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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Marc Sangnier (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA) |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the co-evolution of social capital, measured as generalized trust, and financial development over the twentieth century. I use cross generations inherited trust of Americans with foreign ancestors to track trust in their home country in 1913 and 1990. The paper documents a positive cross-section relationship between trust and financial development in 1913. Then, I show that increasing trust is also associated with increasing financial development at the country level over the twentieth century. In other words, countries that experienced larger improvements in trust also experienced a stronger financial development. These results are robust to the introduction of real GDP per capita and trade openness as alternative determinants of financial development. |
| Keywords: | Financial development ; social capital ; trust |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00585008&r=soc |
| By: | Brown, Sarah (University of Sheffield); McHardy, Jolian (University of Sheffield); Taylor, Karl (University of Sheffield) |
| Abstract: | We explore the relationship between the social interaction of parents and their offspring from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Our theoretical framework establishes possible explanations for the intergenerational transfer of social interaction whereby the social interaction of the parent may influence that of their offspring and vice versa. The empirical evidence, based on four data sets covering Great Britain and the U.S., is supportive of our theoretical priors. We find robust evidence of intergenerational links between the social interaction of parents and their offspring supporting the existence of positive bi-directional intergenerational effects in social interaction. |
| Keywords: | social interaction, intergenerational transfer |
| JEL: | D19 H24 H41 H31 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5621&r=soc |
| By: | Cary Deck; Maroš Servátka; Steven Tucker (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; promises; partnership; guilt aversion; psychological game theory; trust; lies; social distance; behavioral economics; hidden action |
| JEL: | C70 C91 |
| Date: | 2011–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:11/14&r=soc |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Alexander James (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | The field of social psychology explores how a person behaves within the context of other people. The social context can play a substantive role in non-market allocation decisions given peoples choices and values extend beyond the classic market-based exchange institution. Herein we explore how social psychology has affected one aspect of environmental economics: preference elicitation through survey work. We discuss social representation, social isolation, framing through cheap talk, and commitment theory through an oath. |
| Keywords: | Social psychology, Commitment, Persuasive communication, Preference elicitation |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00584247&r=soc |
| By: | Maroš Servátka; Steven Tucker; Radovan Vadovič (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | Should one use words or money to foster trust of the other party if no means of enforcing trustworthiness are available? This paper reports an experiment studying the effectiveness of two types of mechanisms for promoting trust: a costly gift and a costless message as well as their mutual interaction. We nest our findings in the standard version of the investment game. Our data provide evidence that while both stand-alone mechanisms enhance trust, and a gift performs significantly worse than a message. Moreover, when a gift is combined with sending a message, it can be counterproductive |
| Keywords: | Communication; content analysis; experimental economics; gift giving; investment game; message; trust; trustworthiness |
| JEL: | C70 C91 |
| Date: | 2011–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:11/13&r=soc |
| By: | Tim Ehlers |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model showing an incentive for a group of people to vote for higher tuition fees, even if these fees have no quality effect. The incentive is based on a non-monetary influence on utility, namely the social status or prestige of graduating. The basic assumption is that the higher the prestige is, the lower the number of people studying. In a static equilibrium, it is shown that a group of wealthier and more able people can exist that attempts to prevent others from studying. |
| JEL: | I22 J24 H52 |
| Date: | 2011–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:cegedp:120&r=soc |
| By: | Tom Broekel; Matte Hartog |
| Abstract: | A key question raised in recent years is which factors determine the structure of inter-organizational networks. While the focus has primarily been on different forms of proximity between organizations, which are determinants at the dyad level, recently determinants at the node and structural level have been highlighted as well. To identify the relative importance of determinants at these three different levels for the structure of networks that are observable at only one point in time, we propose the use of exponential random graph models. Their usefulness is exemplified by an analysis of the structure of the knowledge network in the Dutch aviation industry in 2008 for which we find determinants at all different levels to matter. Out of different forms of proximity, we find that once we control for determinants at the node and structural network level, only social proximity remains significant. |
| Keywords: | exponential random graph models, inter-organizational network structure, network analysis, proximity, aviation industry, economic geography |
| JEL: | R11 D85 L14 L62 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1107&r=soc |
| By: | Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Cooperation is indispensable in human societies, and much progress has been made towards understanding human pro-social decisions. Formal incentives, such as punishment, are suggested as potential effective approaches despite the fact that punishment can crowd out intrinsic motives for cooperation and detrimentally impact efficiency. At the same time, evolutionary biologists have long recognized that cooperation, especially food sharing, is typically efficiently organized in groups living on wild foods, even absent formal economic incentives. Despite its evident importance, the source of this voluntary compliance remains largely uninformed. Drawing on costly signaling theory, and in light of the widely established competitive nature of males, we hypothesize that unique and displayable rewards (trophies) out of competition may trigger male generosity in competitive social environments. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, competition, gender, trophy, evolution |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1022&r=soc |
