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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Luigi Guiso (EIEF and CEPR); Paolo Pinotti (Bocconi University and DONDENA) |
| Abstract: | We document a sharp reversal in electoral participation between the North and the South of Italy after the 1912 enfranchisement which extended voting rights from a limited élite to (almost) all adult males. When voting was restricted to the élite, electoral turnout was higher in the South but falls significantly below that in the North after the enfranchisement. Furthermore the new gap is never bridged over the following century and participation remains lower in the South despite the enrichment of democratic institutions and further extension of voting rights to the female population during the post war democratic republic. This pattern in the data is consistent with a simple model where individuals’ voting in political elections is affected by private benefits and by civic duty, only elites can grab private benefits from participation in politics and civic culture differs across communities. We also find that extension of voting rights to non-elites results in a significant transfer of power to their political organizations only among populations with a high sense of civic duties. Together with the very persistent gap in participation between North and South our findings suggest that democratization – a process of concession of democratic rights – can benefit non-elites only when the latter have already a high sense of civic capital and is unlikely to be a viable avenue for inducing norms of civic behavior. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1202&r=soc |
| By: | Ritzen, Jo (IZA and Maastricht University); Zimmermann, Klaus F. (IZA and University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | A substantial literature claims that the strong increase in inequality over the last decade in countries such as the US would lead to a collapse of society. Fading hopes in the population seem to confirm this. The paper rejects this interpretation since the decline in hopes cannot be traced back to rising inequality. |
| Keywords: | confidence, ethnicity, hope, human capital, income inequality |
| JEL: | D31 J15 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6340&r=soc |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Fabio Pisani (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | We investigate factors affecting happiness on a sample of Italian secondary school students. We find that money matters since family’s house ownership, mortgages and (class) relative wealth significantly affect life satisfaction. Other crucial factors are geographical residence (those living in Milan are significantly less happy), mother’s occupation, trust on family and friendships. Even though we cannot rule out inverse causality and other forms of endogeneity, the characteristics of many of the significant regressors such as family wealth, parental job and geographical residence (not under the decisional power of the student) suggest a direct causality nexus for these factors. |
| Keywords: | life satisfaction, secondary school, wealth |
| JEL: | I31 E01 |
| Date: | 2012–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:223&r=soc |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Milano - Bicocca); Stefania Ottone (University of Milano - Bicocca); nazaria Solferino (University of Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better. |
| Keywords: | Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Meritocracy; Talent; Chance; Effort |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2012–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:221&r=soc |
| By: | González de San Román, Ainara (University of the Basque Country); de la Rica, Sara (University of the Basque Country) |
| Abstract: | The existence of gender gaps in test scores has been documented in the relevant literature for a wide range of countries. In particular, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the OECD over the past ten years reveals that on average female students underperform (outperform) males in maths (reading) test scores in most of the countries that take part in the evaluation programme. We find that differences in culture and social norms across countries and across regions within the same country are crucial determinants in understanding gender differences in PISA 2009 test scores: girls perform relatively better in both maths and reading in societies where gender equality is enhanced, and the effect varies over the distribution of scores. In addition, we find substantial evidence for the intergenerational transmission of gender role attitudes, especially from mothers to daughters, as the performance of girls – not that of boys, is better in families where the mother works outside home. |
| Keywords: | PISA, test scores, achievement, gender differences, culture, role attitudes, intergenerational transmission |
| JEL: | C14 C33 I21 I24 J16 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6338&r=soc |
| By: | Ernest Miguélez (Economics and Statistics Division, World Intellectual Property Organization and Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Rorina Moreno (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | The aim of the present paper is to identify the determinants of the geographical mobility of skilled individuals, such as inventors, across European regions. Their mobility contributes to the geographical diffusion of knowledge and reshapes the geography of talent. We test whether geography, amenities, job opportunities and social proximity between inventors’ communities, and the so-called National System of Innovation, drive in- and out-flows of inventors between pairs of regions. We use a control function approach to address the endogenous nature of social proximity, and zero-inflated negative binomial models to accommodate our estimations to the count nature of the dependent variable and the high number of zeros it contains. Our results highlight the importance of physical proximity in driving the mobility patterns of inventors. However, job opportunities, social and institutional relations, and technological and cultural proximity also play key roles in mediating this phenomenon. |
| Keywords: | inventors’ mobility, gravity model, amenities, job opportunities, social and institutional proximities, zero-inflated negative binomial, European regions. JEL classification: C8, J61, O31, O33, R0 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ira:wpaper:201204&r=soc |
