nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2012‒02‒08
four papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Euricse

  1. Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation By Thöni, Christian; Gächter, Simon
  2. GINI DP 20: Does Income Inequality Negatively Affect General Trust? Examining three potential problems with the inequality-trust hypothesis By Sander Steijn; Bram Lancee
  3. Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment By Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran
  4. A taxonomy of innovation networks By Schön, Benjamin; Pyka, Andreas

  1. By: Thöni, Christian (University of St. Gallen); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the importance of social influence effects ("peer effects"). Yet, little is known about how peer effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents' efforts are positively related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and considerations of social esteem are candidate explanations.
    Keywords: social preferences, voluntary cooperation, peer effects, reflection problem, gift exchange, conformism, social norms, social esteem
    JEL: C92 D03
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6277&r=soc
  2. By: Sander Steijn (AISSR, University of Amsterdam); Bram Lancee (AIAS, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Many studies on the consequences of income inequality find that where inequality is high, trust is low. There are, however, reasons to examine the relation between inequality and trust more closely. First, previous research does not differentiate between the effect of income inequality and that of national wealth. Furthermore, the underlying mechanism is often unclear. Finally, the association might be dependent on non-Western countries where income inequality is extremely high. In this paper, we evaluate whether there is a relation between income inequality and trust in a sample of Western developed economies when taking into account national wealth. Theoretically, we distinguish between stratification effects and perception effects of inequality. Empirically, besides actual income inequality and national wealth, we include a measurement of perceived inequality on the basis of individual level earnings estimations for stereotypical jobs. We find no significant effect of inequality on trust when taking into account national wealth, suggesting that in Western countries the amount of resources rather than its distribution explains trust. Key words: trust, income inequality, perceived inequality, national wealth, comparative research.
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:dp20&r=soc
  3. By: Bandiera, Oriana (London School of Economics); Barankay, Iwan (University of Pennsylvania); Rasul, Imran (University College London)
    Abstract: Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers' effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production.
    Keywords: rank incentives, team-based incentives, teams, tournaments
    JEL: D23 J33 M52
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6279&r=soc
  4. By: Schön, Benjamin; Pyka, Andreas
    Abstract: In this discussion paper we develop a theory-based typology of innovation networks with a special focus on public-private collaboration. This taxonomy is theoretically based on the concept of life cycles which is transferred to the context of innovation networks as well as on the mode of network formation which can occur either spontaneous or planned. The taxonomy distinguishes six different types of networks and incorporates two plausible alternative developments that eventually lead to a similar network structure of the two types of networks. From this, important conclusions and recommendations for network actors and policy makers are drawn. --
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fziddp:422012&r=soc

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