| By: | Bengtsson, Niklas (Uppsala Center for Labor Studies); Engström, Per (Uppsala Center for Labor Studies) |
| Abstract: | Results in behavioral economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out effort, if agents are mission-oriented rather than self-interested. We test this prediction on a sample of nonprofit organizations in Sweden. Swedish nonprofit organizations receive tax funds annually to promote global development issues through information campaigns. Traditionally, the contract with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) has been based on trust and self-regulation. We designed an experimental policy intervention, effectively replacing the trust-based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal, along with a threat to cut future funds if irregularities were detected. Our findings are inconsistent with (strong) motivational crowd-out. Overall, using both self-reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention improved effciency. Graphical analysis shows that non-monitored organizations exhibit a distinct tendency to maximize expenditure; in contrast, organizations in the treatment group are more likely to return unused grants to Sida. Additionally, we find no crowding out of private contributions and no evidence of a \discouraged NGO"-syndrome. |
| Keywords: | Bureaucrats; NGO; Economics of psychology; Foreign aid; Randomized experiments; Hawthorne effect; Laboratory vs. field evidence; Treatment externalities; Spillover effects; Reference group contamination |
| JEL: | H83 L31 O19 |
| Date: | 2011–04–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uulswp:2011_006&r=soc |
| By: | Cervellati, Matteo (University of Bologna); Sunde, Uwe (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of democratization during the “Third Wave”, we find evidence that the effect of democratization is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, which suggests that part of the positive growth effect of democratization arises because democratization reduces conflict incidence. When accounting for the role of violence during democratization, we find evidence that peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported in the previous literature, while violent transitions to democracy have no, or even negative, effects on economic growth. |
| Keywords: | democratization, armed conflict, civil war, economic growth, democratization scenario, peaceful transition |
| JEL: | O43 N10 N40 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5643&r=soc |
| By: | Margherita Comola (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper takes a network perspective t oinvestigate how rural households in developing countries form the links through which they provide and get economic support. I test the hypothesis that indirect contacts (e.g. friends of friends) matter for link formation. An estimation procedure of a network formation model à la Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is proposed and applied to data on a single village in Tanzania. Results show that when agents evaluate the net advantage of forming a link they also consider the wealth and the position of indirect contacts. The network externalities from indirect contacts are negative, which suggests a mechanism of competition over scarce resources. This paper proposes the first structural estimation of an endogenous network formation model, and also contributes to the development literature by overcoming the dyadic regression approach and providing evidence that village-level network structure has an explanatory value disregarded by all previous studies. |
| Keywords: | mutual support ; network formation ; structural estimation ; indirect contacts |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00585968&r=soc |
| By: | Panagiotis Arsenis; Dimitrios Varvarigos |
| Abstract: | We build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity/child quality trade-off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital. By integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth, corruption and fertility choices, we offer a novel mechanism on the driving forces behind demographic transition. In particular, we attribute it to the endogenous change in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption that occurs at different stages of an economy?s transition towards higher economic development. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Demographic transition; Human capital; Economic growth |
| JEL: | D73 H52 J13 O41 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:11/28&r=soc |
| By: | Kevin Denny (School of Economics and Geary Institute, University College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the question of whether higher levels of education contribute to greater tolerance of homosexuals. Using survey data for Ireland and exploiting a major reform to education, the abolition of fees for secondary schools in 1968, it is shown that increases in education causes individuals to be significantly more tolerant of homosexuals. Ignoring the endogeneity of education leads to much lower estimates of the effect of education. Replicating the model with data for the United Kingdom generates very similar results. |
| Keywords: | education, homophobia, tolerance, social returns |
| Date: | 2011–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucd:wpaper:201109&r=soc |
| By: | Ari Aisen; Francisco José Veiga |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample covering 169 countries, and 5-year periods from 1960 to 2004, we find that higher degrees of political instability are associated with lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Regarding the channels of transmission, we find that political instability adversely affects growth by slowing productivity growth and, to a smaller degree, physical and human capital accumulation. Finally, economic freedom and ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to growth, while democracy may have a slight negative effect. |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chb:bcchwp:568&r=soc |
| By: | Stephen Hall; George S. Tavlas; P. A. V. B. Swamy |
| Abstract: | The method of instrumental variables (IV) and the generalized method of moments (GMM) has become a central technique in health economics as a method to help to disentangle the complex question of causality. However the application of these techniques require data on a sufficient number of instrumental variables which are both independent and relevant. We argue that in general such instruments cannot exist. This is a reason for the widespread finding of weak instruments. |
| JEL: | C32 C51 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:11/24&r=soc |