand in the international markets was soaring at the time. We test this hypothesis combining data on the early presence of the mafia and on the distribution of sulfur reserves across Sicilian municipalities and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of sulphur availability on mafia's diffusion. These results remain unchanged when including department fixed-effects and various geographical and historical controls, when controlling for spatial correlation, and when comparing pairs of neighboring municipalities with and without sulfur. |
| Keywords: | Natural Resource Curse, Weak Institutions, Mafia-type Organizations |
| JEL: | K42 N33 N54 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:261&r=soc |
| By: | Eric Schniter (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Daniel Sznycer (Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara) |
| Abstract: | Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. In the first game 16.6% of trustees were distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game used long messages and promises closer to equal splits to encourage trust in the second game. To restore damaged trust, promise-breakers used apologies and upgraded promises. On average, investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that effective use of cheap signals fosters profitable trust-based exchange in these economies. |
| Keywords: | promise, atonement, apology, cheap talk, cheap signals, trust game, trust building, remedial strategies, reciprocity, experiments |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-19&r=soc |
| By: | Dimitrios Christelis (CSEF and CFS); Loreti I. Dobrescu (University of New South Wales) |
| Abstract: | Using micro data from eleven European countries, we investigate the impact of being socially active on cognition in older age. Cognitive abilities are measured through scores on numeracy, fluency and recall tests. We address the endogeneity of social activities through panel data and instrumental variable methods. We find that social activities have an important positive effect on cognition, with the results varying by gender. Fluency is positively affected only in females, while numeracy only in males. Finally, recall is affected in both sexes. We also show that social activities, through their effect on cognition, influence positively households’ economic welfare. |
| Keywords: | Social Activities, Ageing, SHARE, Panel Data |
| JEL: | I10 J14 C23 |
| Date: | 2012–09–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:320&r=soc |
| By: | Quang Nguyen (Division of Economics - Nanyang Technological University); Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon); Hui Xu (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We study the influence of risk and time preferences on trust and trustworthiness by conducting a field experiment in Vietnamese villages and by estimating the parameters of the Cumulative Prospect Theory and of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences. We find that while probability sensitivity or risk aversion do not affect trust, loss aversion influences trust indirectly by lowering the expectations of return. Also, more risk averse and less present biased participants are found to be trustworthier. The experience of receiving remittances influences behavior and a longer exposure to a collectivist economy tend to reduce trust and trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | Trust, trustworthiness ; risk preferences ; time preferences ; Cumulative Prospect Theory ; Vietnam ; field experiment |
| Date: | 2012–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00730609&r=soc |
| By: | Mareike Wagner |
| Abstract: | Given shortages in public child care in Germany, this paper asks whether social support with child care and domestic work by spouses, kin and friends can facilitate mothers’ return to full-time or part-time positions within the first six years after birth. Using SOEP data from 1993-2009 and event history analyses for competing risks, the author compares the employment transitions of West German, East German and migrant mothers of pre-school children. The results indicate that West German and migrant mothers return to work sooner if they have access to kin, and that kinship support is particularly important when public child care is unavailable. Furthermore, West German and migrant mothers are more likely to work full-time if their spouses partipate in domestic work. In contrast, social support does not affect employment transitions in East Germany where public child care is more easily accessible and continuous female employment is a prevalent social norm. |
| Keywords: | Maternal employment, child care, social support |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp483&r=soc |
| By: | Natalia Montinari (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Antonio Nicolò (University of Padua, Italy); Regine Oexl (University of Innsbruck, Austria) |
| Abstract: | We report evidence from an experiment where a principal chooses an agent out of two to perform a task for a fixed compensation. The principal's payoff depends on the agent's ex-ante ability and on a non-contractible effort that the agent has to exert once employed. We find that a significant share of principals select the mediocre agent (i.e. the one with the lower ex-ante ability). When the principal is allowed to send a message, mediocre agents exert more effort than agents with the higher ability, and principals who chooses mediocre agents on average have a larger payoff than principals who select agents with higher ability. This difference in effort overcompensates the difference in ability. Mediocre agents reciprocate more than agents who have ex-ante higher ability when the principals are able to make them feeling indebted. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, communication, incentives, mediocrity |
| JEL: | C9 |
| Date: | 2012–09–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-053&r=soc |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Alexander Wolitzky |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000502&r=soc |
