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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Giacomo Degli Antoni (Department of Law, Universitˆ of Parma); Gianluca Grimalda (University Jaume I of Castell—n - Economics Department) |
| Abstract: | Many scholars have stressed the importance of membership in associations as one of the main determinants of inter-personal trust (e.g. Zucker, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Lahno, 1995). In particular, Olson (1982) and Putnam et al. (1993) provided two different accounts of the role of private voluntary associations in affecting propensity to trust. Olson emphasized the tendency of some groups to pursue private interests and lobby for preferential policies. From this point of view, associations do not contribute to create a social fabric of trust, but instead increase divisions. By contrast, Putnam et al. (1993: 88) stated that voluntary associations Òinstill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritednessÓ. We carried out an experimental analysis aimed at investigating the propensity to cooperate of voluntary members of different kinds of associations compared with propensity to cooperate of people who have never been voluntary members. Association members came from typically ÒOlsonianÓ association Ð i.e. trade unions Ð and typically ÒPutnamianÓ associations Ð i.e. cultural and social welfare or health associations. Our experimental design is based on a standard Investment Game (Berg et al. 1995). It comprises an in-group treatment, where members interact with other members of their own association, and an out-group treatment, in which members are paired with people from the general population. All interactions are anonymous. To the best of our knowledge, the present study represents the first attempt to investigate the relationship between voluntary participation in different kinds of associations and propensity to cooperate by involving people of different age, education and socio-economic status (previous contributions focused on samples of college students: Glaeser et al. 2000, Anderson et al. 2004). Our preliminary evidence shows that: ¥ Voluntary members of associations contribute significantly more (around 50%) than non- members, both in the in-group and in the out-group treatment; this is a much higher proportion than what found by Ruffle and Sosis (2006) and Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2009), who on the contrary found no significant difference; ¥ The type of associations of which people are members affects the patterns of cooperation. We find in-group favoritism for members of Olson-type associations, i.e. they cooperate significantly more with their fellow members than with people from the general public. No in-group favoritism is found for Putnam-type associations members. Moreover, Putnam- type associates cooperate significantly more than non-members with people from the general public, while members of Olson-type associations contribute as non-members when paired with people from the general public. These results seem to confirm the original intuition of the two authors. |
| Keywords: | Propensity to trust; Voluntary membership; Olson-type and Putnam-type associations; In-group favoritism; Out-group hostility; Natural groups; Field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 L31 A13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp37&r=soc |
| By: | Donja Darai; Silvia Grätz |
| Abstract: | Physical attractiveness is associated with goodness in the literature. In particular, people think of attractive ones as being more socially skillful, trustworthy, or likeable. This "beauty-is-good" stereotype can induce a beauty premium in various economic interactions. Cooperative behavior might be one more such attribute that is elicited by physical attractiveness. In this paper we analyze this potential relationship. We combine data from 211 episodes of a television game show, in which contestants play a face-to-face prisoner's dilemma game, with data from independent facial appearance ratings of these contestants. The main finding is that attractiveness is an important factor for cooperative behavior even in an environment of very high stakes, communication, and past behavior. Although there is no difference between facially attractive and unattractive contestants regarding the decision to cooperate, facing a facially attractive opponent increases cooperation significantly. Especially, in mixed-gender interactions males and females are more likely to cooperate with a facially attractive counterpart. The marginal beauty premium for a one standard deviation increase in facial attractiveness amounts to an increase of a contestant's expected earnings of £2 153. Moreover, the probability to obtain positive earnings increases by 5.9 percentage points for facially attractive contestants. |
| Keywords: | Beauty premium, stereotypes, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma |
| JEL: | C71 D83 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:082&r=soc |
| By: | Giorgio Fazio; Luciano Lavecchia |
