|
on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Corneo, Giacomo (Free University of Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Interpersonal relations are shaped by the judgements associated with the social categories that individuals perceive in their social contacts. I develop a model of how those judgments form based on a theory of symbolic values. The model depicts the interaction between two values, one associated with an inherited ethnic trait ("nationality") and one with an endogenous achievement trait ("income"). Individuals who are less likely to achieve are predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile relations with immigrants. Multiple equilibria are possible and better schooling may eliminate equilibria with xenophobia. Econometric findings from three large surveys corroborate the predictions derived from the theoretical model. |
| Keywords: | nationalism, immigration, interpersonal relations, value systems |
| JEL: | Z1 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4315&r=soc |
| By: | Grund, Christian (University of Würzburg); Harbring, Christine (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | Based on two representative samples of employees, the German Socio Economic Panel and the European Social Survey, we explore the relation between certain measures of control in employment relationships (i.e. working time regulations, use of performance appraisal systems, monitoring by supervisors, autonomy to organize the work) and individuals’ inclination to trust others. Trust is measured by the general trust question like in most other economic studies based on surveys. We find that strict working time regulations, monitoring and lack of autonomy – all indicators for control at the workplace – are negatively related to trust. Moreover, we contribute to the literature on trust by gathering hints to other potential determinants of trust. |
| Keywords: | autonomy, control, monitoring, performance appraisal, regulation of working time, trust |
| JEL: | J81 M12 M5 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4297&r=soc |
| By: | Rooks, Gerrit; Szirmai, Adam; Sserwanga, Arthur |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the characteristics and determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour in Uganda. It is based on a recent survey of urban and rural entrepreneurs, executed in May 2008. The main dependent variables are business success, gestation activities and innovative performance. The paper focuses in particular on the interplay of human and social capital in determining entrepreneurial performance. A prominent question in the literature is whether human capital and social capital act as complements or substitutes in furthering entrepreneurial dynamism.We find that Ugandan enterprises are predominantly very small and not very dynamic. Most enterprises are young, with little or no growth of employment since start-up. Only a very small subset of sample entrepreneurs could be classified as entrepreneur in the dynamic |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2009-09&r=soc |
| By: | Knack, Stephen; Eubank, Nicholas |
| Abstract: | The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets targets for increased use by donors of recipient country systems for managing aid. A consensus view holds that country systems are strengthened when donors trust recipients to manage aid funds, but undermined when donors manage aid through their own separate parallel systems. This paper provides an analytical framework for understanding donors’ decisions to trust in country systems or instead to micro-manage aid using their own systems and procedures. Where country systems are sufficiently weak, the development impact of aid is reduced by donors’ reliance on them. Trust in country systems will be sub-optimal, however, if donors have multiple objectives in aid provision rather than a sole objective of maximizing development outcomes. Empirical tests are conducted using data from an OECD survey designed to monitor progress toward Paris Declaration goals. Trust in country systems is measured in three ways: use of the recipient’s public financial management systems, use of direct budget support, and use of program-based approaches. The authors show using fixed effects regression that a donor’s trust in recipient country systems is positively related to (1) trustworthiness or quality of those systems, (2) tolerance for risk on the part of the donor’s constituents, as measured by public support for providing aid, and (3) the donor’s ability to internalize more of the benefits of investing in country systems, as measured by the donor’s share of all aid provided to a recipient. |
| Keywords: | Gender and Health,Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness,Economic Theory&Research,Disability,Microfinance |
| Date: | 2009–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5005&r=soc |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Frédéric Koessler (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris) |
| Abstract: | We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players' preferences and the equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conflict of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with whom they communicate. Apart from some specific cases, the equilibrium communication networks are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social welfare always increases as the communication network expands. |
| Keywords: | Cheap talk ; coordination ; incomplete information ; networks |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367692_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Reuben, Ernesto (Columbia University); Riedl, Arno (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidental but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding contribution possibilities but not regarding earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way. |