| By: | Elisabetta LODIGIANI (DEAS, University of Milan and Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano); Sara SALOMONE (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and Tor Vergata University) |
| Abstract: | It is recognized that affirmative action, as anti-discriminatory policies whose aim is to benefit an underrepresented group, is a key driver of progress for women. However, the role of migrants in helping female voice from abroad has not been addressed yet. This paper empirically investigates the effect of international migration on the parliamentary participation of women left behind following the brand new strand of literature on ‘transfers of norms’. Panel data from 1960 to 2000 allows us to take into account selection due to women’s eligibility, observed and unobserved heterogeneity. After having controlled for traditional political and non political factors, we show that total international migration to countries with higher female political empowerment significantly increases the female parliamentary shares in sending countries |
| Keywords: | Women’s empowerment, Transfers of norms, International Migration, Panel Data, Sample Selection |
| JEL: | J16 D72 F22 C33 |
| Date: | 2012–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2012001&r=soc |
| By: | Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Nosenzo, Daniele (University of Nottingham); Sefton, Martin (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by a model of distributional social preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agent's effort can be best explained by the social preferences model. In further treatments with modified games we find that the presence/strength of peer effects changes as predicted by the social preferences model. As with the baseline treatment, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms following for these treatments. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, social influence, gift-exchange, experiment, social preferences, inequity aversion, measuring social norms |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6345&r=soc |
| By: | Andrweas Leibbrandt (Department of Economics, Monash University, Australia); Abhijit Ramalingam (School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom); Lauri Sääksvuori (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); James M. Walker (Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, United States) |
| Abstract: | Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network. |
| Keywords: | public goods experiment, punishment, cooperation, networks |
| JEL: | C92 D01 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2012–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-004&r=soc |
| By: | Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Natalia Montinari (Max Planck Institute for Economics); Marco Piovesan (Harvard Business School) |
| Abstract: | Substantial research with adult populations has found that selfish impulses are less likely to be pursued when decisions are publicly observable. To the best of our knowledge, however, this behavioral regularity has not been systematically explored as potential solution to social dilemmas. This paper takes a step in that direction. We report data on the self-control decisions of children aged 6 to 11 who participated in games that require one to resist a selfish impulse for several minutes in order to benefit others. In one condition children make decisions in public view of the group of other participants, while in another they can make decisions either publicly or privately. In both conditions, we allow the group size to vary. We find that children aged 9 and higher are better able to resist selfish impulses in public environments. Younger children, however, display no such effect. Further, we find self-control substantially impacted by group size. When decisions are public, larger groups lead to better self-control, while in the private condition the opposite holds. Our findings suggest that announcing decisions publicly and to large groups may be part of a solution to some social dilemmas. In addition, the fact that public decision-making promotes pro-social behavior only in older children suggests this positive effect may stem from a desire to avoid shame. Length: 28 |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1034&r=soc |
| By: | V. I. Yukalov; D. Sornette |
| Abstract: | Decision making of agents who are members of a society is analyzed from the point of view of quantum decision theory. This generalizes the approach, developed earlier by the authors for separate individuals, to decision making under the influence of social interactions. The generalized approach not only avoids paradoxes, typical of classical decision making based on utility theory, but also explains the error-attenuation effects observed for the paradoxes occurring when decision makers, who are members of a society, consult with each other increasing in this way the available mutual information. |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1202.4918&r=soc |
| By: | WALTHER Olivier |
| Abstract: | To date, most of the literature on economic networks in West Africa has considered networks in a metaphorical way. The aim of this paper is to go one step further by showing how network analysis may be applied to the study of regional trade in West Africa. After a brief review of the literature, this exploratory paper investigates two main issues related to regional trade. We start by discussing how recent developments in regional trade in West Africa, brought on by urbanization, liberalization, and globalization, have contributed to challenging the social structure of traders. We then discuss the changes that have affected the spatiality of regional trade by looking at the influence of spatial location and geographic scale on traders’ abilities to trade. In both cases, we argue that the value of social network analysis in exploring how traders have progressively adapted to social and spatial changes in economic activities has been greatly underestimated. Through the combination of social and spatial ties, we ultimately show that the structural position of economic actors can be used to reassess the centrality of places. By doing so, the relational approach developed in this paper invites scholarship to reconsider the geographic organization of West African societies. |
| Keywords: | regional trade; economic networks; social network analysis; border markets; West Africa |
| JEL: | F15 L26 N77 N97 R12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2012-07&r=soc |