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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Amrish Patel; Edward Cartwright |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyse the effect that naive agents (those who take behaviour at "face value") have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naive inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naive agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms. |
| Keywords: | Signalling; Conformity; Social Norms; Naive beliefs |
| JEL: | D82 D83 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0906&r=soc |
| By: | Christopher Blattman; Edward Miguel |
| Abstract: | Most nations have experienced an internal armed conflict since 1960. The past decade has witnessed an explosion of research into the causes and consequences of civil wars, belatedly bringing the topic into the economics mainstream. This article critically reviews this interdisciplinary literature and charts productive paths forward. Formal theory has focused on a central puzzle: why do civil wars occur at all when, given the high costs of war, groups have every incentive to reach an agreement that avoids fighting? Explanations have focused on information asymmetries and the inability to sign binding contracts in the absence of the rule of law. Economic theory has made less progress, however, on the thornier (but equally important) problems of why armed groups form and cohere, and why individuals decide to fight. Likewise, the actual behavior of armed organizations and their leaders is poorly understood. On the empirical side, a vast cross-country econometric literature has aimed to identify the causes of civil war. While most work is plagued by econometric identification problems, low per capita incomes, slow economic growth and geographic conditions favoring insurgency are the factors most robustly linked to civil war. We argue that microlevel analysis and data are needed to truly decipher war’s causes, and understand the recruitment, organization, and conduct of armed groups. Recent advances in this area are highlighted. Finally, turning to the economic legacies of war, we frame the literature in terms of neoclassical economic growth theory. Emerging stylized facts include the ability of some economies to experience rapid macroeconomic recoveries, while certain human capital impacts appear more persistent. Yet econometric identification has not been adequately addressed, and there is little consensus on the most effective policies to avert conflicts or promote postwar recovery. The evidence is weakest where it is arguably most important: in understanding civil wars’ effects on institutions, technology, and social norms. |
| JEL: | H56 O10 O40 C80 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14801&r=soc |
| By: | Robert Jiro Netzer; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | We show that the level of trust and reciprocity in an intercultural trust game experiment between Austrian and Japanese subjects differs from the results of an intracultural experiment run in the respective countries among compatriots. Austrian subjects show significantly higher levels of trust towards Japanese subjects than towards fellow countrymen. Japanese do not differentiate between Austrian or Japanese subjects. Japanese subjects are found to be less reciprocal than Austrian subjects. A post-experimental survey reveals differences in culture-specific dispositions between the two countries that can explain the country-specific differences. |
| Keywords: | intercultural experiment, intracultural experiment, trust game, Austria, Japan |
| JEL: | C91 C71 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-05&r=soc |
| By: | Basit Zafar |
| Abstract: | Social interdependence is believed to play an important role in how people make individual choices. This paper presents a simple model constructed on the premise that people are motivated by their own payoff as well as by how their actions compare with those of other people in their reference group. I show that conformity of actions may arise either from learning about the norm (social learning), or from adhering to the norm because of image-related concerns (social influence). To disentangle the two empirically, I use the fact that image-related concerns can be present only if actions are publicly observable. The model predictions are tested in a "charitable contribution" experiment in which the actions and identities of the subjects are unmasked in a controlled and systematic way. Both social learning and social influence seem to play an important role in the subjects' choices. In addition, individuals gain utility simply by making the same choice as the reference group (social comparison) and change their contributions in the direction of the social norm even when their identities are hidden. Once the identities and contribution distributions of group members are revealed, individuals conform to the modal choice of the group. Moreover, I find that social ties (defined as subjects knowing one another from outside the experimental environment) affect the role of social influence. In particular, a low-contribution norm evolves that causes individuals to contribute less in the presence of people they know. |
| Keywords: | Human behavior ; Social choice |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:365&r=soc |
| By: | Sylvia Keim (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Andreas Klärner (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Laura Bernardi (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Although the relevance of social interactions or social networks for fertility research has been increasingly acknowledged in recent years, little is known about the channels and mechanisms of social influences on individuals� fertility decision making. Drawing on problem-centred interviews and network data collected among young adults in western Germany the authors show that qualitative methods broaden our understanding of social and contextual influences on couples� fertility intentions, by exploring the phenomenon, taking into account subjective perceptions, analysing interactions within networks as well as the dynamics of networks. Qualitative methods allow for the collection and analysis of rich retrospective information on network dynamics in relation to life course events. This also can be helpful both to complement the still rare longitudinal data on social networks and to develop parsimonious and efficient survey instruments to collect such information in a standardized way. |
| Keywords: | Germany, fertility, qualitative methods, social network |
| JEL: | J1 Z0 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2009-006&r=soc |
| By: | Gary Charness (University of California, Santa Barbara); Chun-Lei Yang |
| Abstract: | We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously, through the use of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where there are economies of scale: in two treatments the social value of an incremental contribution to the group account increases with the size of the group, but in the second treatment, the social value is capped once a certain group size is reached. Societies of nine people are initially formed randomly into three groups of three people who play the game for three periods. Individuals then learn about the average contribution of each individual (by ID number) in one's current own group, as well as the average contribution in other groups, and can decide whether to exit the group. Remaining group members choose whether to exclude any current members from the group; the new groups and 'free agents' then choose whether to merge with other existing groups and/or other free agents. We find a great degree of success for this mechanism. The average contribution rate is quite high in both treatments, but is modestly (albeit significantly) higher in the first treatment, when there is no cap on the social value of a contribution. In the first treatment, we see large and stable groups forming, but we see considerably more instability and smaller group sizes in the second treatment. The driving force appears to be the economies of scale combined with the awareness that bad behavior will result in ostracism, but in the Athenian sense of possible redemption. This redemption is a unique feature of our environment, with about one-third of the population becoming good citizens after initially being low contributors. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous group formation, Exclusion, Experiment, Merger, Ostracism, Public goods, Social efficiency, Voting, |
| Date: | 2008–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:13-08&r=soc |
| By: | Zachary Grossman |
| Abstract: | Part of why people give is because doing so sends a positive signal about the giver. The intended audience may be another person or the giver herself, yet the relative importance of social-signaling versus self-signaling is unclear. Using the predictions of a model of a preference-signaling decision-maker, I separately test for social-signaling and self-signaling in an experimental dictator game in which, with some probability, the outcome is determined by chance. Lowering the probability that the dictator's choice will count while holding constant the recipient's information has little impact on behavior, but holding constant this probability while increasing the noisiness of the recipient's signal significantly reduces giving. This provides evidence of social-signaling, but not self-signaling and suggests that giving is largely tied to what it says to others, as opposed to the self. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving, altruism, dictator game, self-image, self-signaling, signaling, beliefsdependent preferences, |
| Date: | 2009–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:01-09&r=soc |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Frédéric Koessler (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris) |
| Abstract: | We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players' preferences and the equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conflict of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with whom they communicate. Apart from some specific cases, the equilibrium communication networks are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social welfare always increases as the communication network expands. |
| Keywords: | Cheap talk ; coordination ; incomplete information ; networks |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00367692_v1&r=soc |