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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Opolot, Daniel (UNU-MERIT, University of Maastricht,) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of interaction topologies on individual and aggregate behavior in environments with social interactions. We study social interaction games of an infnitely large population with local and global externalities. Local externalities are limited within agents' ego-networks while the global externality is derived from aggregate distribution in a feedback manner. We consider two forms of heterogeneity, that due to individual intrinsic tastes and that due to ego-networks. The agents know the potential number of other agents they will interact with but do not posses complete information about their neighbors' types and strategies so they base their decisions on expectations and beliefs. We characterize the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium distribution of strategies. By considering arbitrary interaction topologies, we show that the interaction structure greatly determines the uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, as well as the equilibrium aggregate distribution of strategies as measured by the mean strategy. |
| Keywords: | Complex networks, Partial information, Local externality, Global externality, Adoption |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012014&r=soc |
| By: | Cowan, Robin (UNU-MERIT, and SBE, Maastricht University); Jonard, Nicolas (University of Luxemburg); Weehuizen, Rifka (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we model interactions between organizational structures, job stress, emotional contagion and organization performance. An organization is modelled as solving problems or performing tasks. Tasks enter the organization and can be addressed by a subset of its members. Organization structure determines which agents can address which problems. Members address the task by applying energy to it. An agent's available energy is determined by his stress level, which is in turn determined by his workload. However agents' stress levels are moderated by social interactions that take place in parallel to the work environment. Organizations can be structured as a group of specialized individuals or as hierarchies of varying depths. We explore the effects of organizational structure and social interactions on performance. |
| Keywords: | stress, emotional contagion, social networks, organization structure, productivity |
| JEL: | L22 L25 M14 M54 D23 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012012&r=soc |
| By: | Niclas Berggren (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and University of Economics in Prague); Christian Bjørnskov (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | Social and cultural determinants of economic institutions and outcomes have come to the forefront of economic research. We introduce religiosity, measured as the share for which religion is important in daily life, to explain institutional quality in the form of property rights and the rule of law. Previous studies have only measured the impact of membership shares of different religions, with mixed results. We find, in a cross-country regression analysis comprising up to 112 countries, that religiosity is negatively related to our institutional outcome variables. This only holds in democracies (not autocracies), which suggests that religiosity affects the way institutions work through the political process. Individual religions are not related to our measure of institutional quality. |
| Keywords: | Religion, religiosity, rule of law, property rights, institutions |
| JEL: | K11 K42 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-08&r=soc |
| By: | Giovanna d’Adda |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of leadership on the level and evolution of pro-social behavior using an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions. Authority is measured through a social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within the community. I find that giving by a pair is higher and shows a lower tendency to decrease over time when a leader is part of a pair. This is because higher-ranked pair members in general, and leaders in particular, donate more and are less likely to revise contributions downwards after giving more than their counterparts. Leadership effects are stronger when moral authority is made salient within the experiment, in line with the ethical nature of the decision under study. These findings highlight the importance of identifying different forms of leadership and targeting the relevant leaders in projects aimed at local public good provision. |
| Keywords: | Leadership, local public goods, experimental, Colombia |
| JEL: | D7 H4 O1 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:059&r=soc |
| By: | P. Nijkamp; A. Reggiani |
| Abstract: | An avalanche of empirical studies has addressed the validity of the rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) in a multi-city context in many countries. City size in most countries seems to obey Zipf’s law, but the question under which conditions (e.g. sample size, spatial scale) this ‘law’ holds remained largely underinvestigated. Another complementary question is whether socio-economic networks in space also show a similar hierarchical pattern. Against this background, the present paper investigates – from a methodological viewpoint – the relationship between network connectivity and the rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) in an urban-economic network constellation. After a review of the literature, we address in particular the following methodological issues: (i) the (aggregate) behavioural foundation underlying the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law in the light of spatial-economic network theories (e.g. entropy maximization, spatial interaction theory, etc.); (ii) the nature of the analytical relationship between social-spatial network analysis and the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law. We argue that the rank size rule is compatible with conventional economic foundations of spatial network models. Consequently, a spatial-economic interpretation – as well as a network connectivity interpretation – of the rank-size rule coefficient is provided. Our methodological contribution forms the foundation for the subsequent empirical analysis applied to spatial networks in a socio-economic context. The aim here is to test the sensitivity of empirical findings for changes in scale, functional forms, time periods, and network structures. Our application is concerned with an extensive spatio-temporal panel database related to the evolution of urban population in Germany. We test the relevance of the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law, and its evolution over the years, and – in parallel – the related ‘socio-economic’ connectivity in these urban networks. In particular, we will show that Zipf’s law (i.e., with the rank-size coefficient equal to 1) is only valid under particular conditions of the sample size. The paper concludes with some retrospective and prospective remarks. |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp816&r=soc |