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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Benno Torgler; Bin Dong |
| Abstract: | The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has an impact on corruption controlling for a large number of factors. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Political Interest, Social Norms |
| JEL: | K42 D72 O17 J24 |
| Date: | 2008–03–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:dpaper:229&r=soc |
| By: | Eichberger, Jürgen (Sonderforschungsbereich 504); Kelsey, David (Department of Economics, The University of Birmingham); Schipper, Burkhard (University of California, Davis Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing)equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements. |
| Date: | 2007–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:07-19&r=soc |
| By: | Fabio Maccheroni; Massimo Marinacci; Aldo Rustichini |
| Abstract: | We introduce a theoretical framework in which to study interdependent preferences, where the outcome of others affects the preferences of the decision maker. The dependence may take place in two conceptually different ways, depending on how the decision maker evaluates what the others have. In the first he values his outcome and that of others on the basis of his own utility. In the second, he ranks outcomes according to a social value function. These two different views of the interdependence have separate axiomatic foundations. We then characterize preferences according to the relative importance assigned to social gains and losses, or in other words to pride and envy. Finally, we study a two period economy in which agents have our social preferences. We show how envy leads to conformism in consumption behavior and pride to diversity. |
| Keywords: | Social preferences, social economics. |
| JEL: | D81 E21 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:71&r=soc |
| By: | Draca, Mirko (CEP, London School of Economics); Machin, Stephen (University College London); Witt, Robert (University of Surrey) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the causal impact of police on crime by looking at what happened to crime before and after the terror attacks that hit central London in July 2005. The attacks resulted in a large redeployment of police officers to central London boroughs as compared to outer London – in fact, police deployment in central London increased by over 30 percent in the six weeks following the July 7 bombings. During this time crime fell significantly in central relative to outer London. Study of the timing of the crime reductions and their magnitude, the types of crime which were more likely to be affected and a series of robustness tests looking at possible biases all make us confident that our research approach identifies a causal impact of police on crime. Implementing an instrumental variable approach shows an elasticity of crime with respect to police of approximately -0.3, so that a 10 percent increase in police activity reduces crime by around 3 percent. |
| Keywords: | crime, police, terror attacks |
| JEL: | H00 H5 K42 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3410&r=soc |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach; Frédéric Koessler |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we consider situations in which individuals want to choose an action close to others' actions as well as close to a payoff relevant state of nature with the ideal proximity to the common state varying across the agents. Before this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who decide to whom they reveal the private information they hold about the state. The strategic information transmission taking place in the communication stage is characterized by a "strategic communication network". We provide a direct link between players' preferences and the strategic communication network emerging at equilibrium, depending on the strength of the coordination motive and the prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very tractable way and compared in term of efficiency. In general, a maximal strategic communication network may not exist and communication networks cannot be ordered in the sense of Pareto. However, expected social welfare always increases when the communication network expands. Strategic information transmission can be improved when group or public communication is allowed, and/or when information is certifiable. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pse:psecon:2008-10&r=soc |
| By: | Linardi, Sera; McConnell, Margaret A. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1282&r=soc |
| By: | Samuel Bowles (Santa Fe Institute, University of Siena and University of Massachusetts); Sung Ha Hwang (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) |
| Abstract: | Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these conditions. We identify cases in which a sophisticated planner cognizant of these non-additive effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent. JEL Categories: D52, D64, H21. H41 |
| Keywords: | Social preferences, implementation theory, incentive contracts, incomplete contracts, framing, motivational crowding out, ethical norms, constitutions |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2008-06&r=soc |
