nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2010‒03‒13
ten papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
University of Siena

  1. The Solaria Syndrome: Social capital in a growing hypertechnological economy By Antoci Angelo; Sabatini Fabio; Sodini Mauro
  2. Economic Insecurity and the Spread of Obesity in Social Networks By Michael G. Barnes; Trenton Smith; Jonathan K. Yoder
  3. Teen overweight, weight stigma, and intimate relationship development from adolescence to young adulthood By Yen-hsin Alice Cheng; Nancy S. Landale
  4. Neighborhood Effects and Housing By Yannis M. Ioannides
  5. Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime By Natalia
  6. The Solaria Syndrome: Social Capital in a Growing Hyper-technological Economy By Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini , Mauro
  7. Multiple information search and employee participation in occupational pension plans By Kathrin Johansen
  8. Experimenting with Strategic Experimentation: Risk Taking, Neighborhood Size and Network Structure By Niels D. Grosse
  9. Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks By Noga Alon; Michal Feldman; Ariel D. Procaccia; Moshe Tennenholtz
  10. I piani formativi settoriale e di filiera: lo sviluppo del capitale intellettuale e del capitale sociale nell’Appennino bolognese By Ferrari , Filippo

  1. By: Antoci Angelo; Sabatini Fabio; Sodini Mauro
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic model to analyze the sources and the evolution of social participation and social capital in a growing economy characterized by exogenous technical progress. Starting from the assumption that the well-being of agents basically depends on material and relational goods, we show that the best-case scenarios hold when technology and social capital both support just one of the two productions at the expenses of the other. However, trajectories are possible where technology and social interaction balance one another in fostering the growth of both the social and the private sector of the economy. Along such tracks, technology may play a crucial role in supporting a “socially sustainable” economic growth.
    Keywords: Technology, economic growth, relational goods, social participation, social capital
    JEL: O33 J22 O41 Z13
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:0062&r=soc
  2. By: Michael G. Barnes; Trenton Smith; Jonathan K. Yoder (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)
    Abstract: A number of recent studies have provided evidence suggesting that increases in body weight may spread via social networks. The mechanism(s) by which this might occur have become the subject of much speculation, but to date little direct evidence has been available. We provide evidence for one such mechanism: economic insecurity. Using a sample of working-age men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we show that cohabitation with working (but not non-working) adults appears to be protective against weight gain. We address the potential endogeneity of the independent variable by employing instrumental variables in our regression analysis.
    Keywords: overweight, contagion, obesity, networks
    JEL: D12 I12
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsu:wpaper:tgsmith-6&r=soc
  3. By: Yen-hsin Alice Cheng (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Nancy S. Landale
    Abstract: With an emphasis on how weight stigma is manifested in social relationship context, this study explores two under-studied consequences of adolescent overweight, timing of first sex and subsequent intimate relationship development. The data employed come from Waves I to III of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. The results indicate that overweight adolescents have significantly later onset of first sex and are more likely to enter early adulthood without any intimate relationship experience when compared to normal-weight youth. Overweight adolescents are vulnerable to discriminatory treatments such as being rejected by or having less close relationships with peers and are thus less likely to have any intimate relationship. The study contributes to the existing literature on overweight youth by revealing the critical role of prejudiced social encounters in peer relationships as the key context that hinders the development of intimate relationships from adolescence to early adulthood. Future studies should seek to understand the broader implications of poor social adjustments during adolescence for later development.
    JEL: J1 Z0
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2010-008&r=soc
  4. By: Yannis M. Ioannides
    Abstract: This chapter presents a number of approaches that economists have used in studying neighborhood effects in housing markets. It emphasizes how individuals in effect choose neighborhood effects, or more generally social interactions, via their location decisions. The chapter looks constructively at neighborhood effects and rather than reviewing the role of neighborhood effects as mere externalities that might interfere with locational equilibrium, and focuses on what we have learned empirically about their role by observing locational decisions along with individual and group characteristics. It examines several classes of models which economists have relied upon in exploring the role and empirical significance of neighborhood effects that originate in housing markets. It takes the concept of neighborhood effects quite literally as arising in residential neighborhoods. For precisely this reason, the chapter emphasizes how we may detect empirically the presence of neighborhood effects when they may be priced by housing markets and be capitalized into housing values and rents. The chapter focuses on models that are empirically relevant and help identify neighborhood effects, and discusses actual empirical findings.
