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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Deepti Goel (Delhi School of Economics); Kevin Lang (Boston University and NBER, IZA) |
| Abstract: | We show that increasing the probability of obtaining a job offer through the network should raise the observed mean wage in jobs found through formal (non-network) channels relative to that in jobs found through the network. This prediction also holds at all percentiles of the observed wage distribution, except the highest and lowest. The largest changes are likely to occur below the median. We test and confirm these implications using a survey of recent immigrants to Canada. We also develop a simple structural model, consistent with the theoretical model, and show that it can replicate the broad patterns in the data. For recent immigrants, our results are consistent with the primary effect of strong networks being to increase the arrival rate of offers rather than to alter the distribution from which offers are drawn. |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:201022&r=soc |
| By: | Sergio Beraldo; Robert Sugden |
| Abstract: | This paper offers a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation. In the model, interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and the evolutionary process selects strategies according to material payoffs. The cooperation problem is modelled as a game similar to Prisoner’s Dilemma, but there is an outside option of nonparticipation and the payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, this payoff exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; voluntary participation; random payoffs. |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:18-2010&r=soc |
| By: | P. Bönisch; Lutz Schneider |
| Abstract: | Individuals’ preferences in transition regions are still shaped by the former communist system. We test this ‘Communism legacy’ hypothesis by examining the impact of acculturation in a communist regime on social network participation and, as a consequence, on preferences for spatial mobility. We focus on the paradigmatic case of East Germany where mobility intentions seem to be substantially weaker than in the western part. Applying an IV ordered probit approach we firstly find that East German people acculturated in a Communist system are more invested in locally bounded informal social capital than West Germans. Secondly, we confirm that membership in such locally bounded social networks reduces the intention to move away. Thirdly, after controlling for the social network effect the mobility gap between East and West substantially reduces. Low spatial mobility of the eastern population, we conclude, is to an important part attributable to a social capital endowment characteristic to post-communist economies. |
| Keywords: | regional mobility, social capital, East Germany |
| JEL: | J61 R23 C35 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:16-10&r=soc |
| By: | Lorenz Goette; David Huffman; Stephan Meier; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | We investigate how group boundaries, and the economic environment surrounding groups, affect altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to platoons. We find that, without competition between groups, individuals are more prone to cooperate altruistically in a prisoner's dilemma game with in-group as opposed to out-group members. They also use a costly punishment option to selectively harm those who defect, encouraging a norm of cooperation towards the group. Adding competition between groups causes even stronger in-group cooperation, but also a qualitative change in punishment: punishment becomes anti-social, harming cooperative and defecting out-group members alike. These findings support recent evolutionary models and have important organizational implications. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Punishment, Army, Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2010-24&r=soc |
| By: | Luca Corazzini; Filippo Pavesi; Beatrice Petrovich; Luca Stanca |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for possible repetitions in the information they receive. The results indicate that network structure plays a significant role in determining social influence. How- ever, the most influential agents are not those with more outgoing links, as predicted by the persuasion bias hypothesis, but those with more incoming links. We show that a boundedly rational updating rule that takes into account not only agents' outdegree, but also their inde- gree, provides a better explanation of the experimental data. In this framework, consensus beliefs tend to be swayed towards the opinions of influential listeners. We then present an effort-weighted updating model as a more general characterization of information aggregation in social networks. |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:196&r=soc |
| By: | Lan Shi |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2010-07&r=soc |
| By: | Cherry, Josh; Salant, Stephen; Uler, Neslihan |
| Abstract: | Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form output-sharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level. Whether individuals manage to form the efficient number of groups and to invest within the chosen groups as theory predicts, however, has not been previously determined. We investigate these questions experimentally. We find that subjects do vote in most cases to divide themselves into the optimal number of output-sharing groups, and in addition do decrease the inefficiency significantly (by 50% to 71%). We did observe systematic departures from the theory when the group sizes are not predicted to induce socially optimal investment. Without exception these are in the direction of the socially optimal investment, confirming the tendency noted elsewhere in public goods experiments for subjects to be more “other-regarding” than purely selfish. |
| Keywords: | catch-sharing, common-pool resources, efficient private provision, free-riding, laboratory experiment, partnership solution |
| Date: | 2010–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-43&r=soc |
