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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Alexia Gaudeul (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Caterina Giannetti (bRoyal Holloway, University of London) |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with the role of reciprocation in the formation of individuals' social networks. We follow the activity of a panel of bloggers over more than a year and investigate the extent to which initiating a relation brings about its reciprocation. We adapt a standard capital investment model to study how reciprocation affects the build-up of the individual social capital of bloggers, as measured by their links and interactions with others. This allows us to measure the role of content production and relationship building in the dynamics of online social networks and to distinguish between the social networking and media aspects of blogging. |
| Keywords: | Blogs, Friendship, LiveJournal, Reciprocation, Social Capital, Social Networks |
| JEL: | C33 D85 L82 |
| Date: | 2012–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-031&r=soc |
| By: | Karlsson, Charlie (Jönköping International Business School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we discuss three factors of critical importance for regional economic develop-ment, namely entrepreneurship, social capital and governance. We conclude firstly that the relationships between regional entrepreneurship, regional social capital, regional governance and regional economic development are complex and interdependent. Secondly, to influence these factors and the relationship between them policy-makers must have a long-term per-spective and be both patient and persistent in their efforts. It is our hope that this paper pro-vides both a somewhat better understanding of the relationships between regional entrepre-neurship, regional social capital, regional governance and regional economic development and some help to national and regional policy-makers in formulating and implementing the proper long-term regional policies needed. |
| Keywords: | Regional economic development; entrepreneurship; social capital; governance |
| JEL: | D70 G38 L26 R58 |
| Date: | 2012–06–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0278&r=soc |
| By: | Mitesh Kataria (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates experimentally whether people in retrospective are self-aware that they engage in status-seeking behavior. Subjects participated in a real-effort task where effort translated into a donation to a charity. Within-subjects we varied the visibility of their performance (private/public feedback). On average subjects exerted more effort in the public treatment. After the real effort task subjects were asked to state their retrospective beliefs about their performance in public given feedback about their performance in private, and about the performance of other subjects in public given the average performance in private. Between-subjects we varied the compensation (low/high) for accurate estimates. Our results show a lack of self-awareness about status-seeking behavior that is robust to increased belief compensation. We also found that subjects expected others to be as status-seeking as they are themselves or even less. |
| Keywords: | Social status, self-image, self-awareness, self-deception, experiment, beliefs |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D84 |
| Date: | 2012–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-032&r=soc |
| By: | Â Leif Brandes (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Â Marc Brechot (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Â Egon Franck (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We introduce agency concerns to social capital theory and predict that managers can use individual social capital to reduce personal effort costs, which is not in the best interest of the firm. To test this prediction, we collect data on all 8,019 hiring decisions from general managers in the National Basketball Association between 1981 and 2011. We find that managers have a clear preference for hiring players through social ties. The probability that a manager hires players from an NBA franchise to which he is socially tied is 27.6% higher than for an untied franchise. To isolate the motivation for this behavior, we complement our data with information on the sporting performance of teams. In line with agency theory, we find that the hiring of players through social ties reduces team performance. The effect is large: on average, each social-tie player reduces team winning percentage by 5.4%. Overall, this paper documents first empirical evidence that decision makers’ use of individual social capital can lead to reduced firm-level performance.  |
| Keywords: | Social Networks, Social Capital, Principal-Agent-Relationship, Worker Allocation, Basketball |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:wpaper:0159&r=soc |
| By: | Gordon B. Dahl; Katrine V. Løken; Magne Mogstad |
| Abstract: | The influence of peers could play an important role in the take up of social programs. However, estimating peer effects has proven challenging given the problems of reflection, correlated unobservables, and endogenous group membership. We overcome these identification issues in the context of paid paternity leave in Norway using a regression discontinuity design. Our approach differs from existing literature which attempts to measure peer effects by exploiting random assignment to peer groups; in contrast, we study peer effects in naturally occurring peer groups, but exploit random variation in the “price” of a social program for a subset of individuals. Fathers of children born after April 1, 1993 in Norway were eligible for one month of governmental paid paternity leave, while fathers of children born before this cutoff were not. There is a sharp increase in fathers taking paternity leave immediately after the reform, with take up rising from 3% to 35%. While this quasi-random variation changed the cost of paternity leave for some fathers and not others, it did not directly affect the cost for the father’s coworkers or brothers. Therefore, any effect on the brother or the coworker can be attributed to the influence of the peer father in their network. Our key findings on peer effects are four-fold. First, we find strong evidence for substantial peer effects of program participation in both workplace and family networks. Coworkers and brothers are 11 and 15 percentage points, respectively, more likely to take paternity leave if their peer father was induced to take up leave by the reform. Second, the most likely mechanism is information transmission about costs and benefits, including increased knowledge of how an employer will react. Third, there is essential heterogeneity in the size of the peer effect depending on the strength of ties between peers, highlighting the importance of duration, intensity, and frequency of social interactions. Fourth, the estimated peer effect gets amplified over time, with each subsequent birth exhibiting a snowball effect as the original peer father's influence cascades through a firm. Our findings demonstrate that peer effects can lead to long-run equilibrium participation rates which are substantially higher than would otherwise be expected. |
| JEL: | D62 H23 I38 J13 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18198&r=soc |
| By: | Irenaeus Wolff (Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Models of evolutionary game theory have shown that punishment may be an adaptive behaviour in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but questions the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. This study provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of retaliating behaviour in the context of repeated social dilemmas and analyses the role punishment can play in the evolution of cooperation under these conditions. We show a punishing strategy can pave the way for a partially-cooperative equilibrium of conditional cooperators and defecting types and, under positive mutation rates, foster the cooperation level in this equilibrium by prompting reluctant cooperators to cooperate. However, when rare mutations occur, it cannot sustain cooperation by itself as punishment costs favour the spread of non-punishing cooperators |
| Keywords: | Public goods, Prisoner's Dilemma, Strong reciprocity, Counterpunishment |
| JEL: | C73 C72 H41 |
| Date: | 2012–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1213&r=soc |