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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Dominic Rohner (Department of Economics, University of Zurich); Mathias Thoenig (Department of Economics, University of Lausanne); Fabrizio Zilibottix (Department of Economics, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabited by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects. |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:95&r=soc |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Pham Khanh, Nam (Faculty of Development Economics, University of Ho Chi Minh City) |
| Abstract: | The ability to provide public goods is essential for economic and social development, yet there is very limited empirical evidence regarding contributions to a real local public good in developing countries. This paper analyzes a field experiment where 200 households in rural Vietnam could make real contributions to an archetypical public good, a bridge. In particular, we study the role of two kinds of social influence: i) conditional cooperation, i.e., that people may be more willing to cooperate if others do, and ii) the effects of the default alternative, i.e., that people are influenced by the default alternative presented to them in the choice situation. We find significant and substantial effects of both kinds of influence. For example, by either giving the subjects the additional information that one of the most common contributions by others is 100,000 dong (a relatively low contribution) or introducing a zero-contribution default alternative, the average contribution decreases by about 20% compared to the baseline case. |
| Keywords: | voluntary contribution; local public goods; social influence; default contribution; conditional cooperation; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 Q50 |
| Date: | 2011–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0503&r=soc |
| By: | Sabatini, Fabio |
| Abstract: | We test the relationship between happiness and self-rated health in Italy. The analysis relies on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a representative sample (n = 817) of the population of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011. Based on probit regressions, instrumental variables estimates and structural equations modelling, we find that happiness is strongly correlated with perceived good health, after controlling for a number of relevant socio-economic phenomena. Health inequalities based on income, work status and education are relatively contained in respect to the rest of Italy. As expected, this scales down the role of social capital. |
| Keywords: | cooperative enterprises; happiness; health; instrumental variables; Italy; life satisfaction; non-profit; social capital; structural equations modelling |
| JEL: | I12 I31 I18 L31 C35 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30948&r=soc |
| By: | Juliane Scheffel |
| Abstract: | The widening of the working hour distribution complicates the coordination of social leisure. This paper examines the short- and long-run impact of unusual working schedules on social life using German Time Use Data for 2001/02. I find evidence that younger workers with higher than median earnings seem to accept higher levels of solitary leisure as investment and because of the substantial wage premia. Younger workers tend to substitute sleep with free time. Older workers, in contrast, tend to sleep less which can be interpreted as elevated risk of mental and physical health. |
| Keywords: | ShiftWork, Non-StandardWorking Hours, Time Allocation, Social Capital, Social Life, Solitary Leisure, Adverse Consequences |
| JEL: | J22 J28 J81 D62 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-025&r=soc |
| By: | Marina Murat; Barbara Pistoresi; Alberto Rinaldi |
| Abstract: | Emigrant associations abroad are structured nodes of social networks; they are manifestations of a transnational social capital. Italian associations are numerous, spread across several countries, in some cases they exist since the end of the nineteenth century, and may count on high numbers of members. Also, they are robustly tied to the home country. This paper assesses the effects of Italian associations abroad on the bilateral FDI between Italy and the countries of settlement of Italian diaspora. The main results are that these effects are positive and strongly significant, especially for the inward FDI and relatively to the countries with the oldest associations |
| Keywords: | international migration, FDI, Italy |
| JEL: | F21 F23 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:depeco:0654&r=soc |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Matthew O. Jackson |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution of the social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. "History" matters because agents only receive noisy information about the play of the previous generation and their interpretation of these signals is shaped by history. We characterize the conditions under which history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. The impact of history is potentially countered by "prominent" agents, whose actions are more visible (in our baseline model, observed by all future agents), and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of other agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. We also show that in equilibria not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of "reversion" whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. We study the evolution of the social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. "History" matters because agents only receive noisy information about the play of the previous generation and their interpretation of these signals is shaped by history. We characterize the conditions under which history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. The impact of history is potentially countered by "prominent" agents, whose actions are more visible (in our baseline model, observed by all future agents), and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of other agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. We also show that in equilibria not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of "reversion" whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D7 P16 Z1 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17066&r=soc |
| By: | Schwarzberg, Raphaelle |
| Abstract: | Social capital has been used to describe the links between guildsmen in pre-industrial times. However, contemporary historical research has shown that both English society and the guilds displayed more openness to newcomers than had been previously thought. This new perspective however does not preclude the use of social ties by individuals to gain a competitive advantage, as potential apprentices to find a master, or as Freemen to climb the ladder of power within the guilds. This dissertation will enquire into what type of social capital was used and by whom predominantly in the Goldsmiths’ Company. It rests on the creation of a new data set of fifty-seven masters who practiced their trade in the second half of the seventeenth century. Social capital will be analyzed according to geographical proximity, occupational proximity and kinship as they manifested in social networks. Results indicate that on the one hand, the Goldsmiths’ Company was on the whole open to individuals with no previous contacts through geographical proximity, occupational proximity or kin. The openness must however be nuanced with respect to the rural and poor apprentices as well as women. On the other hand, internal mobility within the guild highly depended on the belonging to a sub-group of goldsmiths who were practising banking activities. These findings confirm the recent literature on openness but bring new light to the processes of mobility and social capital within the guild of the London Goldsmiths’ Company. |
| JEL: | N0 O52 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:28446&r=soc |
| By: | Aleksynska, Mariya (CEPII, Paris); Chiswick, Barry R. (George Washington University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines differences in religious behaviors of the native born and immigrants in Europe, measured as self-reported religiosity, frequency of praying, and frequency of church attendance. Using the European Social Survey, we first show that, on average, religiosity of immigrants is higher than that of the native born, even among those without a religious affiliation. We test hypotheses that can explain these observations. Differences in individual characteristics, such as age, education, income, marital status, and notably denominations, partly account for the overall differences. Religiosity of immigrants declines with duration in the destination. Both origin and destination country characteristics, such as economic development, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards religion are important predictors of religiosity. These external factors are able to fully explain the difference in church attendance between immigrants and the native born. |
| Keywords: | economics of religion, religiosity, immigrants, secularization, culture, integration |
| JEL: | F22 J61 N3 Z12 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5724&r=soc |
| By: | Gerald Eisenkopf (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Ruslan Gurtoviy (Department of Business Administration, University of Trier, Germany); Verena Utikal (Department of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | A small lie appears trivial but it obviously violates moral commandments. We analyze whether the preference for others’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment for different sizes of lies controlling for the resulting economic harm. We find that people are sensitive to the size of a lie and that this behavioural pattern is driven by honest people. People who lie themselves punish softly in any context. |
| Keywords: | Lying, norm violation, punishment, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D82 |
| Date: | 2011–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1114&r=soc |
| By: | Kube, Sebastian; Maréchal, Michel André; Puppe, Clemens |
| Abstract: | What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducted a controlled field experiment to measure the extent to which monetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers' performance. We find that nonmonetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetary gifts of equivalent value. We also observe that when workers are offered the choice, they prefer receiving the money but reciprocate as if they received a nonmonetary gift. This result is consistent with the common saying, 'it's the thought that counts.' We underline this point by showing that also monetary gifts can effectively trigger reciprocity if the employer invests more time and effort into the gift's presentation. -- |
| Keywords: | field experiment,reciprocity,gift exchange,non-monetary gifts,in-kind gifts |
| JEL: | C93 J30 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:25&r=soc |