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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Aldo Rustichini (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1925 4th Street South, 4-101 Hanson Hall, Minneapolis, MN 55455-0462, U.S.); Marie-Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their actions, just as much as they adjust their actions to their principles. We first elicit the individuals’ principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust game). One week later, the same individuals are invited to play those same games with monetary compensation. Finally in the same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three scenarios. Our results show that individuals adjust abstract norms to fit the game, their role and the choices they made. First, norms that appear abstract and universal take into account the bargaining power of the two sides. The strong side bends the norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations, individuals adjust the range of fair shares after playing the game for real money compared with their initial statement. Third, the discrepancy between hypothetical and real behavior is larger in games where real choices have no strategic consequence (Dictator game and second mover in Trust game) than in those where they do (Ultimatum game). Finally the adjustment of principles to actions is mainly the fact of individuals who behave more selfishly and who have a stronger bargaining power. The moral hypocrisy displayed (measured by the discrepancy between statements and actions chosen followed by an adjustment of principles to actions) appears produced by the attempt, not necessarily conscious, to strike a balance between self-image and immediate convenience. |
| Keywords: | Moral hypocrisy, fairness, social preferences, power, self-deception |
| JEL: | D03 D63 C91 C7 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1216&r=soc |
| By: | Dufhues, Thomas; Buchenrieder, Gertrud; Munkung, Nuchanata |
| Abstract: | This study shows how different forms of individual social capital affect access to formal credit in rural Thailand. In the context of agriculture economics, an innovative data collection approach is used that originates from the field of sociology (personal network survey). We measure social capital according to: 1. the tie strength between the respondent and the personal network member (bonding/bridging); and 2. the social distance between the respondent and the personal network member (linking). Strong ties (bonding) in combination with access to socially distant network members (linking) reduce the chances of being access-constrained. |
| Keywords: | Thailand, access to credit, social capital, personal networks, Agricultural Finance, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae12:123401&r=soc |
| By: | Quoc, Hoang Dinh; Dufhues, Thomas; Buchenrieder, Gertrud |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of individual social capital on the access of rural households to services. In the context of agriculture economics, an innovative data collection approach is used to determine social capital. The approach originates from the field of sociology and entails a personal network survey. We define four social capital variables according to tie strength (bonding/bridging) and social distance (bondinglink/bridginglink) between the respondent and his/her network member. The econometric results suggest that social capital with weaker ties in combination with socially distant ties (bridginglink social capital) can potentially improve households’ access to rural services. |
| Keywords: | Consumer/Household Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, rural services, social capital, rural households, Vietnam, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae12:123402&r=soc |
| By: | Best, James A |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric information, cooperation, effciency, social learning, social dilemmas, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:289&r=soc |
| By: | Ernest Miguélez |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I aim to assess the influence of spatial mobility of knowledge workers on the formation of ties of scientific and industrial collaboration across European regions. Co-location has been traditionally invoked to ease formal collaboration between individuals and firms. Tie formation is costly and decreases as distance between the partners involved increases, making ties between co-located individuals more likely than between spatially separated peers. In some instances, highly-skilled actors might become mobile and bridge regional networks across long physical distances. The effect of trust and mutual understanding between members of a co-located community may well survive the end of their co-localisation, and therefore the formation of networks across the space may overcome long distances. In this paper I estimate a fixed effects logit model to ascertain whether there exists a ‘previous co-location premium’ in the formation of networks across European regions. The role of mobility in network formation has been lately discussed elsewhere, but, to my knowledge, barely empirically tested. |
| Keywords: | inventors’ mobility, technological collaborations, co-location, brain drain, panel data |
| JEL: | C8 J61 O31 O33 R0 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1208&r=soc |
| By: | Justine Burns; Malcolm Keswell (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | This paper utilises techniques in experimental economics to investigate the impact of racial identity on the provision of public goods. A large sample of Black and White undergraduate University students were recruited to participate in public goods games, where the racial composition of the groups was varied to include All White groups, All Black groups and mixed race groups (comprising Black and White students). The results show that contrary to predictions from social identity theory, racial homogeneity in a group does not uniformly predict higher contributions to the public pool. Rather, it would appear that observable racial identity may convey information about extensive heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity, especially where race is highly correlated with diversity in other dimensions, such as ethnolinguistic diversity. In accordance with the established macroeconometric literature on the provision of public goods, the results presented in this study show that contributions to the public good are indeed increasing in the level of trust in a group, and declining in the extent of ethnolinguistic diversity and socio-economic need in the group. Moreover, while communication has a large and significant effect on contributions to the public pool, patterns of communication are a ected by the racial composition of the group, with Black students appearing to be more responsive to communications made by White colleagues as opposed to Black colleagues. Hence, communication is not effective at sustaining co-operation in racially homogenous Black groups, possibly because communication in these groups allows participants to verify the greater diversity on other dimensions amongst group members. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:72&r=soc |
| By: | M. Bigoni; G. Camera; M. Casari |
| Abstract: | We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available. |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp828&r=soc |
| By: | Nina Neubecker; Marcel Smolka; Anne Steinbacher |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the role of ethnic communities in shaping the recent immigration boom to Spain. We find that ethnic communities exerted a strong positive effect on the scale and a strong negative effect on the skill structure of this immigration. Unlike previous studies, we explicitly acknowledge similarities among final migration destinations and thus partly relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. We strengthen our causal interpretation by controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral migration costs, and by adopting an instrumental variables approach. Our results suggest that previous estimates of the scale effect are upward-biased by approximately 50%. |
| Keywords: | international migration, ethnic networks, family and friends effect, skill structure of migration, Spain |
| JEL: | F22 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iaw:iawdip:83&r=soc |
| By: | Subhani, Dr. Muhammad Imtiaz |
| Abstract: | There is a blend of various factors on which the hiring of employee is based upon. This paper investigates and interrogates the contribution of physical attractiveness and referrals in the hiring of employee and further ponders on which matters the most from the above outlined variables when an employee is hired. The findings of the paper clearly confirm that it is the physical attractiveness which matters the most when an organization (hiring manager) goes for hiring on any hierarchical level. |
| Keywords: | Physical attractiveness; Referrals; Social network; Hiring; Selection process; Recruitment process |
| JEL: | A1 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39105&r=soc |