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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Ahmed, Ali M. (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Using quasi-experimental data, this paper examines the relationship between religiosity and prosocial behavior. In contrast to previous studies which identify religious people by how often they attend religious services or by their self-reported religiosity, this study compares the behavior of highly devout students who are preparing to enter the clergy, to the behavior of other students in a public-goods game and in the dictator game. The results show that religious students were significantly more cooperative in the public-goods game and significantly more generous in the dictator game than other students.<p> |
| Keywords: | generosity; trust; cooperation; religion; experiment |
| JEL: | C90 Z12 |
| Date: | 2008–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0330&r=soc |
| By: | Ahmed, Ali M. (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Salas, Osvaldo (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Does religion enhance prosocial behavior? We investigate the ways in which implicit influences of religious concepts affect generosity and cooperation. In contrast to previous studies, we assess the direct impact of religion as an independent variable on prosocial behavior. We do so by subliminally priming participants with religious concepts in a scrambled sentence task before they play a dictator game and a prisoner’s dilemma game. We found that implicit priming of religious concepts significantly increased prosocial behavior in both games. This result was present among both religious and nonreligious participants. Selfreported measure of religiosity was related neither to generosity nor to cooperation.<p> |
| Keywords: | religion; priming; dictator game; prisoner’s dilemma game |
| JEL: | C90 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0331&r=soc |
| By: | Shuang LI; Ming LU; Hiroshi Sato |
| Abstract: | Party membership and social networks, as two forms of nonmarket power, have significant effects on personal income. Do the effects vary across different ownership sectors (suoyouzhi xingzhi)? Using a nationally representative survey of urban households (China Household Income Project surveys in 1995 and 2002), we find that (1) party membership can significantly increase personal income, but this effect does not significantly differ between different ownership sectors or between the years 1995 and 2002 and (2) social networks are insignificant in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while they contribute significantly to personal income in non-SOE sectors. |
| Keywords: | Income, Party membership, Social networks, Ownership, Maketization |
| JEL: | J40 O15 P26 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd08-011&r=soc |
| By: | Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, and IZA); Joeri Sol (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions. |
| Keywords: | social interaction; altruism; incentive contracts; co-worker satisfaction |
| JEL: | D86 J41 M50 |
| Date: | 2008–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080094&r=soc |
| By: | Vigier, A. |
| Abstract: | The present paper suggests a possible framework to analyze the impact of changes to the economic and social environment on the topology of networks formed. Economic (costs) and social (norms) constraints bind individuals in their ability to create ties with others. When global phenomena affect these constraints, the overall shapes of resulting networks naturally alter. I attempt to shed light on this relationship. |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0851&r=soc |
| By: | Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Agnieszka Rusinowska (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) |
| Abstract: | In the paper, we study a model of influence in a social network. It is assumed that each player has an inclination to say YES or NO which, due to influence of other players, may be different from the decision of the player. The point of departure here is the concept of the Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes the overall decisional "power" of a player in a social network. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision in terms of success and failure. In this paper, we separate the influence part from the group decision part, and focus on the description and analysis of the influence part. We propose among other descriptive tools a definition of a (weighted) influence index of a coalition upon an individual. Moreover, we consider different influence functions representative of commonly encountered situations. Finally, we propose a suitable definition of a modified decisional power. |
| Keywords: | Influence function, influence index, decisional power, social network. |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00344457_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Bin Dong; Uwe Dulleck; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This implies that people observe a lower probability to be involved in corruption if on average the guilt level of others within a country is higher. We also explore whether - and to what extent - group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. In other words, we explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. The empirical section presents evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set covering almost 20 years. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level. |
| Keywords: | corruption; contagion effect; conditional cooperation; interdependent preferences |
| JEL: | K42 D72 D64 O17 J24 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-29&r=soc |
| By: | Rafael Di Tella; Robert MacCulloch |
| Abstract: | We test for whether, once "basic needs" are satisfied, there is happiness adaptation to further gains in income using three data sets. Individual German Panel Data from 1985-2000, and data on the well-being of over 600,000 people in a panel of European countries from 1975-2002, shows different patterns of adaptation to income across the rich and poor. We find evidence that for wealthy Germans, and for the rich half of European nations, higher levels of per capita income don't buy greater happiness. The reason appears to be adaptation. However even for the rich half of European nations such habituation may take over 5 years so the happiness gains that they experience, whilst not permanent, can still be relatively long-lasting. Finally we study a cross section of nations in 2005 from the World Gallup Poll and find that the past 45 years of economic growth (from 1960-2005) in the rich half of nations has not brought happiness gains above those that were already in place once the 1960s standard of living had been achieved. However in the poorest half of nations we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the happiness gains they have experienced from the past 45 years of growth have been the same as the gains that they experienced from growth prior to the 1960s. |
| JEL: | D0 I31 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14539&r=soc |
| By: | Markus Kitzmueller |
| Abstract: | Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an important economic phenomenon with broad implications for .rms, employees, consumers, investors, governments and NGOs alike. This paper collects, structures and combines scattered pieces of economic theory and empirical evidence in novel ways that shed light on various fundamental economic questions related to CSR. The main conjecture presents individual preferences as the ultimate driving force behind any form of CSR. In the presence of social stakeholder preferences, firms may use strategic CSR to maximize profits, while not-for-profit CSR may satisfy shareholders. social ambitions. Only if managers take CSR beyond strategic levels or shareholder preferences, does CSR constitute moral hazard. Incentives and mechanisms underlying for-profit CSR will be outlined in greater detail. Six frameworks for the analysis of strategic CSR are proposed and analyzed. Finally, some empirical issues related to measurement and estimation of CSR are briefly discussed. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Social Responsibility, Public Goods Provision, Preferences, Strategic CSR |
