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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Shinichiro Iwata (Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama); Koji Karato (Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the location choices of homeless people in Osaka City, and .nds them concentrated because of homeless networks. The paper also shows that different types of homeless networks operate in two different homeless groups: (1) peer networks that provide a social tie inside homeless communities are observed in groups that had not had work experience in the day labor market; (2) homed networks that provide a social tie outside homeless communities affect location choice in the expected way, although the effect is statistically insigni.cant in groups that had worked in the day labor market. |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf522&r=soc |
| By: | Christian R. Østergaard |
| Abstract: | Knowledge spillovers from a university to the local industry play an important role in clusters, but we know little about these spillovers. This paper examines empirically the extent of university-industry informal contacts. Furthermore, it analyses the characteristics of an engineer that acquire knowledge from informal contacts with university researchers. The university-industry contacts are compared with results for interfirm contacts. The research shows that the interfirm informal contacts are more numerous than university informal contacts. Likewise, knowledge is more frequently acquired from other firms than through university-industry contacts. Engineers that have participated in formal projects with university researchers and engineers that are educated at the university have a higher likelihood of acquiring knowledge from informal contacts with university researchers. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge flows; informal contacts |
| JEL: | D83 O32 I23 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:07-19&r=soc |
| By: | Saïd Hanchane (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - [CNRS : UMR6123] - [Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I][Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II]); Tarek Mostafa (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - [CNRS : UMR6123] - [Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I][Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II]) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we develop a multicommunity model where public mixed finance and private schools coexist. Students are differentiated by income, ability and social capital. Schools maximize their profits under a quality constraint; the pricing function is dependent on the cost of producing education and on the position of an individual relatively to mean ability and mean social capital. Income plays an indirect role since it determines the type of schools and communities that can be afforded by a student given his ability and social capital.<br />Three dimensional stratification results from schools’ profit maximization and individuals’ utility maximization. This stratification is the corner stone of the distribution of students across communities and schools. Finally, we study majority voting over tax rates; property tax is used to finance educational quality not only in pure public schools but also in mixed finance schools. We provide the necessary conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the median voter. |
| Keywords: | Education market; Majority voting equilibrium; Peer group effects; Social Capital; Students; Formation of communities; School choice |
| Date: | 2007–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00177630_v1&r=soc |
| By: | Benno Torgler; Markus Schaffner; Alison Macintyre |
| Abstract: | Taxpayers are more compliant than the traditional economic models predict. Why? The literature calls it the “puzzle of tax compliance”. In this paper we use field, experimental and survey data to investigate the empirical evidence on whether presence of tax morale helps to resolve this puzzle. The results reveal a strong correlation between tax morale and tax evasion/compliance which confirms the value of taking the research a step further by looking at the determinants of tax morale. We explore this question with a particular focus on the importance of governance quality. |
| Keywords: | tax morale; tax compliance; tax evasion; institutional and governance quality; social capital |
| JEL: | H26 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2007-17&r=soc |
| By: | David Masclet; Marc Willinger; Charles Figuières |
| Abstract: | We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pure public good. The design differs from the standard public good game with respect to the decision procedure. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects can observe the exact contributions from earlier decisions ("sequential treatment with information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially but cannot observe earlier contributions ("sequential treatment without information"). The results indicate that sequentiality increases the level of contribution to the public good when subjects are informed about the contribution levels of lower ranked subjects while sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions. Moreover, we observe that earlier players try to influence positively the contributions of subsequent decision makers in the sequence, by making a large contribution. Such behaviour is motivated by the belief that subsequent players will reciprocate by also making a large contribution. We also discuss the effect of group size on aggregate contributions. Finally, we conceptualize a model where agents’ preferences incorporate a “weak” moral motivation element. The moral motivation is “weak” in the sense that contributors update their morally ideal level of contribution according to observed behaviours. This suggested qualification of rational contributors fits well with the patterns observed in the lab. |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:03&r=soc |