| Abstract: | An extensive economics and regional science literature has discussed the importance of social capital for economic growth and development. Yet, what social capital is and how it is formed are elusive issues, which require further investigation. Here, we refer to social capital in terms of “civic capital” and “good culture” as rephrased by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) and Tabellini (2010). The accumulation of this kind of capital allows the emerging of regional informal institutions, which may help explaining differences in regional development. In this paper, we take a regional perspective and use exploratory space and space-time methods to assess whether geography, via proximity, contributes to the formation of social capital across European regions. In particular, we ask whether generalized trust, a fundamental constituent of social capital and an ingredient of economic development, tends to be clustered across space and over time. From the policy standpoint, the spatial “hysteresis” of regional trust may contribute to the formation of “spatial traps” of social capital and act as a further barrier to regional economic development and convergence. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital; Generalized Trust; European Social Survey; Spatial Dynamics; ESTDA |
| JEL: | R1 Z13 C31 F02 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2012_07&r=soc |
| By: | Javier G. Polavieja (IMDEA Social Sciences Institute) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of economic vulnerability and economic recession on political trust, satisfaction with democracy and attitudes towards welfare-state redistribution across different EU countries. I argue that these set of attitudes are crucial in defining public support for the European model of social capitalism, historically characterized by the combination of national democratic institutions and extensive welfare provision. I further content that the impact of recession on citizens’ support for national political institutions could have been particularly severe in Euro-zone countries since national governments inside the European Monetary Union lack standard policy instruments to combat recession. Following the economic voting literature, I distinguish between recession effects that are triggered by the individual experience of economic hardship (egocentric effects) and those triggered by citizens’ dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country as a whole (sociotropic effects). Applying two-step regression techniques to a pool of the 2004 and the 2010 rounds of the European Social Survey, I investigate individual-level egocentric and sociotropic effects on political trust, democratic satisfaction and attitudes to redistribution, as well as direct macro-level recession effects on the typical citizen for both countries inside and outside the Euro zone. I find significant recession effects for political trust and satisfaction with democracy in Euro-zone countries. The erosion of political trust and satisfaction with democracy is sizeable in Ireland, Slovenia and Spain and reaches truly alarming proportions in the case of Greece. The evidence on recession effects on attitudes to redistribution is, however, inconclusive. Implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | economic recession, political trust, satisfaction with democracy, attitudes towards redistribution; europe; welfare states; monetary union; legitimacy; european social survey |
| Date: | 2012–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2012-08&r=soc |
| By: | Baylis, Katherine R.; Chhatre, Ashwini; Prasanna, Satya; Songsermsawas, Tisom |
| Keywords: | Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, |
| Date: | 2012–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:124889&r=soc |
| By: | Yamamura, Eiji |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how a perceived tax burden is influenced by the degree that neighbors prefer income redistribution. Further, this paper investigates how the influence of neighbors is affected by the degree of interaction between neighbors. For these purposes, individual-level data and place of residence data were combined. After controlling for individual characteristics, I obtained the following key findings: people are more likely to perceive the amount of tax as low when neighbors are more likely to support redistribution policies. Further, this neighbor effect increases when community participation rates are high. This tendency is clearly observed in high-income groups but not in low-income groups. This implies that the norm for redistribution leads rich people to consider the tax burden as low. Further, the effect of the norm increases when there is a greater accumulation of social capital within a residential area. That is, one’s perceived tax burden is influenced by psychological externalities. |
| Keywords: | Perceived tax; Norm; Redistribution; Social capital; Externality |
| JEL: | D63 D30 H29 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39434&r=soc |
| By: | Zaki Wahhaj |
| Abstract: | The use of social sanctions against behaviour which contradicts a set of informal rules is often an important element in the functioning of informal institutions in traditional societies. In the social sciences, sanctioning behaviour has often been explained in terms of the internalisation of norms that prescribe the sanctions (e.g. Parsons 1951) or the threat of new sanctions against those who do not follow sanctioning behaviour (e.g. Akerlof 1976). We propose an alternative mechanism for maintaining a credible threat of social sanctions, showing that even in a population where individuals have not internalised a set of social norms, do not believe that others have internalised them, do not believe that others believe that others have internalised these norms, etc., up to a finite nth order, collective participation in social sanctions against behaviour which contradict the norms is an equilibrium if such beliefs exist at higher orders. The equilibrium can persist even if beliefs change over time, as long as the norms are believed to have been internalised at some finite nth order. The framework shows how precisely beliefs must change for the equilibrium to unravel and social norms to evolve. |
