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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (Centre of Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Benedikt Herrmann (Centre of Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Christian Thoeni (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities. |
| Keywords: | human cooperation; punishment; culture; experimental public good games |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-09&r=soc |
| By: | Luigi Guiso (European University Institute, EIEF, & CEPR); Paola Sapienza (Northwestern University, NBER, & CEPR); Luigi Zingales (University of Chicago, NBER, & CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This chapter reviews the recent debate about the role of social capital in economics. We argue that all the difficulties this concept has encountered in economics are due to a vague and excessively broad definition. For this reason, we restrict social capital to the set of values and beliefs that help cooperation—which for clarity we label civic capital. We argue that this definition differentiates social capital from human capital and satisfies the properties of the standard notion of capital. We then argue that civic capital can explain why differences in economic performance persist over centuries and discuss how the effect of civic capital can be distinguished empirically from other variables that affect economic performance and its persistence, including institutions and geography.. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1005&r=soc |
| By: | Tan Tay Keong |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the realization of Singapore’s vision of “active citizenship†and “state-society partnershipâ€, to a significant extent, depends on how social capital is being created and renewed in Singapore’s evolving political landscape.[Working Paper 9] |
| Keywords: | Singapore, vision, active citizenship, state-society, partnership, social capital, renewed, political landscape |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2544&r=soc |
| By: | Lea Cassar; Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social net- works at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in ex- plaining brain drain. The e¤ects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We distinguish between the role of insidership and personal connections. The larger the cost of being an outsider, the smaller is the number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic job market. Per- sonal connections partly compensate for this e¤ect by attracting highly connected researchers back. However, starting from a world with no dis- tortions, personal connections also increase brain drain. |
| Keywords: | Brain Drain; Social Networks; Institutions; Asymmetric In- formation; Italian Academia |
| JEL: | D82 F22 I20 J24 J44 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2010-12&r=soc |
| By: | Chi, Feng; Yang, Nathan |
| Abstract: | Our general objective is to characterize the recent and well publicized diffusion of Twitter among politicians in the United States 111th House of Representatives. Ultimately, Barrack Obama, Facebook and peers matter when it comes to the propensity and speed of Twitter adoption. A basic analysis of the distribution of first Tweets over time reveals clustering around the President's inauguration; which holds regardless whether the adopter is Democratic or Republican, or an incumbent or newcomer. After we characterize which representatives are most likely to adopt Twitter, we confirm the widespread belief that Facebook and Twitter are indeed complementary technology. Given their perceived desire for accessible government, a surprising result is that Republicans are more likely to adopt Twitter than Democrats. Finally, using the exact dates of each adopter's first Tweet, we demonstrate that the diffusion of Twitter is faster for those representatives with a larger number of peers already using the technology, where peers are defined by two social networks: (1) Politicians representing the same state; and (2) politicians belonging to the same committees; especially so for those in committee networks. This observed behavior can be rationalized by social learning, as the instances in which the peer effects are important correspond to the cases in which social learning is relevant. |
| Keywords: | Communication; diffusion of technology; political marketing; social interaction; social media; social learning. |
| JEL: | M3 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23225&r=soc |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how social comparison information about referent others (i.e. learning what similar others do and how they are treated) affects reciprocal relationships. Using a three-person gift-exchange game we study how employees’ reciprocity towards an employer is affected by exposure to pay comparison information (what co-workers earn) and effort comparison information (how co-workers perform). We find that pay comparison information does not affect reciprocity. Effort comparison information, however, influences reciprocal relationships in important ways: the ability to observe reciprocal behavior on the part of others strongly affects employees’ reciprocity towards the employer. While our data show that social information in principle may either erode or amplify reciprocal relationships, we find that, on average, social comparisons have a detrimental impact on reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity, gift-exchange, social information, social comparisons, pay comparisons |
| JEL: | A13 C92 J31 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-10&r=soc |
| By: | Laurence Kranich; Matteo Cervellati; Joan Esteban |
| Abstract: | We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nya:albaec:10-05&r=soc |