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0747&r=soc
  5. By: Natalia (University of Padua)
    Abstract: Relying on the relevance of other-regarding preferences in workplaces, the paper provides a behavioral explanation for the puzzle of unpaid overtime. It characterizes the optimal compensation schemes offered by the employer which induce overtime by exploiting workers’ horizontal reciprocity under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers’ action. Finally, the paper shows that reciprocity furnishes a rationale for the composition of teams of reciprocal workers when the production technology induces negative externality among the employees’ efforts.
    Keywords: Overtime, Horizontal Reciprocity, Negative Reciprocity.
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0114&r=soc
  6. By: Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini , Mauro
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic model to analyze the sources and the evolution of social participation and social capital in a growing economy characterized by exogenous technical progress. Starting from the assumption that the well-being of agents basically depends on material and relational goods, we show that the best-case scenarios hold when technology and social capital both support just one of the two productions at the expenses of the other. However, trajectories are possible where technology and social interaction balance one another in fostering the growth of both the social and the private sector of the economy. Along such tracks, technology may play a crucial role in supporting a “socially sustainable” economic growth.
    Keywords: Technology; economic growth; technical progress; relational goods; social participation; social interaction; social capital
    JEL: O41 A13 J22 O33 Z13
    Date: 2010–02–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:21023&r=soc
  7. By: Kathrin Johansen (University of Rostock)
    Abstract: Multiple searches for information can increase individual participation in occupational pension programs. This paper tests hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and search theory to explain the formation of information networks on pensions. Using a dataset representative of the German population, we empirically investigate the determinants of network formation with respect to information about occupational pensions. We find that transaction costs, provision of information by the employer, quality of the intermediary, and subjective concern with this topic increase willingness to participate in a network and increase the number of network partners.
    Keywords: information search, occupational pensions, network formation
    JEL: D83 J14
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ros:wpaper:114&r=soc
  8. By: Niels D. Grosse (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of neighborhood size and network structure on strategic experimentation. We analyze a multi-arm bandit game with one safe and two risky alternatives. In this setting, risk taking produces a learning externality and an opportunity for free riding. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether group size and the network structure affect risk taking. We find that group size has an effect on risk taking that is qualitatively in line with equilibrium predictions. Introducing an asymmetry among agents in the same network with respect to neighborhood size leads to substantial deviations from equilibrium play. Findings suggests that subjects react to changes in their direct neighborhood but fail to play a best-response to their position within the network.
    Keywords: strategic experimentation, experiment, bandit game, risk taking
    JEL: C91 D81 D85 O33
    Date: 2010–02–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-011&r=soc
  9. By: Noga Alon; Michal Feldman; Ariel D. Procaccia; Moshe Tennenholtz
    Abstract: We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of the facility. Specifically, we are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. We wish to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents can never benefit by lying, or, even better, group strategyproof, in the sense that a coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. At the same time, our mechanisms must provide a small approximation ratio with respect to one of two optimization targets: the social cost or the maximum cost. We give an almost complete characterization of the feasible truthful approximation ratio under both target functions, deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and with respect to different network topologies. Our main results are: We show that a simple randomized mechanism is group strategyproof and gives a tight approximation ratio of 3/2 for the maximum cost when the network is a circle; and we show that no randomized SP mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2-o(1) to the maximum cost even when the network is a tree, thereby matching a trivial upper bound of two.
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp541&r=soc
  10. By: Ferrari , Filippo
    Abstract: This paper describes the action-research aimed at implementing Sectorial Training Plans in the territory of the former Mountain Community Cinque Valli Bolognesi, near Bologna in central northern Italy. Been involved in research are a variety of agencies, both public and private, institutional and technical, and work has identified three sectors (building conservation, tourism, energy production from renewable sources) to be developed. Furthermore, research has highlighted the need for a meta-managerial role of government of the territory.
    Keywords: training needs; local development; human resources management
    JEL: R58 O15
    Date: 2010–02–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:20983&r=soc

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