| By: | Sergio Currarini (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari and School for Advanced Studies in Venice); Paolo Pin (Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics, Trieste and University of Venice); Matthew O. Jackson (Department of Economics, Stanford University and the Santa Fe Institute.) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of friendship formation that sheds light on segregation patterns observed in social and economic networks. Individuals come in different types and have type-dependent benefits from friendships; we examine the properties of a steady-state equilibrium of a matching process of friendship formation. We use the model to understand three empirical patterns of friendship formation: (i) larger groups tend to form more same-type ties and fewer other-type ties than small groups, (ii) larger groups form more ties per capita, and (iii) all groups are biased towards same-type relative to demographics, with the most extreme bias coming from middle-sized groups. We trace each of these empirical observations to specific properties of the theoretical model and highlight the role of choice and chance in generating homophilous behavior. Finally we discuss welfare implications of the model. |
| Keywords: | Networks, Homophily, Segregation, Friendships, Social Networks, Integration, Diversity, Minorities |
| JEL: | D85 A14 J15 J16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:20_07&r=soc |
| By: | Gould, Eric D; Winter, Eyal |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the effort choices of workers within the same firm interact with each other. In contrast to the existing literature, we show that workers can affect the productivity of their co-workers based on income maximization considerations, rather than relying on behavioural considerations such as peer pressure, social norms, and shame. Theoretically, we show that a worker's effort has a positive effect on the effort of co-workers if they are complements in production, and a negative effect if they are substitutes. The theory is tested using panel data on the performance of baseball players from 1970 to 2003. The empirical analysis shows that a player's batting average significantly increases with the batting performance of his peers, but decreases with the quality of the team's pitching. Furthermore, a pitcher's performance increases with the pitching quality of his team-mates, but is unaffected by the batting output of the team. These results are inconsistent with behavioural explanations which predict that shirking by any kind of worker will increase shirking by all fellow workers. The results are consistent with the idea that the effort choices of workers interact in ways that are dependent on the technology of production. These findings are robust to controlling for individual fixed-effects, and to using changes in the composition of one's co-workers in order to produce exogenous variation in the performance of one's peers. |
| Keywords: | Externalities; Peer Effects; Team Production |
| JEL: | J2 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6527&r=soc |
| By: | Alejandro Cid (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Montevideo); Daniel Ferrés (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Montevideo); Máximo Rossi (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República) |
| Abstract: | A growing strand of economic literature focuses its attention on the relationship between happiness levels and various individual and socioeconomic variables. Recent studies analyze the impact of income, marital status, health, educational levels and other socioeconomic variables on satisfaction with life. A large majority of these studies limit their attention to industrialized countries. In our work, we analyze data for a group of individuals living in a Latin American country (Uruguay) with age 60 or older. We use a rich data set that allows us to test different happiness hypothesis employing four methodological approaches. We find that older people in Uruguay have a tendency to report themselves happy when they are married, when they have higher standards of health and when they earn higher levels of income or they feel their income is suitable for their standard of living. On the contrary, they report lower levels of happiness when they live alone and when their nutrition is insufficient. We also find that education has no clear impact on happiness. We think that our study is an initial contribution to the study of those factors that can explain happiness among the elderly in Latin American countries. Future work will focus on enhanced empirical analysis and in extending our study to other countries. |
| Keywords: | Happiness, Health, Family, Censored Econometric Models, Semiparametric Methods, Treatment Evaluation |
| JEL: | C14 C24 I10 J12 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ude:wpaper:1207&r=soc |
| By: | Pablo Revilla (Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents’ preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets. |
| Keywords: | Many-to-one matching, Hedonic, Coalitions, Stability, Colleagues |
| JEL: | C78 D71 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.87&r=soc |