| By: | Jackson, Matthew O.; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We provide an overview and synthesis of the literatures analyzing games where players are connected via a network structure. We study, in particular, the impact of the structure of the network on individuals’ behaviors. We focus on the game theoretic modeling, but also include some discussion of analyses of peer effects, as well as applications to diffusion, employment, crime, industrial organization, and education. |
| Keywords: | games on networks; games with incomplete information; graphical games; network games; peer effects.; social networks |
| JEL: | A14 C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9127&r=soc |
| By: | Ana Sílvia de Matos Vaz |
| Abstract: | Voter education is crucial to promote voters’ participation. The question that remains is how voter education campaigns can reach a significant part of the population. During the 2009 Mozambican elections, a field experiment implemented three voter education interventions: the distribution of a free newspaper, the creation of a SMS hotline to report electoral problems, and a civic education campaign. Based on a sample of untreated individuals living with experimental subjects, this paper examines the diffusion of the interventions’ effects within the household. I find different spillover effects associated with different interventions and interpret that as evidence that different interventions trigger influence at different levels. I find that the delivery of the newspaper has almost no effect on the other people in the household. The hotline intervention affects the preferences and behavior of the other individuals, but not their information. Finally, the civic education campaign only affects the behavior of other people in the household. This paper shows that the transmission of voter education campaigns’ effects does not occur through information sharing, but through sharing of opinions and pressure. Furthermore, this study provides statistical evidence that social control increases voter turnout. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2012-14&r=soc |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University, IZA and CReAM) |
| Abstract: | A model is set up where migrants must choose a level of social traits and consumption of ethnic goods. As the consumption level of ethnic goods increases, the migrants become ever more different to the local population and are less assimilated. Less assimilation affects the reaction of the local population to the migrants and their willingness to accept the newcomers. This social phenomenon and affects wages and unemployment. We show that the growth in the unemployment and social benefits of legal migrants increases the consumption of ethnic goods, thus creating a trap wherein the willingness of the local population to accept the migrants into the economy decreases. This process also increases the probability of the migrants' dependence on the welfare state. On the other hand, illegal migrants could play an important role in the assimilation of the legal migrants. |
| Keywords: | Welfare state, Social benefits, Ethnic goods, Social trait, Assimilation, Unemployment. |
| JEL: | F22 O15 D6 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1225&r=soc |
| By: | Mwangi wa Githinji (University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | A large literature on African economies argues that ethnicity plays a role in the politics and economics of African countries. Unfortunately, much of this literature is speculative or anecdotal because of the lack of data, with the exception of a few papers that examine ethnic networking as a business or employment strategy. In many ways Africa’s failure to develop is a failure of nationhood. Creating nation is handicapped by the use of ethnicity. In this paper, I empirically examine the relationship between employment, wages and ethnicity in Africa via a case study of Kenya. I challenge the pervasive view that ethnicity in Africa is related to a primordial instinct and attempt to show empirically that ethnicity is used by politicians as a political strategy to maintain power. In the process of using ethnicity, class solidarity is explicitly down played by politicians as ethnicity is reified. In this paper I specifically examine whether jobs are being used by politicians as both reward and carrot to ensure ethnic allegiances. This is done by testing whether being a member of a dominant group (in terms of population and also politically) has an impact on the possibility of employment and the level of wages. I do this using data from the 1986 Labour Force Survey which due to timing, uniquely allows me to connect ethnicity and income. I group the observation into 5 groups that are ranked based on kind of employment and wage. Of the five sectors the two desirable sectors are Self-employed above median income and Full time employment above median income. I test whether ethnicity has an impact of one being employed in these sectors. By inter-acting the dummy variable for dominant group in population and the ethnic dummy, I am able to separate out what may be returns just due to ethnic networking that comes from common culture, language etc and returns which are due in some sense to being from a politically dominant ethnicity. I am also able to test for the impact in a change in the ethnicity of the president (a further test of ethnic dominance) by using a difference in difference approach. I find that being in a politically dominant group improves one’s chances of obtaining a full time above median wage job. In fact this improvement in chances was highly correlated with political power and a change of ethnicity of the president resulted in a decrease in the probabilities of the past presidents “kinsfolk” being in desired sectors. Being a member of a locally dominant group in terms of population as compared to a politically dominant national group has no effect on likelihood of employment in one of the premium categories. My findings support the view that in a highly centralized state ethnicity can be reproduced via preferential employment to members of an in-group thus diminishing class solidarity that one may expect to occur between workmates. JEL Categories: Z13 N37, O15, P16. |
| Keywords: | Social Stratification, Discrimination, ethnicity, Kenya, inequality, class, employment. |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2012-08&r=soc |