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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Sabatini, Fabio; Modena, Francesca; Tortia, Ermanno |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first empirical investigation into the role of different types of enterprises in the creation of social trust. Drawing on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a representative sample of the population of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011, we find that cooperatives are the only type of enterprise where the work environment fosters the social trust of workers. |
| Keywords: | cooperative enterprises; nonprofit organizations; trust; social capital; intrinsic motivations; inclusive governance; work organization |
| JEL: | P13 Z1 Z13 L31 L33 |
| Date: | 2012–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39814&r=soc |
| By: | Yamamura, Eiji |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how a trust in government shared by neighbors is associated with individual preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions regarding income tax burden. Three measures for trust in government are used: “trust in ministries and government agencies”, “trust in diet members”, and “trust in members of municipal councils”. After controlling for individual characteristics, the key findings are: (1) people are more likely to express preferences for income redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high; (2) people are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low when trust in government in their residential area is high; and (3) when the sample is divided into high- and low-income earners, these results are only clearly observed for high-income earners and not low-income earners. |
| Keywords: | Trust in government; Redistribution; Perception of tax; Inequality |
| JEL: | D63 H20 D30 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39833&r=soc |
| By: | Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB), University of Erfurt, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a real-effort task experiment where subjects' performance translates into a donation to a charity. In a within-subjects design we vary the visibility of the donation (no/private/public feedback). Confirming previous studies, we find that subjects' performance increases, that is, they donate more to charity, when their relative performance is made public. In line with the competitive altruism hypothesis, a biology-based explanation for status-seeking behavior, especially male subjects increase performance in the public setting. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, other-regarding behavior, charitable giving, social-image concerns, competitive altruism, experiments, social status |
| JEL: | C91 D03 J16 |
| Date: | 2012–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-038&r=soc |
| By: | Lambarraa, Fatima; Riener, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | Charitable giving is one of the major obligations Islam and a strong Muslim norm endorses giving to the needy, but discourages public displays of giving. This norm is puzzling in light of previous evidence, suggesting that making donations public often increases giving. We report the results two field experiments with 534 and 186 participants at Moroccan educational institutions (among them two religious schools) to assess the effects this moral prescription on actual giving levels in anonymous and public settings. Subjects who participated in a paid study were given the option to donate from their payment to a local orphanage, under treatments that varied the publicity of the donation and the salience of Islamic values. In the salient Islamic treatment, anonymity of donations significantly increased donation incidence from 59% to 77% percent as well as average donations for religious subjects from 8.90 to 13.00 Dh. This findings stand in stark contrast to most previous findings in the charitable giving literature and suggest to rethink fundraising strategies in Muslim populations. -- |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,Islam,Social pressure,Priming,Religion,Norms,Field experiment |
| JEL: | H40 C93 D01 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:59&r=soc |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Stefano Castriota (University of Perugia); Pierluigi Conzo (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | Natural disasters have been shown to produce effects on social capital, risk and time preferences of victims. We run experiments on altruistic, time and risk preferences on a sample of Sri Lankan microfinance borrowers affected/unaffected by the tsunami shock in 2004 at a 7-year distance from the event (a distance longer than in most empirical studies). We find that people who suffered at least a damage from the event behave in dictator games less altruistically as senders (and expect less as receivers) than those who do not report any damage. Interestingly, among damaged, those who suffered also house damages or injuries send (expect) more than those reporting only losses to the economic activity. Since the former are shown to receive significantly more help than the latter we interpret this last finding as a form of indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | tsunami, disaster recovery, social preferences, altruism, development aid |
| JEL: | C90 D03 O12 |
| Date: | 2012–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:239&r=soc |
| By: | Berggren, Niclas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof (HUI Research AB); Hellström, Jörgen (Umeå School of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Central banks have been made more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical findings, based on data from 149 countries, confirm that there is such a link, in the form of a u-shaped relationship. We suggest that two factors help explain this finding: the need for this kind of reform and the ability with which it can be implemented. At low trust levels, the need for central-bank independence is strong enough to dominate the low ability; at high trust levels the ability for reform is high and dominates the low need; at intermediate trust levels there is neither need nor ability strong enough to generate very independent central banks. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Credibility; Reforms; Monetary Policy; Inflation; Central Bank; Time Inconsistency |
| JEL: | E52 E58 P48 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–05–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0920&r=soc |
| By: | Anastasia Litina (University of Luxembourg CREA) |
| Abstract: | This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic develop- ment can be traced to the effect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse effect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the beneficial effects of cooperation on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries lagged behind during the agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent effect on social capital, have become increasingly important in the process of industrialization, the transition from agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited, permitting those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across countries the research further explores the testable predictions of the theory. It establishes that: (i) reversal of fortunes in the process of development can be traced to variation in natural land productivity across countries. Economies characterized by favorable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage of development but were overtaken in the process of industrialization; (ii) lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital; (iii) cooperation, as reflected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive and collective action could have diminished the adverse effects of the environment and enhance agricultural output. |
| Keywords: | Land productivity, Cooperation, Social Capital, Economic development, Agriculture, Industrialization |
