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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Giacomo De Luca (University of Leuven); Marijke Verpoorten (University of Leuven) |
| Abstract: | We show that armed conflict affects social capital as measured by trust and associational membership. Using the case of Uganda and two rounds of nationally representative individual-level data bracketing a large number of battle events, we find that self-reported generalized trust and associational membership decreased during the conflict in districts in which battle events took place. Exploiting the different timing of two distinct waves of violence, we provide suggestive evidence for a rapid recovery of social capital. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies, including difference-indifference and instrumental variable estimates, suggests that these relationships are causal. |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:111&r=soc |
| By: | Johanna D'Hernoncourt |
| Abstract: | This paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust, in a sample of countries, both developed and developing. That relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic, policy, and institutional variables, to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period, and to controlling for endogeneity. It is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality, and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries. Those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system. |
| Keywords: | Shadow economy, informal sector, trust; Shadow economy, Informal sector, Trust |
| JEL: | O11 O17 O57 H26 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/98287&r=soc |
| By: | Ceyhun Elgin; Mario-Solis Garcia |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bou:wpaper:2011/04&r=soc |
| By: | Michael Beckmann; Istvàn Hegedüs (University of Basel) |
| Keywords: | Trust-based working time, working time flexibility, firm performance |
| JEL: | J24 J81 M50 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2011/13&r=soc |
| By: | Kato, Takao (Colgate University); Shu, Pian (MIT) |
| Abstract: | Using data on team assignment and weekly output for all weavers in an urban Chinese textile firm between April 2003 and March 2004, this paper studies a) how randomly assigned teammates affect an individual worker's behavior under a tournament-style incentive scheme, and b) how such effects interact with exogenously formed social networks in the manufacturing workplace. First, we find that a worker's performance improves when the average ability of her teammates increases. Second, we exploit the exogenous variations in workers' origins in the presence of the well-documented social divide between urban resident workers and rural migrant workers in large urban Chinese firms, and show that the coworker effects are only present if the teammates are of a different origin. In other words, workers do not act on pecuniary incentives to outperform teammates who are from the same social network. Our results point to the important role of group identities in overcoming self-interests and facilitating altruistic behavior. |
| Keywords: | coworker effects in the workplace, social networks, intergroup competition |
| JEL: | M5 J24 L2 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6219&r=soc |
| By: | Dirk Engelmann; Alistair Munro; Marieta Valente (NIMA, Universidade do Minho) |
| Abstract: | Ethical goods are increasingly available in markets for conventional goods giving pro-ethically motivated consumers a convenient option to contribute to public goods. In a previous experiment we explored the behavioural relevance of impure public goods in a within-subject setting and observed reduced aggregate pro-social behavior in the presence of impure goods that favor private consumption at the expense of public good provision. In this experiment, we implement a between-subject design to test the behavioural relevance of impure public goods with only a token contribution to a public good cause. From a theoretical perspective, assuming people demand private and public characteristics regardless of how they are provided, we would expect no behavioural relevance of the presence of impure public goods. However, this experiment establishes that pro-social behaviour defined as contributing to a public good, is negatively affected by impure goods with token contributions, in comparison to when they are absent. Furthermore, if the token impure good is mandatory instead of optional the negative effect on pro-social behaviour seems to be offset. The results from this experiment suggest impure public goods are not behaviourally irrelevant, can decrease pro-social behaviour but their optional or mandatory nature can have different behavioural consequences. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, impure public goods, ethical goods, pro-social behaviour, social norms, experimental dictator games |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 Q59 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nim:nimawp:45/2011&r=soc |
| By: | Lindbeck, Assar (Stockholm University); Palme, Mårten (Stockholm University); Persson, Mats (IIES, Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | In many countries, sickness absence financed by generous insurance benefits has become an important concern in the policy debate. It turns out that there are strong variations in absence behavior between local geographical areas, and it has been difficult to explain these variations by observable socioeconomic factors. In this paper we investigate whether such variation is related to group effects in the form of social interaction among individuals within neighborhoods. Well-known methodological problems arise when trying to answer such a question. A special feature of our attempt to deal with these problems is that we adopt several alternative approaches to identify group effects. We base the study on a rich set of Swedish panel data, and we find indications of group effects in each one of our approaches. |
| Keywords: | sick-pay insurance, work absence, moral hazard, reflection problem, social norms |
| JEL: | H56 I38 J22 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6245&r=soc |
| By: | Canta, Chiara; Dubois, Pierre |
| Abstract: | This paper studies spousal peer effects on the smoking behaviour and their implication for the health of children through passive smoking. Smoking decisions are modeled as equilibrium strategies of an incomplete information game within the couple. Using data from the French Health Survey 2002-2003, we identify two distinct effects linked to spousal behaviour: a smoking enhancing effect of smoking partners and a smoking deterring effect of non smoking partners. On the one hand, having a smoking partner might make smoking more valuable because of the possibility of smoking together. On the other hand, having a non smoking partner might reduce the utility of smoking because the smoker partially internalises the nuisance imposed on the partner. An implication of these findings is that the smoking behaviour could differ qualitatively in couples in which both partners smoke and in which just one partner smokes. This interpretation is supported by our finding that the respiratory health of children is negatively affected only if both parents smoke. |
| Keywords: | Smoking, Social Interaction, Simultaneous Game Model, Health |
| JEL: | C31 D10 I12 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25234&r=soc |