| Keywords: | public good, heterogeneous groups, punishment, cooperation, social norms, norm enforcement |
| JEL: | H41 C92 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4303&r=soc |
| By: | Sonja C. Kassenboehmer; John P. Haisken-DeNew |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of social assistance payments (SAP or Sozialhilfe) in determining levels of life satisfaction in Germany using the SOEP 1995–2004. We find strong evidence that individuals in Germany are negatively influenced by increased SAP payments controlling for income, whether or not they actually receive such payments (stigma and social jealousy). While there are obvious benefits to making SAP to those needy, there are substantial negative externalities experienced by those who neither receive SAP nor qualify (counterfactual SAP). Furthermore, these negative effects are even stronger for those who do receive benefits (stigma) suggesting that social jealousy and stigma are a force to be reckoned with when evaluating social policy.We show that the added benefits of increasing SAP are reduced by 50 to 100% because of social jealousy and stigma costs, whereas child benefits (Kindergeld) are seen to enhance life satisfaction over and above a simple income effect. Further, own-earned income, over and above the SAP subsistence level is valued much higher than transfer payments at the SAP subsistence level, suggesting a policy focus on increasing employment integration efforts for SAP recipients as opposed merely to providing SAP transfers. |
| Keywords: | Well being, life satisfaction, social assistance, stigma, social jealousy |
| JEL: | I31 I38 J64 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0117&r=soc |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | In the dynamic game we consider, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only paper to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the network. In every period, each agent strategically chooses whether or not to transmit the items he holds to this neighbors in the network. The sooner all the items are gathered by any individual, the better it is for the group of players as a whole. Besides, the agent who first centralizes all the items is offered an additional reward that he keeps for himself. In this framework where information transmission is strategic and physically restricted, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a group to pool information items in every equilibrium. This condition is independent of the network structure. The architecture of links however affects the time needed before items are centralized in equilibrium. This paper provides theoretical support to Bonacich (1990)'s experimental results. |
| Keywords: | Social network ; social dilemma ; dynamic network game ; strategic communication |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367894_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Nijkamp, Peter |
| Abstract: | Entrepreneurship has been a topical issue in the business administration literature, but in the past decade a wave of interest can be observed on the role of entrepreneurship in the economic growth literature. This paper aims to highlight the various contributions to the entrepreneurship literature from the perspective of regional economic development. After a broad overview, particular attention is given to the regional action space of entrepreneurs, including their social and spatial network involvement. The paper concludes with a future research agenda. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship, regional growth, action space, networks, SME, virtual organization, innovation |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2009-08&r=soc |
| By: | Emilio Barucci (Department of Mathematics, Politecnico di Milano); Marco Tolotti (Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice) |
| Abstract: | We analyze a class of binary dynamic models inspired by [4] on agents’ choices and social interaction. The main feature of our analysis is that agents are heterogeneous, in particular their attitude to interact with the choices of the other agents changes over time endogenously. Although dynamic approaches to the study of models with heterogeneous agents have been already applied in different fields, to our knowledge a complete study of an endogenously varying population of agents has not yet been pursued. As observed in [3], the main problem is given by the fact that with heterogeneous agents the system may be non reversible. We address these problems, we describe the (possible multiple) steady states of the processes involved, we analyze local and global stability and we discuss the similarities and the differences with respect to the literature. Applications are also provided. |
| Keywords: | heterogeneous agent models, intensity-based models, mean field interactions, random utilities, social interactions. |
| JEL: | D71 D81 C62 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpaper:189&r=soc |
| By: | Amoros, Jose Ernesto |
| Abstract: | Over the last few years we have observed a prominent flourishing of empirical studies on the determinants of new business creation and its effect on the economy. The present study focuses on an important determinant of entrepreneurship: the quality of institutions. This paper is an empirical exploratory work that has the objective of uncovering the relationships between entrepreneurial dynamics and different variables related to the quality of government institutions, with an emphasis on developing countries. The study is based on the panel data of 60 countries that participated in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project. The results indicate that the quality of institutions is a relevant factor for the distribution and type of entrepreneurial activities. Some implications for public policy are discussed. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship, government institutions, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2009-07&r=soc |