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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Fischer, Justina AV |
| Abstract: | This paper postulates that a country’s integration into the world economy may lower citizens’ political trust. I argue that economic globalization constrains government’s choice set of feasible policies, impeding responsiveness to the median voter. Matching individual-level survey data from 1981 to 2007, repeated cross-sections of altogether 260’000 persons from 80 countries, with a measure of a country’s degree of economic globalization for the same time period, I find that there is a trust-lowering impact of globalization; its magnitude, however, depends on whether or not the individual is informed about politics and the economy. Trust-lowering effects of globalization are larger for those who have no interest in politics, are unwilling to indicate their political leaning, or who have low educational levels. Two-stage least squares regressions and a set of country and time fixed effects support a causal interpretation. Obviously, viewing the domestic government as accountable for its policies plays a decisive role for the relation between economic globalization and political trust. Robustness against country’s degree of economic development, past globalization and different time periods is tested. |
| Keywords: | Political trust; globalization; international trade; openness; FDI; World Values Survey |
| JEL: | F15 H41 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37763&r=soc |
| By: | Martin Binder (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Andreas Freytag (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | Is the activity of volunteering something that benefits the volunteer as well as the recipient of the volunteer's activities? We analyze this relationship and apply matching estimators to the large-scale British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data set to estimate the causal impact of volunteering on happiness. We take into account personality traits that could jointly determine volunteering behaviour and happiness. We find that the causal impact of volunteering on happiness is positive and increasing over time if volunteering is sustained. In a quantile analysis, we find that this effect seems to be driven by reducing the unhappiness of the less happy quantiles of the well-being distribution. We test the robustness of our findings and discuss their relevance for public policy. |
| Keywords: | volunteering, happiness, altruism, generosity, public policy, BHPS |
| JEL: | D6 D64 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-013&r=soc |
| By: | Yamamura, Eiji |
| Abstract: | The Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995 has had a significant detrimental effect on the economic conditions of southern-central Japan. However, the earthquake also led people to acknowledge the importance of the many volunteer activities in Japan at that time. Using a large sample of individual-level data from 1991 and 1996, this study investigates how and the extent to which the earthquake increased the participation of students and house-workers in volunteer activities. After controlling for various individual characteristics, a Heckman-Tobit model was used and the following key findings were obtained: (1) the probability of students’ participating in volunteer activities was 2% higher after the earthquake than before, and (2) the number of days that students spent participating in volunteer activities was 4.38 days longer after the earthquake than before. However, the same did not hold true for house-workers. |
| Keywords: | Natural disasters; social capital; volunteer activities |
| JEL: | N35 Z13 Q54 |
| Date: | 2012–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37734&r=soc |
| By: | Ramon Flores (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Maurice Koster (University of Amsterdam); Ines Lindner (VU University Amsterdam); Elisenda Molina (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new measure for a group's ability to lead society to adopt their standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to convince the whole society to adopt their position. This notion of a group's power to initiate action is computed as the reciprocal of the resistance against it, which is in turn given by the expected absorption time of a related finite state partial Markov chain that captures the social dynamics. The measure is applicable and meaningful in a variety of models where interaction between agents is formalized through (weighted) binary relations. Using Percolation Theory, it is shown that the group power is monotonic as a function of groups of agents. We also explain the differences between our measure and those discussed in the literature on Graph Theory, and illustrate all these concerns by a thorough analysis of two particular cases: the Wolfe Primate Data and the 11S hijackers' network. |
| Keywords: | Collective action; Social networks; Influence and diffusion models; Network intervention; Group centrality measures |
| JEL: | C79 D01 D71 |
| Date: | 2012–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120032&r=soc |
| By: | Salomon Israel; Ori Weisel; Richard P. Ebstein; Gary Bornstein |
| Abstract: | In today’s increasingly interconnected world, deciding with whom and at what level to cooperate becomes a matter of increasing importance as societies become more globalized and large-scale cooperation becomes a viable means of addressing global issues. This tension can play out via competition between local (e.g. within a group) and global (e.g., between groups) interests. Despite research highlighting factors influencing cooperation in such multi-layered situations, their biological basis is not well understood. In a double-blind placebo controlled study, we investigated the influence of intranasally administered oxytocin and arginine vasopressin on cooperative behavior at local and global levels. We find that oxytocin causes an increase in both the willingness to cooperate and the expectation that others will cooperate at both levels. In contrast, participants receiving vasopressin did not differ from those receiving placebo in their cooperative behavior. Our results highlight the selective role of oxytocin in intergroup cooperative behavior. |