| By: | Thierry Mayer (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | Using data on name distributions in 95 French d´epartements observed from 1946 to 2002, we investigate spatial and social mechanisms behind the transmission of parental preferences. Drawing inspiration from recent work on social interactions, we develop a simple discrete choice model that predicts a linear relationship between choices by agents in one location and the choices made in neighboring areas. We explain the shares of parents that give their children Saint, Arabic, and American-type names. In a second exercise we examine the effect of distance between locations on dierences in name-type shares. In our last exercise we consider dissimilarity in actual names rather than name-types. Using Manhattan Distances as our metric, we find a steady and substantial decline in the importance of geographic distance. Meanwhile, differences in class and national origins have increasing explanatory power. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00266554_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Adrian de la Garza (Yale University); Atsushi Sannabe (Kyoto University); Katsunori Yamada (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper utilizes survey data of Japanese union workers to pro- vide new insights to the \happiness and economics" literature. A cru- cial item that distinguishes our empirical analyses from previous stud- ies is the use of data on workers' expectations of their peers' wages. With our data, we conrm that individuals report higher levels of subjective well-being (SWB) when they perceive that their wages are higher relative to their peers'. On the other hand, the traditional ap- proach in the literature constructs relative wages from Mincer equa- tions, thus presuming that individuals infer their peers' wages the way econometricians do. We argue that this method may be inappropriate. Moreover, we address the issue of endogeneity of our subjective refer- ence income measure employing an instrumental variables approach, and corroborate the causality from relative income to SWB. Addition- ally, we study the relationship between SWB measures and workers' individual characteristics, and compare our results with standard nd- ings in the literature for U.S. and European workers. In agreement with these studies, women and married individuals seem to be happier than their counterparts, men and single workers. However, we observe a U-shaped relationship between education and happiness, which con- trasts with ndings for U.S. and British workers. Finally, we attempt to explain these relationships in the context of the Japanese social background. |
| Keywords: | subjective well-being; relative utility; sub- jective reference income |
| JEL: | C25 D00 J28 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:0810&r=soc |
| By: | Lewis, Maureen; Lockheed, Marlaine |
| Abstract: | Despite a sharp increase in the share of girls who enroll in, attend, and complete various levels of schooling, an educational gender gap remains in some countries. This paper argues that one explanation for this gender gap is the degree of social exclusion within these countries, as indicated by ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, which triggers both economic and psycho-social mechanisms to limit girls ' schooling. Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity initially was applied to explaining lagging economic growth, but has emerged in the literature more recently to explain both civil conflict and public goods. This paper is a first application of the concept to explain gender gaps in education. The paper discusses the importance of female education for economic and social development, reviews the evidence regarding gender and ethnic differences in schooling, reviews the theoretical perspectives of various social science disciplines that seek to explain such differences, and tests the relevance of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in explaining cross-country differences in school attainment and learning. The study indicates that within-country ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity partly explains both national female primary school completion rates and gender differences in these rates, but only explains average national learning outcomes when national income measures are excluded. |
| Keywords: | Primary Education,Education For All,Gender and Education,Population Policies,Disability |
| Date: | 2008–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4562&r=soc |
| By: | Syngjoo Choi; Douglas Gale; Shachar Kariv; Thomas Palfrey |
| Date: | 2008–03–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001997&r=soc |
| By: | Berninghaus, Siegfried K. (Universität Karlsruhe); Ehrhart, Karl-Martin (Universitaet Karlsruhe); Ott, Marion (Universitaet Karlsruhe) |
| Abstract: | A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are interested in the resulting formation of networks and the action distributions. Compared with static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Berninghaus and Vogt, 2004, 2006; Bramoulle, Lopez-Pintado, Goyal, and Vega-Redondo, 2004) and social optimum as theoretical benchmark solutions, subjects seem to employ a more complex, forward-looking thinking. We develop an other benchmark solution, called one-step-ahead stability, that combines forward-looking belief formation with rational response and that fits the data much better. |
| Date: | 2008–01–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:08-02&r=soc |
| By: | Tauchmann, Harald |
| Abstract: | In contrast to West-Germany, illicit drugs were virtually absent in the East-Germany until 1990. Yet, after the collapse of the former GDR, East-Germany was expected to encounter a sharp increase in the prevalence of substance abuse. By analyzing individual data, we find that East-Germany largely caught up with West-Germany’s ever-growing prevalence of illicit drugs within a single decade. We decompose the west-east difference in prevalence rates into an explained and an unexplained part using a modified Blinder-Oaxaca procedure. This decomposition suggests that the observed convergence is just weakly related to socioeconomic characteristics and therefore remains mainly unexplained. That is, West- and East-Germans seem to have become more alike per se. We conclude that both parts of the country have converged in terms of the culture of drug consumption. |
| Keywords: | illicit drugs, west-east convergence, decomposition |
| JEL: | I12 P23 P36 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7129&r=soc |