| Keywords: | social norms; higher-order belief; social sanctions; community enforcement; dynamics of norms; institutional change |
| JEL: | D01 D02 D83 Z10 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1210&r=soc |
| By: | Vani K. Borooah (University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK); Catherine Bros (University of Paris-Est Marne La Vallée – ERUDITE, CSH Delhi) |
| Abstract: | Most studies of distribution in developing countries are concerned with the distribution of material resources, most usually income or consumption and, sometimes, wealth. On the other hand, most studies of social capital are grounded in countries of the developed world. In this paper we depart from both traditions by analysing the distribution of social capital in a developing country (India). In so doing, we establish a link with the subject matter of political economy by examining the relationship between the distribution of social capital, the distribution of confidence in public bodies, and electoral participation. |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-05-ccr&r=soc |
| By: | Deller, Steven C.; Halstead, John M.; Jarema, Patricia M.; Keene, Ashleigh Arledge |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:125095&r=soc |
| By: | Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; Spagnolo, Giancarlo |
| Abstract: | This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears then mainly driven by 'distrust', the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter the most, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust; Betrayal; Cartels; Collusion; Distrust; Fines; Leniency; Whistleblowers |
| JEL: | C92 D03 K21 K42 L41 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9002&r=soc |
| By: | Loukas Balafoutas; Nikos Nikiforakis |
| Abstract: | Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in the main subway station in Athens, Greece. The large number of passengers ensures that strategic motives for punishing are minimized. We study violations of two distinct efficiency enhancing social norms. In line with laboratory evidence, we find that individuals punish norm violators. Men are more likely than women to punish violators, while the decision to punish is unaffected by the violator’s height and gender. Interestingly, we find that violations of the better known of the two norms are substantially less likely to trigger punishment. We present additional evidence from two surveys providing insights into the determinants of norm enforcement. |
| Keywords: | norm enforcement, social norms, field experiment, altruistic punishment, cooperation |
| JEL: | C93 D63 H41 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-12&r=soc |
| By: | Bonnefon, Jean-François (Centre national de la recherche scientifique); De Neys, Wim (Centre national de la recherche scientifique); Hopfensitz, Astrid (TSE) |
| Abstract: | The capacity to trust wisely is a critical facilitator of success and prosperity, and it has been conjectured that people of higher intelligence were better able to detect signs of untrustworthiness from potential partners. In contrast, this article reports five Trust Game studies suggesting that reading trustworthiness on the faces of strangers is a modular process. Trustworthiness detection from faces is independent of general intelligence (Study 1) and effortless (Study 2). Pictures that include non-facial features such as hair and clothing impair trustworthiness detection (Study 3) by increasing reliance on conscious judgments (Study 4), but people largely prefer to make decisions from this sort of pictures (Study 5). In sum, trustworthiness detection in an economic interaction is a genuine and effortless ability, possessed in equal amount by people of all cognitive capacities, but whose impenetrability leads to inaccurate conscious judgments and inappropriate informational preferences. |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25848&r=soc |
| By: | Douhou, S. (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | The first chapter deals with keystroke dynamics, the study of human typing behavior, as a means to prevent crime. The remaining chapters focus on so-called small crimes (e.g., taking a bundle of printing paper from the office for private use, littering in a public place, or fare dodging). More specifically, the influence of offender and offense characteristics on small crime perception and how perception is related to reporting behavior (in case of witnessing a small crime) is analyzed in the third and fourth chapter. The last chapter investigates the happiness-crime relationship with a focus on trust and social norms. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5556380&r=soc |
| By: | Xiaodong Liu (University of Colorado at Boulder); Eleonora Patacchini (La Sapienza University of Rome, EIEF and CEPR); Yves Zenou (Stockholm University, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and GAINS); Lung-Fei Lee (The Ohio State University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze delinquent networks of adolescents in the United States. We develop a dynamic network formation model showing who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest possible reduction in aggregate crime level. We then structurally estimate our model using data on criminal behaviors of adolescents in the United States (AddHealth data). Compared to other criminals, key players are more likely to be male, have less educated parents, are less attached to religion and feel socially more excluded. We also find that, even though some criminals are not very active in criminal activities, they can be key players because they have a crucial position in the network in terms of betweenness centrality. |
