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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Gordon Dahl; Stefano DellaVigna |
| Date: | 2007–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001778&r=soc |
| By: | Matilde Bombardini; Francesco Trebbi |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator. This pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician (thereby increasing contributions), but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds (thereby decreasing contributions). The model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and PAC donations and local employment by sector. This procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes: we find that an additional vote costs a politician between 100 and 400 dollars depending on the district. |
| JEL: | D72 H7 P48 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13672&r=soc |
| By: | Kerwin Kofi Charles; Jonathan Guryan |
| Abstract: | This paper tests the predictions about the relationship between racial prejudice and racial wage gaps from Becker's (1957) seminal work on employer discrimination - something which has not previously been done in the large economics discrimination literature. Using rich data on racial prejudice from the General Social Survey, we find strong support for all of the key predictions from Becker about the relationship between prejudice and racial wage gaps. In particular, we show that, relative to white wages, black wages: (a) vary negatively with a measure of the prejudice of the "marginal" white in a state; (b) vary negatively with the prejudice in the lower tail of the prejudice distribution, but are unaffected by the prejudice of the most prejudiced persons in a state; and (c) vary negatively with the fraction of a state that is black. We show that these results are robust to a variety of extensions, including directly controlling for racial skill quality differences and instrumental variables estimates. We present some initial evidence to show that racial wage gaps are larger the more racially integrated is a state’s workforce, also as Becker's model predicts. The paper also briefly discusses familiar criticisms and extensions of the standard Becker model, including an argument of our own which, like some recent work, shows that the model's main predictions can be shown theoretically to survive the effects of long run competition. |
| JEL: | J01 J7 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13661&r=soc |
| By: | Swantje Renfordt |
| Abstract: | By comparing European and US newspaper debates on the 2003 Iraq War, this working paper empirically tests whether a European public sphere exists regarding the contested issue of war and peace. This component of foreign and security policy represents a hard case for the evolution of European communication and looking for it empirically leads into nearly uncharted territory, as most studies have not yet addressed this particular policy field. The data set includes more than 400 articles from six respected newspapers in Germany, Great Britain, and the US, which serve in this case as a non-European control group. One interesting finding of the frame analysis is the fact that one can identify a European community of communication that relates to the legal dimension of the Iraq-debate and to discourses in two European countries. Opinions related to the question whether or not the use of military force complies with international law vary widely in all three countries. However, in contrast to the discourse prevalent in the US, both the German and the British discourses show a strong preference for upholding the rule of international law. |
| Keywords: | European identity; institutions; media |
| Date: | 2007–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0017&r=soc |
| By: | Dalgaard, Carl-Johan (University of Copenhagen); Olsson, Ola (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | The present paper documents that political stability is positively associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg- ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex- change, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer- ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en- hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non- cooperative under self-su¢ ciency, the political decision making process becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ- uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods.<p> |
| Keywords: | Political cohesion; Economic growth |
| JEL: | O41 P16 |
| Date: | 2007–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0280&r=soc |
| By: | Andrei Markevich (Department of Economics, University of Warwick, and the Center for Economic and Financial Research, New Economic School, Moscow) |
| Abstract: | In hierarchies, agents’ hidden actions increase principals' transactions costs and give rise to a demand for monitoring and enforcement. The fact that the latter are costly raises questions about their scope, organisation, and type. How much control is enough? The paper uses historical records to examine Stalin’s answers to this question. We find that Stalin's behaviour was consistent with his aiming to maximise the efficiency of the Soviet system of control subject to the loyalty of his inspectors and the risk of a “chaos of orders” arising from parallel centres of power. |
| Keywords: | Casymmetric information, principal-agent problem, transaction costs, hierarchy, USSR |
| JEL: | H83 D73 P21 N44 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0110&r=soc |