| By: | Drouvelis, Michalis (University of York); Metcalfe, Robert (University of Oxford); Powdthavee, Nattavudh (University of York) |
| Abstract: | Research on public goods mainly focuses its attention on the ability of incentives, beliefs and group structure to affect behaviour in social dilemma interactions. This paper investigates the pure effects of a rather subtle mechanism on social preferences in a one-shot linear public good game. Using priming techniques from social psychology, we activate the concept of cooperation and explore the extent to which this intervention brings about changes in people’s voluntary contributions to the public good and self-reported emotional responses. Our findings suggest that priming cooperation increases contribution levels, controlling for subjects' gender. Our priming effect is much stronger for females than for males. This difference can be explained by a shift in subjects' beliefs about contributions. We also find a significant impact of priming on mean positive emotional responses. |
| Keywords: | priming, contributions, beliefs, emotional responses, public goods experiments |
| JEL: | C92 D01 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4963&r=soc |
| By: | Chakravarty, Surajeet; Fonseca, Miguel A. |
| Abstract: | Social fragmentation has been identified as a potential cause for the under-provision of public goods in developing nations, as well as in urban communities in developed countries such as the U.S. We study the effect of social fragmentation on public good provision using laboratory experiments. We create two artificial social groups in the lab and we assign subjects belonging to both groups to a public good game. The treatment variable is the relative size of each social group, which is a proxy for social fragmentation. We find that while higher social fragmentation leads to lower public good provision, this effect is short-lived. Furthermore, social homogeneity does not lead to higher levels of contributions. |
| Keywords: | Social Identity; Public Goods; Social Fragmentation; Experiments. |
| JEL: | C92 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23115&r=soc |
| By: | Britta Hoyer; Kris De Jaegher |
| Abstract: | Networks are one of the essential building blocks of society. Not only do firms cooperate in R&D networks, but firms themselves may be seen as networks of information-exchanging workers. Social movements increasingly make use of networks to exchange information, just as on the negative side criminal and terrorist networks use them. However, the literature on networks has mainly focused on the cooperative side of networks and has so far neglected the competition side of networks. Networks themselves may face competition from actors with opposing interests to theirs. Several R&D networks may compete with one another. The firm as a network of employees obviously faces competition. In particular, given the importance of connectivity for networks, competing networks may try to disrupt each other, by trying to convince key players in competing networks to defect, or to stop sponsoring key links (strategic network disruption). In response, networks that face competition will adapt their structure, and will avoid vulnerable network structures. Such network competition is what our paper is concerned with. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Network Disruption, Strategic Network Design, Noncooperative Network Games |
| JEL: | C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1013&r=soc |
| By: | Matthias Opfinger |
| Abstract: | Despite all economic and social transitions that have occurred in the last centuries we still find that people go to church. Somehow religious beliefs have not vanished over time. Since there is no material reward for going to church or praying religiosity has to create utility through other means. It could raise peoples' personal well-being. In this paper we use information from the World Values Survey about subjective happiness and life satisfaction. We relate this information to revealed religiosity and measure if religiosity makes people happier. We use different methods and also control for economic factors, family matters, health, and democracy. The key finding is that there seems to be a U-shaped relationship between personal well-being and religiosity, especially so for happiness. This result is consistent throughout all our estimations. Our analysis also gives hints that higher income might lead to higher subjective well-being |
| Keywords: | personal well-being, happiness,life satisfaction, religiosity, U-shaped relationship |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieasw:455&r=soc |
| By: | Smith, John |
| Abstract: | Measures of preferences are primarily useful in that they are helpful in predicting behavior. We perform an experiment which demonstrates that the timing of the measurement of social preferences can affect such a measure. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular technique, Social Value Orientation (SVO). We vary the order of the SVO measurement and a lager stakes dictator game. In our first study, we find that subjects with prosocial preferences act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered first, whereas those with selfish preferences are unaffected by the order. In our second study we vary the order of the SVO measurement and a nonstandard dictator game. We do not find the effect found in the first study. This suggests that the effect found in the first study is driven by choices involving the size of surplus. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics; social values; dictator game; social value orientation |
| JEL: | D64 Z13 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–06–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23282&r=soc |