| JEL: | D21 D6 H11 L21 L22 M14 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2008/37&r=soc |
| By: | Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques); Francesco Saraceno (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques) |
| Abstract: | The paper endorses the thesis that current macro imbalances are partly due to an excess of household savings in China, whose origin is to be found among other things in household uncertainty about the provision of public services like health care, pensions and education. Focusing on health services, because of their priority in the concerns of the Chinese people, we describe the recent trends in the provision of health care. We then argue that social spending by the government may have important intergenerational content, in that it allows higher private spending, lower inequality, higher levels of human capital and the like. All these factors are related to the potential growth rate of the economy. We conclude that a more important role of the government in the sector of public services, and in particular of health care, may help reduce the possibility of future bottlenecks, and hence help keeping the Chinese economy on a sustainable growth path. We conclude the paper by an assessment of the current debate on how to reform the system, and we advocate universal publicly funded basic health coverage. |
| Keywords: | Social Spending, Health Care, Sustainable Growth, Chinese Economy, Savings Glut |
| JEL: | I11 I18 N35 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fce:doctra:0827&r=soc |
| By: | Declerck C.H.; Boone Ch.; Kiyonari T. |
| Abstract: | The neuropeptide Oxytocin (OT), implicated in mammalian social behavior, may affect cooperation through its anxiolytic and affiliative properties. The current study experimentally investigates how OT interacts with three well-studied determinants of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas: extrinsic incentives, social cues, and individual differences. Participants received OT or a placebo following a double blind procedure and played two economic games with randomly determined partners: a Coordination Game (with strong extrinsic incentives to cooperate (CG)) and a Prisoner’s Dilemma (with weak extrinsic incentives (PD)). Social cues were present when participants had the chance to meet their partners in advance, and absent when the interactions were anonymous. A first prediction, that OT enhances cooperation when social cues are present, was confirmed by the data. This appeared to be more pronounced when participants played a CG. In contrast, in a PD we predicted that OT’s influence on cooperation would depend on the subject’s intrinsic willingness to cooperate, as assessed by means of his/her Social Value Orientation and Machiavellianism. The data indicate that for prosocials, OT and social cues appear to be substitutes, with either one being sufficient to overcome fear of betrayal and elicit cooperation. For proselfs, OT and social cues appear to be complements: their concurrence is essential to overcome greediness in situations with weak cooperative incentives. Machiavellists cooperated very little overall, and the combination of OT and social cues, in contrast to proselfs, actually reduced machiavellists’ willingness to cooperate. |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2008014&r=soc |
| By: | Dash, Rajdeep K (School of Electronics and Computer Science,University of Southampton); Giovannucci, Andrea (Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, Spanish Council for Scientific Research); Jennings, Nicholas R. (School of Electronics and Computer Science,University of Southampton,); Mezzetti, Claudio (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Ramchurn, Sarvapali D. (School of Electronics and Computer Science,University of Southampton); Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A. (Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, Spanish Council for Scientific Research) |
| Abstract: | Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive-compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e. maximise social utility) and individually rational (i.e. agents prefer to join rather than opt out). However, an important assumption of these mechanisms is that the agents will always successfully complete their allocated tasks. Clearly, this assumption is unrealistic in many real-world applications where agents can, and often do, fail in their endeavours. Moreover, whether an agent is deemed to have failed may be perceived differently by different agents. Such subjective perceptions about an agent’s probability of succeeding at a given task are often captured and reasoned about using the notion of trust. Given this background, in this paper, we investigate the design of novel mechanisms that take into account the trust between agents when allocating tasks. Specifically, we develop a new class of mechanisms, called trust-based mechanisms, that can take into account multiple subjective measures of the probability of an agent succeeding at a given task and produce allocations that maximise social utility, whilst ensuring that no agent obtains a negative utility. We then show that such mechanisms pose a challenging new combinatorial optimisation problem (that is NP-complete), devise a novel representation for solving the problem, and develop an effective integer programming solution (that can solve instances with about 2×105 possible allocations in 40 seconds). |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:880&r=soc |
| By: | Emmanuelle Lavallée (DIAL, Paris); Mireille Razafindrakoto (DIAL, IRD, Paris); François Roubaud (DIAL, IRD, Paris) |
| Abstract: | (english) This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on the extent of trust in political institutions using a rich collection of comparable data provided by the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, we set out to test the “efficient grease” hypothesis that corruption can strengthen citizens’ trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this increases institutional trust. Our findings reject this theoretical argument. We show that corruption never produces trust-enhancing effects regardless of the evaluation of public service quality. The results reveal how perceived and experienced corruption impact negatively, but differently, on citizens’ trust in political institutions. The adverse effect of perceived corruption decreases with the fall in public service quality, whereas the negative effect of experienced corruption decreases as public service quality increases. _________________________________ (français) Cet article explore les interactions entre la confiance institutionnelle et la corruption à partir d’un riche corpus d’enquêtes-ménages comparables : les enquêtes Afrobaromètre réalisées dans 18 pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne. Plus précisément, il teste les théories de l’ « huile dans les rouages » selon lesquelles la corruption peut renforcer la confiance des citoyens en leur permettant d’accéder à des services publics autrement inaccessibles. Nos résultats infirment clairement ces théories. Nous montrons que la corruption réduit clairement la confiance et ce quelque soit la qualité des services gouvernementaux. Ils suggèrent toutefois que l’expérience et la perception de la corruption ont des effets distincts sur la confiance institutionnelle. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Institutions. |
| JEL: | D73 P48 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt200807&r=soc |