nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2011‒11‒28
eleven papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Euricse

  1. The Bright Side of Social Capital: How 'Bridging' Makes Italian Provinces More Innovative By Riccardo Crescenzi; Luisa Gagliardi; Marco Percoco
  2. Social Interactions and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Latin America. By Victoria Ateca-Amestoy; Alexandra Cortés Aguilar; Ana I. Moro-Egido
  3. The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs By Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul
  4. Group lending with endogenous group size By Bourjade, Sylvain; Schindele, Ibolya
  5. In vino veritas: Theory and evidence on social drinking By Haucap, Justus; Herr, Annika; Frank, Björn
  6. Ethnic Solidarity and the Individual Determinants of Ethnic Identification By Thomas Bossuroy
  7. Regional unemployment and norm-induced effects on life satisfaction By Chadi, Adrian
  8. Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems By Sung-Ha Hwang
  9. Employed but still unhappy? On the relevance of the social work norm By Chadi, Adrian
  10. Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games By Simon Halliday
  11. Measuring social embeddedness : how to identify social networks in science-industry partnerships ? By Marie Ferru; Michel Grossetti; Marie-Pierre Bès

  1. By: Riccardo Crescenzi; Luisa Gagliardi; Marco Percoco
    Abstract: Social capital has remained relatively underexplored in innovation literature. Existing studies have failed to reach a consensus on its impact on local innovative performance: some empirical analyses emphasize a positive effect, others speak about a 'dark side' of social capital. This paper aims to fill this gap by shedding new light on the differential role of 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital. The quantitative analysis of the innovative performance of the Italian provinces shows that social capital is an important predictor of innovative performance after controlling for 'traditional' knowledge inputs (R&D investments and human capital endowment) and other characteristics of the local economy. However, only 'bridging' social capital - based on weak ties - can be identified as the key driver of the process of innovation while 'bonding' social capital is shown to be negative for innovation. Instrumental variable analysis makes it possible to identify clear causal links between bridging (positive) and bonding (negative) social capital and innovation.
    Keywords: Innovation, social capital, knowledge transfer, regional development
    JEL: O31 O33 R15
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:sercdp:0096&r=soc
  2. By: Victoria Ateca-Amestoy (University of the Basque Country); Alexandra Cortés Aguilar (Universidad Industrial de Santander); Ana I. Moro-Egido (University of Granada)
    Abstract: In this paper, we seek to examine the effect of comparisons and social capital on subjective well-being. Furthermore, we test if, through social influence and exposure, social capital is either an enhancer or appeaser of the comparison effect. Using the Latinobarómetro Survey (2007) we find that in contrast to most previous studies, the comparison effect on well-being is positive; that is, the better others perform, the happier the individual is. We also find that social capital is among the strongest correlates of individuals’ subjective well-being in Latin American countries. Furthermore, our findings suggest that social contacts may enhance the comparison effect on individual’s happiness, which is more intense for those who perform worse in their reference group.
    Keywords: Comparison effect, social capital, subjective well-being, social interactions
    JEL: D31 I31 O54 Z10
    Date: 2011–11–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:201105&r=soc
  3. By: Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul
    JEL: A14 J16 J31 J33
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25166&r=soc
  4. By: Bourjade, Sylvain; Schindele, Ibolya
    Abstract: This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers' incentives to exert effort, a profit-maximizing financier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insufficient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-off between raising profits through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size.
    Keywords: Group Lending; Moral Hazard; Social Capital
    JEL: D82 G21
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34817&r=soc
  5. By: Haucap, Justus; Herr, Annika; Frank, Björn
    Abstract: It is a persistent phenomenon in many societies that a large proportion of alcohol consumption takes place in company of other people. While the phenomenon of social or public drinking is well discussed in disciplines as social psychology and anthropology, economists have paid little attention to the social environment of alcohol consumption. This paper tries to close this gap and explains social drinking as a trust facilitating device. Since alcohol consumption tends to make some people (unwillingly) tell the truth, social drinking can eventually serve as a signaling device in social contact games. Empirical support is obtained from a cross-country analysis of trust and a newly developed index of moderate alcohol consumption. --
    Keywords: social and public drinking,alcohol consumption,social contact games,trust,signaling
    JEL: C72 D71 L14
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:37&r=soc
  6. By: Thomas Bossuroy (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town)
    Abstract: This paper examines the individual determinants of ethnic identification using large sample surveys (about 30,000 respondents) representative of seven capitals of West-African countries. A small model that relates ethnic identification to an investment in ethnic capital suggests that individuals initially deprived of social or human capital resort to ethnicity to get socially inserted, and do even more so if their ethnic group itself is well inserted. Empirical results are consistent with this simple theory. First, education lowers ethnic salience. Second, ethnic identification is higher for uneducated unemployed or informal workers who seek a new or better job, and is further raised by the share of the individual’s ethnic group integrated on the job market. Third, ethnic identification is higher among migrants, and raised by the share of the migrant’s ethnic group that is employed. Group solidarity makes ethnic identity more salient for individuals deprived of other means for upward mobility.
