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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces of social information systematically influences employees’ reciprocity. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-worker’s effort decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity, gift-exchange, social information, social comparisons, pay comparisons, peer effects |
| JEL: | A13 C92 J31 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2008-09&r=soc |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Strategic Interaction Group); Hartmut Kliemt (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management) |
| Abstract: | Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible - there is, strictly speaking, no social choice - individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political institutions that embody liberal values (political liberalism) or because individuals make up their mind in a specifically "liberal" way of forming ethical judgment (philosophical liberalism). Seen in this light the Paradox of Liberalism is of theoretical or philosophical interest but not a practical problem of political (institutional) liberalism. |
| Keywords: | Philosophical Liberalism, Political Liberalism, Public Choice, Social Choice |
| JEL: | B3 B52 D6 D7 D71 |
| Date: | 2008–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-061&r=soc |
| By: | David E. Bloom (Harvard School of Public Health); David Canning (Harvard School of Public Health); Isabel Günther (Harvard School of Public Health); Sebastian Linnemayr (Harvard School of Public Health) |
| Abstract: | There is strong evidence that, in addition to individual and household characteristics, social interactions are important in determining fertility rates. Social interactions can lead to a multiplier effect where an individual’s ideas, and fertility choice, can affect the fertility decisions of others. We merge all available Demographic and Health Surveys to investigate the factors that influence both individual and average group fertility. We find that in the early phase of the fertility transition the impact of a woman’s education and experience of child death on her group’s average fertility are more than three times as large as their direct effect on her own fertility decision. |
| Keywords: | demography, growth, age structure, population, economy. |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gdm:wpaper:3408&r=soc |
| By: | David Dreyer Lassen (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Gabriel Helene Bie Lilleør (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling and payments of pensions in the form of remittances. We show, using detailed household level data from rural Tanzania, that informal institutions of social control, rooted in tribal affiliations, determine both the household's investment in schooling and the probability that it receives remittances from migrants. This is consistent with a framework in which households' expected returns in the form of remittances, which is determined partly by the prospects of social control over migrants, influence current investments in schooling. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational contract; social compact; schooling; human capital; traditions; ethnicity; ethnic diversity; social capital; Tanzania; Africa |
| JEL: | D13 O15 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuieca:2008_03&r=soc |
| By: | Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Leibbrandt, Andreas (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of other-regarding and time preferences for cooperation in the field. We study the preferences of fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from using a common pool resource (CPR). The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future yield for both others and themselves. Accordingly, economic theory predicts that more cooperative and more patient individuals should be less likely to exploit the CPR. Our data supports this prediction because fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, exploit the fishing grounds less in their daily lives. Moreover, because the laboratory public goods game exhibits no inter-temporal spillovers, measured time preferences should not predict cooperative behavior in the laboratory. This prediction is also borne out by our data. Thus, laboratory preference measures are useful to capture important dimensions of field behavior. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, common pool resource, experiments, generalizability, methodology |
| JEL: | B4 C9 D8 O1 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3625&r=soc |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Strategic Interaction Group); Hartmut Kliemt (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management) |
| Abstract: | Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paper explores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural "norm(ative) facts" within the search for an inter-personal (W)RE - (Wide) Reflective Equilibrium on normative issues. Assuming that pro-social behaviour "reveals" ethical orientations, it is argued that these "norm-facts" can and should be used along with stated preferences in justificatory arguments of normative ethics and economics of the "means to given ends" variety. |
| Keywords: | Meta-Ethics, Experimental Economics, Reflective Equilibrium |
| JEL: | D64 D7 K00 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-062&r=soc |
| By: | Steven Proud |
| Abstract: | The effect of a child’s peers has long been regarded as an important factor in affecting their educational outcomes. However, these effects follow several different mechanisms and are often difficult to estimate, due to unobserved selection. This paper builds on the work of Hoxby (2000) and uses exogenous changes in the proportion of girls within UK school cohorts to estimate the effect of a more female peer group. I include estimates of effects at a classroom level for schools that appear to contain only one class per cohort to estimate the direct effect of a peer group. Further, I examine if there is a differential effect of boys and girls with differing socioeconomic status, and also examine the effect of a more female peer group on a child’s value added score. I find large significant negative effects of a more female peer group on boy’s outcomes in English, whilst in maths and science, both boys and girls benefit from a more able peer group up until age 11. |
| Keywords: | peer groups, education |
| JEL: | J13 D1 I21 I38 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:08/186&r=soc |
| By: | Adele Atkinson; Simon Burgess; Paul Gregg; Carol Propper; Steven Proud |
| Abstract: | The effect of a more able peer group on a child’s attainment is considered an integral part in estimating a pupil level educational production function. Examinations in England at age 16 are tiered according to ability, leading to a large stratification of pupils by ability. However, within tiers, there is a range of policies between schools regarding setting, ranging from credibly random to strict setting by results from examinations at age 14. We use this variation to estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, with school and teacher fixed effects, of the effect of a more able peer group using a subset of schools that has apparently random allocation of pupils. As a robustness test of the apparently random setting results, we use an instrumental variables (IV) methodology developed by Lefgren (2004b). We find significant, positive, and non-trivial effects of a more able peer group using both the OLS and IV estimations for English and mathematics. |
| Keywords: | peer groups, education |
| JEL: | J13 D1 I21 I38 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:08/187&r=soc |