nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2012‒05‒22
nine papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini

  1. Trustworthy by Convention By M. Bigoni; S. Bortolotti; M. Casari; D. Gambetta
  2. Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking By Berger, Allen N.; Kick, Thomas; Koetter, Michael; Schaeck, Klaus
  3. Migrant Networks as a Basis for Social Control : Remittance Incentives among Senegalese in France and Italy By Isabelle Chort; Flore Gubert; Jean-Noël Senne
  4. E-Lections: Voting Behavior and the Internet By Falck, Oliver; Gold, Robert; Heblich, Stephan
  5. Schooling and Voter Turnout: Is there an American Exception? By Chevalier, Arnaud; Doyle, Orla
  6. Altruism and Voting: A Large-Turnout Result That Does not Rely on Civic Duty or Cooperative Behavior By Özgür Evren
  7. Call Me if You Can – An Experimental Investigation of Information Sharing in Knowledge Networks By Christoph Helbach; Klemens Keldenich; Michael Rothgang; Guanzhong Yang
  8. Mutual Investment Employee-Organization Relationship: A Conceptual Model of How and When it is Functional By M. AUDENAERT; A. VANDERSTRAETEN; D. BUYENS
  9. Reciprocity in the Principal Multiple Agent Model By Giuseppe De Marco; Giovanni Immordino