| Keywords: | altruism, oxytocin, vasopressin, intergroup cooperation, nested social dilemma |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp598&r=soc |
| By: | Kieu-Trang Nguyen (Indiana University Bloomington); Quoc-Anh Do (Singapore Management University); Anh Tran (Indiana University Bloomington) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies nepotism by government officials in an authoritarian regime. We collect a unique dataset of political promotions of officials in Vietnam and estimate their impact on public infrastructure in their hometowns. We find strong positive effects on several outcomes, some with lags, including roads to villages, marketplaces, clean water access, preschools, irrigation, and local radio broadcasters, as well as the hometown’s propensity to benefit from the State’s “poor commune support program”. Nepotism is not limited to only top-level officials, pervasive even among those without direct authority over hometown budgets, stronger when the hometown chairperson’s and promoted official’s ages are closer, and where provincial leadership has more discretionary power in shaping policies, suggesting that nepotism works through informal channels based on specific political power and environment. Contrary to pork barrel politics in democratic parliaments, members of the Vietnamese legislative body have little influence on infrastructure investments for their hometowns. Given the top-down nature of political promotions, officials arguably do not help their tiny communes in exchange for political support. Consistent with that, officials favor only their home commune and ignore their home district, which could offer larger political support. These findings suggest that nepotism is motivated by officials’ social preferences directed towards their related circles, and signals an additional form of corruption that may prevail in developing countries with low transparency. |
| Keywords: | nepotism, infrastructure construction, official’s hometown, political connection, political promotion, social preference, directed altruism. |
| JEL: | O12 H54 H72 D72 D64 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:07-2012&r=soc |
| By: | Karlan, Dean (Yale University and Innovations for Poverty Action); McConnell, Margaret A. (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories, we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and find no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image. |
| JEL: | C90 D64 L30 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:96&r=soc |
| By: | Britta Hoyer |
| Abstract: | "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." This common adage, which seems to be adhered to in social interactions (e.g. high school cliques or work relationships) as well as in political alliances within countries and between countries, describes the ability of groups or people to work together when they face an opponent, although otherwise they have little in common. In social psychology this phenomenon has been termed the "common enemy effect". Such group behavior can be studied using networks to depict the players within a group and the relationships between them. In this paper we study the effect of a common enemy on a model of network formation, where self-interested, myopic players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network and whose goal it is to minimize the overall value of the network. We find that introducing such a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks which would not be stable without the threat of disruption. However, we also find that fragmented networks as well as the empty networks are also stable. While the common enemy can thus have a positive effect on the incentives of players to form an efficient network, it can also lead to fragmentation and disintegration of the network. |
| Keywords: | strategic network disruption, strategic network design, non-cooperative network games |
| JEL: | C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1206&r=soc |
| By: | Michał Krawczyk (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences); Fabrice Le Lec (Catholic University of Lille, Lille Economie & Management UMR CNRS 8179) |
| Abstract: | We propose an experimental method whose purpose is to induce selfish behavior in games for a broad class of social preferences. It provides a theoretical framework for testing game theoretical predictions by confronting subjects with a commonly known payoff matrix actually representing their preferences. The paper describes the empirical tests of this method based on the comparison of results from several popular experimental games played with and without our methodology. Apart from it being a test of validity of the method, our experiment helps answer the question of how useful social preferences could be in explaining commonly observed deviations from selfish rationality. Results suggest that our method does induce more selfish behaviors: a substantial part of the difference between predictions based on selfishness and observed behaviors seems indeed driven by such preferences. But they also indicate that a considerable share is left untouched, perhaps giving weight to alternative explanations. |
| Keywords: | social preference, experimental game theory, ultimatum game, public goods game, trust game, prisoner's dilemma, dictator game |
| JEL: | A13 C65 C72 D63 D03 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2012-06&r=soc |