| By: | Tristan Boyer; Nicolas Jonard (CREA, University of Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the conditions under which efficient behavior can spread from a finite initial seed group to an infinite population living on a network. We formulate conditions on payoffs and network structure under which overall contagion occurs in arbitrary regular networks. Central in this process is the communication pattern among players who are confronted with the same decision, i.e. who are at the same distance from the initial seed group. The extent to which these agents interact among themselves (rather than with players who already have faced or subsequently will face the decision problem) is critical in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Coordination Game the key element is the cohesion of the efficient cluster, a property which is different from the one identified in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Additional results are obtained when we distinguish the interaction and information neighborhoods. Specifically, we find that contagion tends to be favored by fast neighborhood growth if an assumption of conservative behavior is made. We discuss our findings in relation to the notions of clustering, transitivity and cohesion. |
| Keywords: | imitation, contagion, regular graphs, local interaction game |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D70 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:10-03&r=soc |
| By: | Rudolf Berghammer (Computer-Aided Program Development - Institute of Computer Science - Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Harrie De Swart (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte-Logica en taalanalyse - Universiteit van Tilburg) |
| Abstract: | We present an application of relation algebra to measure agents' `strength' in a social network with influence between agents. In particular, we deal with power, success, and influence of an agent as measured by the generalized Hoede-Bakker index and its modifications, and by the influence indices. We also apply relation algebra to determine followers of a coalition and the kernel of an influence function. This leads to specifications, which can be executed with the help of the BDD-based tool RelView after a simple translation into the tool's programming language. As an example we consider the present Dutch parliament. |
| Keywords: | RelView; relation algebra; social network; Hoede-Bakker index; influence index |
| Date: | 2010–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00515878_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Quentin David (CREA, University of Luxembourg); Gilles Van Hamme (IGEAT, Université Libre de Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the processes behind the neighborhood effect in electoral geography. Studies on neighborhood effect have largely ignored the local institutions and cultural milieu within which people are socialized. By taking into account the spatially differentiated social supervision of individuals, we are able to highlight the impact of local institutions on electoral behavior and restore the temporal dimension that has shaped the political specificities of places. In the case of Belgium, we show that social supervision (which took the very accomplished form of pillars) affects voting behavior through two different channels: a direct effect, coming from the family transmission of pillar values, and a contextual effect captured by a measure of the local embeddedness of the pillar. |
| Keywords: | electoral geography, neighborhood effect, social supervision, pillar, Belgium |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:10-05&r=soc |
| By: | van Praag, Bernard M. S. (University of Amsterdam); Romanov, Dmitri (Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel); Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada (IAE Barcelona (CSIC)) |
| Abstract: | We analyze individual satisfaction with life as a whole and satisfaction with the personal financial situation for Israeli citizens of Jewish and Arab descent. Our data set is the Israeli Social Survey (2006). We are especially interested in the impact of the religions Judaism, Islam and Christianity, where we are able to differentiate between individuals who vary in religiosity between secular and ultra-orthodox. We find a significant effect of religiosity on happiness. With respect to Jewish families it is most striking that the impact of family size on both life and financial satisfaction seems to vary with religiosity. This might be a reason for differentiation in family equivalence scales. For Arab families we did not find this effect. First-generation immigrants are less happy than second-generation immigrants, while there is no significant difference between second-generation families and native families. The effect of the Lebanon War is much less than expected. |
| Keywords: | happiness, subjective well-being, financial satisfaction, Israel, religion, immigration, terrorism |
| JEL: | H56 I31 N35 N45 R23 Z12 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5184&r=soc |
| By: | Clausen, Bianca; Kraay, Aart; Murrell, Peter |
| Abstract: | A potential concern with survey-based data on corruption is that respondents may not be fully candid in their responses to sensitive questions. If reticent respondents are less likely to admit to involvement in corrupt acts, and if the proportion of reticent respondents varies across groups of interest, comparisons of reported corruption across those groups can be misleading. This paper implements a variant on random response techniques that allows for identification of reticent respondents in the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria fielded in 2008 and 2009. The authors find that 13.1 percent of respondents are highly likely to be reticent, and that these reticent respondents admit to sensitive acts at a significantly lower rate than possibly candid respondents when survey questions are worded in a way that implies personal wrongdoing on the part of the respondent. |
| Keywords: | Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,E-Business,Social Analysis,Social Accountability,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress |
| Date: | 2010–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5415&r=soc |