| Keywords: | Crime, Bonacich Centrality, Dynamic Network Formation, Crime Policies |
| JEL: | A14 D85 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.39&r=soc |
| By: | Falck, Oliver; Gold, Robert; Heblich, Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the effect of information disseminated by the Internet on voting behavior. We address endogeneity in Internet availability by exploiting regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that hinder the roll-out of fixed-line broadband infrastructure for high-speed Internet. We find small negative effects of Internet availability on voter turnout, and no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits single parties. Robustness tests including placebo estimations from the pre-Internet era confirm our results. We relate differences in the Internet effect between national and local elections to a crowding out of national but not local newspapers. |
| Keywords: | Elections; Political Economy; Instrumental Variables; Mass Media; Inte rnet |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2012-07&r=soc |
| By: | Koen P.R. Bartels (Glasgow University); Guido Cozzi (Durham Business School); Noemi Mantovan (Bangor University) |
| Abstract: | The debate on volunteering has paid insufficient attention to the relationship between public spending and volunteering. Recently, the importance of this relationship was highlighted by the current British government's "Big Society" plan, which asserts that withdrawing public agencies and spending will be compensated by an increase in volunteering. This idea is based on the widely held belief that a high degree of government intervention decreases voluntary activities. This paper uses a multidisciplinary approach to develop a more refined understanding of how public spending affects the decision to volunteer. A theoretical model conceptualizes this relationship in terms of time donation by employed individuals. The model is empirically developed through an econometric analysis of two survey data sets and interpretative analysis of narratives of local volunteers and public professionals. The results suggest that volunteering is likely to decline when government intervention is decreased and recommend a collaborative approach to sustaining volunteering. |
| Keywords: | volunteering, labor supply, public goods, altruism. |
| Date: | 2012–06–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dur:durham:2012_06&r=soc |
| By: | Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their actions, just as much as they adjust their actions to their principles. We first elicit the individuals’ principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust game). One week later, the same individuals are invited to play those same games with monetary compensation. Finally in the same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three scenarios. Our results show that individuals adjust abstract norms to fit the game, their role and the choices they made. First, norms that appear abstract and universal take into account the bargaining power of the two sides. The strong side bends the norm in its favor and the weak side agrees: Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations, individuals adjust the range of fair shares after playing the game for real money compared with their initial statement. Third, the discrepancy between hypothetical and real behavior is larger in games where real choices have no strategic consequence (Dictator game and second mover in Trust game) than in those where they do (Ultimatum game). Finally the adjustment of principles to actions is mainly the fact of individuals who behave more selfishly and who have a stronger bargaining power. The moral hypocrisy displayed (measured by the discrepancy between statements and actions chosen followed by an adjustment of principles to actions) appears produced by the attempt, not necessarily conscious, to strike a balance between self-image and immediate convenience. |
| Keywords: | moral hypocrisy, fairness, social preferences, power, self-deception, self-image |
| JEL: | D03 D63 C91 C7 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6590&r=soc |
| By: | Cassi, Lorenzo; Plunket, Anne |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of co-inventor tie formation using micro-data on genomic patents from 1990 to 2006 in France. In a single analysis, we consider the relational and proximity perspectives that are usually treated separately. In order to do so, we analyse various forms of proximity as alternative driving forces behind network ties that occur within existing components (i.e. closure ties) as well as those between two distinct components (i.e. bridging ties). In doing so, we contrast network and proximity determinants of network formation and we investigate to what extent social networks allow economic actors to cross over geographical, technological and organizational boundaries. |
| Keywords: | Social networks; relational perspective; proximity; co-patenting; network formation |