| By: | Tsakas, Nikolas |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a model of observational learning in social networks. Every period, the agents observe the actions of their neighbors and their realized outcomes, and they imitate the most successful. First, we study the case where the network has finite population and we show that, regardless of the structure, the population converges to a monomorphic steady state, i.e. where every agent chooses the same action. Subsequently, we extend our analysis to infinitely large networks and we differentiate the cases where agents have bounded neighborhoods, with those where they do not. Under bounded neighborhoods, an action is diffused to the whole population if it is the only one initially chosen by infinitely many agents. If there exist more than one such actions, we provide an additional sufficient condition in the payoff structure, which ensures convergence for any network. Without the assumption of bounded neighborhoods, we show that an action can survive even if it is initially chosen by a single agent and also that a network can be in steady state without this being monomorphic. |
| Keywords: | Social Networks; Learning; Diffusion; Imitation |
| JEL: | D03 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2012–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37796&r=soc |
| By: | Barr, Abigail; Packard, Truman; Serra, Danila |
| Abstract: | There is general agreement that the existence of participatory institutions is a necessary condition for accountability, especially where top-down institutions are malfunctioning or missing. In education, the evidence on the effectiveness of participatory accountability is mixed. This paper argues that participation is a social dilemma and therefore depends, at least partly, on individuals'propensity to cooperate with others for the common good. This being the case, the mixed evidence could be owing to society-level heterogeneities in individuals'willingness and ability to overcome collective action problems. The authors investigate whether individuals'propensity to cooperate plays a role in parents'decisions to participate in both a school accountability system -- a"short route"to accountability -- and parliamentary elections -- a"long route"to accountability -- by combining survey data on 1,800 individuals'participation decisions with measures of their willingness to contribute to a public good in the context of a very simple, clearly defined laboratory experiment. They conduct a study in a new democracy, Albania, involving parents of children enrolled in primary schools. The findings confirm that, both across individuals within communities and across communities, the decision to hold teachers and school directors accountable directly through participation at the school level, and indirectly through political participation correlates with cooperativeness in a simple public goods game. |
| Keywords: | Parliamentary Government,Education For All,Tertiary Education,Primary Education,Governance Indicators |
| Date: | 2012–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6027&r=soc |
| By: | Bryan, Gharad (London School of Economics and Innovations for Poverty Action); Karlan, Dean (Yale University and MIT); Zinman, Jonathan (Dartmouth College and MIT) |
| Abstract: | We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening. |
| JEL: | C93 D12 D14 D82 O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:99&r=soc |
| By: | Cheung, Stephen L. |
| Abstract: | Understanding the forces that enhance or erode cooperation in social dilemmas is a fundamental question in social science. Previous experiments have shown that selfish bias is an important source of fragility in conditional cooperation, and that the possibility of punishment can strengthen cooperation, however potential efficiency gains are threatened by antisocial punishment of higher contributors. This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how these behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that selfish bias becomes significantly worse as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Antisocial punishment is seldom directed specifically toward high contributors; rather, it may be motivated by pre-emptive retaliation. |
| Keywords: | strategy method; punishment; conditional cooperation; selfish bias |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8089&r=soc |
| By: | Abraham, Vinoj |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the major sources of data for understanding wages and earnings of Social and Religious Groups in India. It also discusses the limitations of the data sets,and issues for further research but are limited by the availability of data for such research. It also provides suggestions for new data and ways to improve the existing statistical data. |
| Keywords: | social groups; caste; religion; wages; India; data sources |
| JEL: | J31 C80 |
| Date: | 2012–02–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37799&r=soc |
| By: | Sacks, Audrey; Larizza, Marco |
| Abstract: | A broad consensus has emerged among practitioners and researchers that failure to build accountable and legitimate institutions is a critical risk factor associated with vicious circles of repeated violence. Despite this consensus, very few studies have tested the extent to which local government performance and decentralized service provision shape citizens'beliefs toward political authorities. This paper contributes to fill this gap by examining the antecedents of trustworthy local government authorities in a post-conflict and fragile setting, Sierra Leone. Taking advantage of a unique longitudinal survey, the National Public Services, it examines the impact of sub-national variation in local government performance on citizens'beliefs about the trustworthiness of local government authorities. To test the hypothesis, it uses multilevel models to exploit variation over time and within and across sub-national units in Sierra Leone. The results suggest that improvements in the quality of decentralized service delivery, as well as perceptions of local councillors'honesty, are positively associated with perceptions of local government officials as trustworthy political authorities. These findings speak to the possibility that local service provision can play a role in shaping the relationships between citizens and the state and in overcoming the root causes of fragility and conflict. |
| Keywords: | Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Population Policies,E-Government,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,E-Government |
| Date: | 2012–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6021&r=soc |