| JEL: | O11 O13 O14 O31 O33 O41 O50 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:12-07&r=soc |
| By: | Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck (Department of Business and Economics); Bentzen, Jeanet (Department of Economics); Dalgaard, Carl-Johan (Department of Economics); Sharp, Paul (Department of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | We hypothesize that cultural appreciation of hard work and thrift, the "Protestant ethic" according to Max Weber, had a pre-Reformation origin. The proximate source of these values was, according to the proposed theory, the Catholic Order of Cistercians. In support, we document that the Cistercians influenced comparative regional development across English counties, even after the monasteries were dissolved in the 1530s. Moreover, we find that the values emphasized by Weber are comparatively more pervasive in regions where Cistercian monasteries were found historically. Pre-industrial development in England may thus have been propelled by a process of growth through cultural change. |
| Keywords: | Cultural values; protestant ethic; economic development |
| JEL: | N13 O11 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_012&r=soc |
| By: | Luisa Corrado (Department of Economics; Faculty of Economics, University of Rome; University of Cambridge); Roberta Distante (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the importance of social ties for eating behavior of US youth. We propose a novel approach that addresses identification of social endogenous effects. We overcome the problem of measuring the separate impact of endogenous and contextual effects on individual Body Mass Index (BMI) in a dynamic linear-in-means model, where individual- and group-specifi?c unobservable effects are controlled for. We show that the main drivers of eating behavior are habituation and imitation effects. Imitation effects explain most of the variation in BMI of individuals who were normal-weight and overweight during adolescence. Obese adolescents, instead, become future obese adults through wrong habits enforced by imitative behavior. |
| Keywords: | Overweight, Obesity, Peer Effects, Social Networks, Personal History, Dynamic Linear-in-means Mode |
| JEL: | D10 D71 I19 J11 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–06–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1203&r=soc |
| By: | Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We provide an overview on networks in economics. We first look at the theoretical aspects of network economics using a game-theoretical approach. We derive some results on games on networks and network formation. We also study what happens when agents choose both links and actions. We then examine how these models can be used to address some applied and empirical-relevant questions by mainly focusing on labor-market networks and crime networks. We provide some empirical evidence on these two types of networks and address some policy implications of the models. |
| Keywords: | criminal networks; games on networks; labor networks; network formation; Social networks |
| JEL: | A14 C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9021&r=soc |
| By: | Dahl, Gordon B. (University of California, San Diego); Loken, Katrine V. (University of Bergen); Mogstad, Magne (University College London) |
| Abstract: | The influence of peers could play an important role in the take up of social programs. However, estimating peer effects has proven challenging given the problems of reflection, correlated unobservables, and endogenous group membership. We overcome these identification issues in the context of paid paternity leave in Norway using a regression discontinuity design. Our approach differs from existing literature which attempts to measure peer effects by exploiting random assignment to peer groups; in contrast, we study peer effects in naturally occurring peer groups, but exploit random variation in the "price" of a social program for a subset of individuals. Fathers of children born after April 1, 1993 in Norway were eligible for one month of governmental paid paternity leave, while fathers of children born before this cutoff were not. There is a sharp increase in fathers taking paternity leave immediately after the reform, with take up rising from 3% to 35%. While this quasi-random variation changed the cost of paternity leave for some fathers and not others, it did not directly affect the cost for the father's coworkers or brothers. Therefore, any effect on the brother or the coworker can be attributed to the influence of the peer father in their network. Our key findings on peer effects are four-fold. First, we find strong evidence for substantial peer effects of program participation in both workplace and family networks. Coworkers and brothers are 11 and 15 percentage points, respectively, more likely to take paternity leave if their peer father was induced to take up leave by the reform. Second, the most likely mechanism is information transmission about costs and benefits, including increased knowledge of how an employer will react. Third, there is essential heterogeneity in the size of the peer effect depending on the strength of ties between peers, highlighting the importance of duration, intensity, and frequency of social interactions. Fourth, the estimated peer effect gets amplified over time, with each subsequent birth exhibiting a snowball effect as the original peer father's influence cascades through a firm. Our findings demonstrate that peer effects can lead to long-run equilibrium participation rates which are substantially higher than would otherwise be expected. |
| Keywords: | social interactions, peer effects, program participation |
| JEL: | D62 J13 I38 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6681&r=soc |
| By: | Omar Sene (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | The ability to produce local public goods and services such as sharing savings, risk, insurance, sanitation and educational services, is a key fator for development. This ability, however, varies greatly across communities (Ostrom 1990 ; Khwaja 2009). Considering that this ability depends critically on members' willingness to act collectively, this paper investigate whether the level of trust among people measured in different ways can predict the amount of public good produced. I find that (i) trust, as measured by survey questions, has poor predictive power, while (ii) the results from our version of Trust Game are much better predictors of local public-good production. |
| Keywords: | Trust, collective action, provision of local public goods, trust game. |
| JEL: | C93 H41 D71 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12041&r=soc |
| By: | Kerri Brick; Martine Visser |
| Abstract: | The lack of cooperation and prevalence of free riding in efforts to reduce emissions reflects the public good dilemma synonymous with climate change: whereby individual incentives lead to sub-optimal outcomes. This study examines how cooperative norms can be fostered through democratic processes. Specifically, we assess whether a given policy affects cooperation more significantly when it is democratically chosen by heterogeneous subjects as opposed to exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Subjects with differing marginal costs of abatement must democratically select an institution to reduce a national greenhouse gas inventory. By majority vote, subjects can choose between communication and two carbon tax variants. The experimental literature from studies with homogenous subjects suggests that cooperation improves when policy is endogenously selected as opposed to exogenously enforced. Overall we find that endogenous choice does not improve cooperation when subjects are heterogeneous. Furthermore, we find that, in the absence of a binding commitment, cooperation declines with endogenous choice as the prevalence of free-riding increases. |
| Keywords: | heterogeneity; voting; communication; public good |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:298&r=soc |