| By: | Cruijssen, F.C.A.M.; Borm, P.E.M.; Dullaert, W.; Hamers, H.J.M. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a framework for joint hub network development. Building a joint physical hub for transhipment of goods is expensive and therefore involves considerable risks for the cooperating companies. In a practical setting, it is unlikely that an entire network will be built at once. Rather, the partners will have a more cautious attitude and build the hub facilities one-by-one. In the proposed framework, every time a new hub is introduced, partners will have the opportunity to decide whether or not they participate (and thus invest) in this network extension. The framework is also applicable in cooperative situations other than hub network development. In cases where multiple (infrastructural) investments have to be made by a consortium of logistics companies, the participants are likely to take advantage of a step-wise approach with gain sharing at intermediate steps. More specifically, the procedure can also benefit maintenance groups, warehouse sharing initiatives, and intermodal groups. |
| Keywords: | Hub Networks; Horizontal Cooperation; Cooperative Game Theory |
| JEL: | C61 C71 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200776&r=soc |
| By: | Silva, Maria José; Leitão, João |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to identify the nature of the relationships that are established amongst agents who co-operate in terms of innovation practices. It analyses whether the entrepreneurial innovation capability of firms is stimulated through the relationships developed with external partners. The data of 2nd Community Innovation Survey of EUROSTAT is used in a logistic model. In the estimation process of the Logit function, the entrepreneurial innovation capability is considered as the answer variable. The scientific agents who cooperate in terms of innovation activities impact, positively, on the propensity to engage in innovative advances revealed by the firms, at the level of product innovation. The paper presents policy implications, which may be used in the design of public policies for fostering open innovation networks between scientific agents and firms. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; Networks; Entrepreneurial Innovation Capability. |
| JEL: | O32 I28 O31 I23 |
| Date: | 2007–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5215&r=soc |
| By: | Joel Waldfogel |
| Abstract: | In the past few years, YouTube and other sites for sharing video files over the Internet have vaulted from obscurity to places of centrality in the media landscape. The files available at YouTube include a mix of user-generated video and clips from network television shows. Networks fear that availability of their clips on YouTube will depress television viewing. But unauthorized clips are also free advertising for television shows. As YouTube has grown quickly, major networks have responded by making their content available at their own sites. This paper examines the effects of authorized and unauthorized web distribution on television viewing between 2005 and 2007 using a survey of Penn students on their tendencies to watch television series on television as well as on the web. The results provide a glimpse of the way young, Internet-connected people use YouTube and related sites. While I find some evidence of substitution of web viewing for conventional television viewing, time spent viewing programming on the web -- 4 hours per week -- far exceeds the reduction in weekly traditional television viewing of about 25 minutes. Overall time spent on network-controlled viewing (television plus network websites) increased by 1.5 hours per week. |
| JEL: | L1 L82 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13497&r=soc |
| By: | Anna Aizer; Pedro Dal Bó |
| Abstract: | Many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality: women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times. To explain this we develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence. This time inconsistency generates a demand for commitment. We present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices. We find that "no-drop" policies -- which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges -- result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered. |
| JEL: | J12 J16 K4 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13492&r=soc |
| By: | Axel Dreher; Florian Mölders; Peter Nunnenkamp |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes whether and to what extent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) outperform official donors by allocating aid in a way that renders effective poverty alleviation more likely. We employ Probit and Tobit models and make use of an exceptionally detailed database that allows an assessment of the allocation of Swedish NGO aid in comparison to the allocation of Swedish official aid. Our results show that NGOs are more selective when deciding about which countries to enter at all. Moreover, in contrast to NGO aid, there is some evidence that political and commercial motives matter for the selection of ODA recipients. However, the Swedish case also supports the skeptical view according to which NGOs are unlikely to outperform official donors by providing better targeted aid when it comes to the allocation across recipients having passed the eligibility test. |
| Keywords: | Aid allocation, NGO aid, ODA, Sector-specific aid |
| JEL: | F35 O11 O19 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1383&r=soc |
| By: | Beard, Rodney |
| Abstract: | In this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate. |
| Keywords: | Public choice; Environmental economics; Agricultural policy |
| JEL: | Q18 Q58 Q53 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5351&r=soc |