| JEL: | L65 Z13 O33 O31 D85 R11 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39481&r=soc |
| By: | Shakun D. Mago (Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, USA); Anya C. Savikhin (Becker Friedman Institute for Economic Research, The University of Chicago, USA); Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, USA) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases efforts. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort levels but it does change the dynamics of individual behavior. We develop a behavioral model based on relative payoff maximization, and use it to estimate the degree of pro-social/status-seeking behavior. We find that decrease in ‘social distance’ between group members through photo display promotes pro-social behavior. Information feedback reduces the within-group volatility in effort level and facilitates greater adherence to the ‘group norm.’ Finally, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, we find significant over-expenditure of efforts in all treatments. This overdissipation can be explained by a combination of non-monetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization. |
| Keywords: | contest, information, identification, over-dissipation, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-15&r=soc |
| By: | Lorenzo Cassi (CES, Université Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne, OST, France; KITeS, Bocconi University, Italy); Lorenzo Zirulia (University of Bologna, Italy; KITeS, Bocconi University, Italy; RCEA, Italy) |
| Abstract: | In this chapter we develop a model where a population of inventors is rival in the production of patents. Inventors are embedded in the social space, and this affects the process of knowledge creation and diffusion. Our main contribution to the existing theoretical literature on social networks and knowledge is to introduce explicitly patents and patents’ citations. This is interesting per se, and it favours a better comparability of results with those of empirical analysis on the same topic. Results from numerical simulations show that our model is able to replicate the empirical negative relationship between patents’ citations and social distance. Furthermore, different social network structures may have an impact on the exact shape of such relationship. |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:39_12&r=soc |
| By: | Tsusaka, Takuji W.; Kajisa, Kei; Pede, Valerien O.; Aoyagi, Keitaro |
| Keywords: | behavioral games, field experiments, spatial econometrics, dictator game, public goods game, irrigation., Institutional and Behavioral Economics, C59, D01, Q25, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:124789&r=soc |
| By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Brilon, Stefanie |
| Abstract: | Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: "good" workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas "bad" workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. While missionoriented organizations take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good workers, they are more vulnerable than profit-oriented organizations to anti-social behavior: bad workers only join them to behave badly. To prevent this, monitoring has to go up in the mission-oriented sector, while the incentives for good behavior stay the same. In the profit-oriented sector, by contrast, both monitoring and bonus payments for good behavior increase to control the damage caused by bad workers. As a result, in equilibrium bad workers are generally working in the for-profit sector where they behave like "normal" people, while good workers self select into the mission-oriented sector. |
| Keywords: | candidate selection; motivated agents; non-profit; sabotage |
| JEL: | D21 D23 L31 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9009&r=soc |
| By: | Paul Gompers; Vladimir Mukharlyamov; Yuhai Xuan |
| Abstract: | This paper explores two broad questions on collaboration between individuals. First, we investigate what personal characteristics affect people’s desire to work together. Second, given the influence of these personal characteristics, we analyze whether this attraction enhances or detracts from performance. Addressing these problems in the venture capital syndication setting, we show that venture capitalists exhibit strong detrimental homophily in their co-investment decisions. We find that individual venture capitalists choose to collaborate with other venture capitalists for both ability-based characteristics (e.g., whether both individuals in a dyad obtained a degree from a top university) and affinity-based characteristics (e.g., whether individuals in a pair share the same ethnic background, attended the same school, or worked for the same employer previously). Moreover, frequent collaborators in syndication are those venture capitalists who display a high level of mutual affinity. We find that while collaborating for ability-based characteristics enhances investment performance, collaborating for affinity-based characteristics dramatically reduces the probability of investment success. A variety of tests show that the cost of affinity is not driven by selection into inferior deals; the effect is most likely attributable to poor decision-making by high-affinity syndicates post investment. Taken together, our results suggest that non-ability-based “birds-of-a-feather-flock-together” effects in collaboration can be costly. |
| JEL: | G24 G3 L14 L2 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18141&r=soc |