  1. By: M. Bigoni; S. Bortolotti; M. Casari; D. Gambetta
    Abstract: Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust relations involve multiple agents. In an experiment, we study a new setting called Collective Trust Game where there are multiple trustees, who may have an incentive to coordinate their actions. Trustworthiness has also a strategic motivation, and the trusters' decision depends upon their beliefs about the predominant convention with regard to trustworthiness. In this respect, the Collective Trust Games offers a richer pattern of behavior than dyadic games. We report that the levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when strategic motivations are present rather than not. Higher levels of trustworthiness also led to higher levels of trust. Moreover, strategic motives appear as a major drive for trustees, comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.
    JEL: C92 C72 D03
    Date: 2012–05
  2. By: Berger, Allen N.; Kick, Thomas; Koetter, Michael; Schaeck, Klaus
    Abstract: Social capital theory predicts individuals establish social ties based on homophily, i.e., affinities for similar others. We exploit a unique sample to analyze how similarities and social ties affect career outcomes in banking based on age, education, gender, and employment history to examine if homophily and connectedness increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider (an individual without previous employment at the bank) compared to being an insider. Our results show that homophily based on age and gender raises the chance of the successful candidate being an outsider, whereas similar educational backgrounds reduce the chance that the appointee comes from outside. When we examine performance effects, we find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability. --
    Keywords: Social networks,executive careers,banking,corporate governance
    JEL: G21 G32 G34 J16
    Date: 2011
  3. By: Isabelle Chort (PSE); Flore Gubert (Author-Workplace-Name:PSE); Jean-Noël Senne (CREST, PSE)
    Keywords: remittances, migrant workers, asymmetric information
    JEL: F24 F22 D82
    Date: 2011
  4. By: Falck, Oliver (Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Gold, Robert (Max Planck Institute for Economics); Heblich, Stephan (University of Stirling)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of information disseminated by the Internet on voting behavior. We address endogeneity in Internet availability by exploiting regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that hinder the roll-out of fixed-line broadband infrastructure for high-speed Internet. We find small negative effects of Internet availability on voter turnout, and no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits single parties. Robustness tests including placebo estimations from the pre-Internet era confirm our results. We relate differences in the Internet effect between national and local elections to a crowding out of national but not local newspapers.
    Keywords: elections, political economy, instrumental variables, mass media, internet
    JEL: D72 C50 L86
    Date: 2012–05
  5. By: Chevalier, Arnaud (Royal Holloway, University of London); Doyle, Orla (University College Dublin)
    Abstract: One of the most consistent findings in studies of electoral behaviour is that individuals with higher education have a greater propensity to vote. The nature of this relationship is much debated, with US studies generally finding evidence of a causal relationship, while European studies generally reporting no causal effect. To assess whether the US is an exception we rely on an international dataset incorporating 38 countries, the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) from 1985 to 2010. Both instrumental variable and multi-level modelling approaches reveal that the US is an outlier regarding the relationship between education and voter turnout. Moreover, country-specific institutional and economic factors do not explain the heterogeneity in the relationship of interest. Alternatively, we show that disenfranchisement laws in the U.S. mediate the effect of education on voter turnout, such that the education gradient in voting is greater in U.S. States with the harshest disenfranchisement legislature. As such, the observed relationship between education and voting is partly driven by the effect of education on crime.
    Keywords: voter turnout, education, disenfranchisement laws
    JEL: D72 I20 K42
    Date: 2012–05
  6. By: Özgür Evren (New Economic School)
    Abstract: I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts signi…cant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large. The model has two key features that jointly drive the result: (i) some agents are altruistic (or ethical), (ii) among the agents who prefer any given candidate, the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain. When deciding whether to vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of the society. Under suitable homogeneity assumptions, the asymptotic predictions of my model coincide with those of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) up to potential differences between the respective parameters that measure the importance of the election. I demonstrate with an example that these homogeneity assumptions are not necessary for qualitative predictions of my model. I also show that when the fractions of altruistic agents are known, turnout rates will typically be close to zero in a large election, despite the presence of altruism.
    Keywords: Altruism; Utilitarianism; Voting; Turnout; Pivotal Voter
    JEL: D64 D72
    Date: 2012–04
  7. By: Christoph Helbach; Klemens Keldenich; Michael Rothgang; Guanzhong Yang
    Abstract: In the public promotion of R&D cluster and network formation, the following situation typically arises: An initial network structure has developed over a long time span and policy measures affect the structure of links between the actors. This new network structure influences the effectiveness of the information flow in a way that is not clear from the beginning. As analyzing the effects of a change in the network structure is difficult in the field, this paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze how information is distributed in four different network structures. Networks are modeled as five-actor groups. Every individual represents a node and possesses some private information. The experimental results suggest that the different network structures do indeed influence the way information is exchanged. Both too many possible links (causing a coordination problem) and too few possible links (introducing bottlenecks) are harmful. The participants in all network structures learn over time and achieve a faster exchange of information in the later rounds. These results suggest that when influencing communication structures, one has to be careful to balance the positive and negative effects of adding more communication possibilities.
    Keywords: Network; communication; laboratory experiment; information flow
    JEL: C93 D70 D81
    Date: 2012–04
    Abstract: A conceptual model is delineated on the process how and when Mutual Investment Employee-Organization Relationship (EOR), relative to other EOR forms, leads to employee reactions. Besides the widely used social exchange-based model that is used to explain this process, we build on theory to hypothesize that Mutual Investment EOR is also associated to improved employee reactions through an empowerment-based model. The social exchangebased model asserts that Mutual Investment EOR sends signals of valuing and caring for the employees, which leads to social exchange. As a result, the employees reciprocate their organizations by exhibiting improved employee reactions. The empowerment-based model holds that Mutual Investment EOR provides employees with feelings of empowerment, which results in improved employee reactions. Furthermore, the effectiveness of empowerment is hypothesized to be stronger than the effectiveness of social exchange in high-complexity jobs. The implications of the conceptual model are discussed.
    Keywords: Employee-organization relationships; mutual investment; social exchange; empowerment; job complexity
    Date: 2012–03
  9. By: Giuseppe De Marco (Università di Napoli Parthenope and CSEF); Giovanni Immordino (Università di Salerno and CSEF)
    Abstract: This paper studies how incentives are affected by intention-based reciprocity preferences when the principal hires many agents. Our results describe the agents' psychological attitudes required to sustain a given strategy profile. We also show that hiring reciprocal agents to implement a first or a second-best contract will always benefit the principal if the strategy profile is symmetric. When instead the profile (first or second-best) is asymmetric the principal's best interest might be better served by self-interested agents. We conclude the paper by clarifying when symmetric profiles are most likely to arise.
    Keywords: reciprocity, many agents, psychological games
    JEL: C72 D03 D86
    Date: 2012–05–10

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