    Keywords: Ethnicity, Identity, Social capital, Networks, Africa.
    JEL: A13 A14 D74 O17
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:69&r=soc
  7. By: Chadi, Adrian
    Abstract: While rising unemployment generally reduces people's happiness, researchers argue that there is a compensating social-norm effect for the unemployed individual, who might suffer less when it is more common to be unemployed. This empirical study, however, rejects this thesis for German panel data and finds individual unemployment to be even more hurtful when aggregate unemployment is higher. On the other hand, an extended model that separately considers individuals who feel stigmatised from living off public funds yields strong evidence that this group of people does in fact suffer less when the normative pressure to earn one's own living is lower. --
    Keywords: social norms,unemployment,well-being,social benefits,labour market policies
    JEL: I3 J6
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:47&r=soc
  8. By: Sung-Ha Hwang (Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul)
    Abstract: This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation. This occurs when agents can punish fellow group members who violate cooperative norms. Unlike existing approaches that focus on decentralized punishment, I view punishment to be a collective activity and show that pun- ishers can ?divide and conquer?defectors more e¢´ectively as the size of the group increases. To describe the punishment activities more precisely I develop a con?ict model which gener- alizes Lanchester?s equations - equations which describe the time evolution of the strengths of two competing armies.
    Keywords: Collective action, group size, collective punishment, Lanchester?s equation
    JEL: H41 D74
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgo:wpaper:1113&r=soc
  9. By: Chadi, Adrian
    Abstract: In the modern welfare state, people who cannot make a living usually receive financial assistance from public funds. Accordingly, the so-called social work norm against living off other people is violated, which may be the reason why the unemployed are so unhappy. If so, however, labour market concepts based on the notion of promoting low-paid jobs that are subsidised if necessary with additional payments would appear far less favourable. It could be that people are employed, but still unhappy. Using German panel data, this paper examines the relevance of the social work norm and finds a significant disutility effect of living off public funds. Although this is true for employed people as well, the results show that the individual is generally better off having a job that requires additional assistance, than having no job at all. On the other hand, such policies as the recent German labour market reforms can trigger undesired side-effects, if policy-makers ignore the issue of the social work norm. --
    Keywords: Unemployment,Social benefits,Low-wages,Labour market policies,Social norms,Well-being
    JEL: I31 J38 J60
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:42&r=soc
  10. By: Simon Halliday (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town)
    Abstract: In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects' endowments, might affect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is a affected, then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences specifically, should be affected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, first, a basic Dictator Game with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish them. The results conict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option, while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish the most self-interested option more than in the baseline.
    Keywords: Experimental Economics, Social Norms, Punishment, Strong Reciprocity, Social Preferences, Third Party.
    JEL: C91 D63
    Date: 2011–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:62&r=soc
  11. By: Marie Ferru; Michel Grossetti; Marie-Pierre Bès
    Abstract: Social embeddedness appears to be a promising way to analyze knowledge collaborations, notably to better understand their build up and their spatial patterns. Nevertheless, measurement problems and an over-territorialized conception of the notion exist. When studying the formation of these partnerships, authors have underlined the embeddedness of innovators in social ties as a major factor (Walker, Kogut, 1994 ; Zucker et al., 1998); others have shed light on institutional devices (Ponomariov, Boardman, 2010 ; Eom, Lee, 2010), but few have integrated both relational and institutional forms of embeddedness. Moreover, “embeddedness is mostly conceived of as a spatial concept related to the local and regional levels of analysis†(Hess, 2004): scholars argued (Moka et al., 2007) and showed (Fischer, 1982 ; Wellman, 1996; Grossetti, 2002) that social ties easily build-up in the neighborhood. They thus conclude social embeddedness favors local partnerships without demonstrating it really. Finally at the empirical level, precise data are missing to identify social embeddedness (Giuri, Mariani, 2007). Therefore, regarding the existing studies, “the analytical scales and the spatiality of embeddedness needs to be scrutinized†(Hess, 2004) theoretically and empirically to determine “who is embedded, in what and what is so spatial about it ?†(Pike et al., 2000). We propose here to address this deficit thanks to the formulation of a method robust enough. In this perspective, an analytical framework which does not postulate the social network hegemony is needed. We realized further theoretical refinements by introducing the concept of « coordination resources » to indicate modalities that permit connections between actors without using interpersonal ties. To identify embeddedness effects, we then present an original method essentially based on interviews. We use it to a group of 264 cases of science-industry collaborations realized in France. Several results are revealed thanks to statistical and econometric treatments. We reaffirm the major weigh of social embeddedness in the build-up of partnerships and the complementary role of coordination resources. Social embeddedness appears to be independent from the partners features. It nevertheless impacts the geography of the partnership although it is not possible to associate systematically social embeddedness and local collaborations.
    Date: 2011–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa11p971&r=soc

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