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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | David, Antonio C. |
| Abstract: | This paper attempts to quantify the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on social capital with cross-country data. It estimates reduced-form regressions of the main determinants of social capital controlling for HIV prevalence, institutional quality, social distance, and economic indicators using data from the World Values Survey. The results obtained indicate that HIV prevalence affects social capital negatively. The empirical estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in HIV prevalence will lead to a 1 percent decline in trust, controlling for other determinants of social capital. If one moves from a country with a relatively low level of HIV prevalence such as Estonia, to a country with a high level such as Zimbabwe, one would observe an approximate 8 percent decline in social capital. These results are robust in a number of dimensions and highlight the empirical importance of an additional mechanism through which HIV/AIDS hinders the development process. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital,Population Policies,Inequality,Economic Theory & Research,HIV AIDS |
| Date: | 2007–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4263&r=soc |
| By: | Beat Hedinger (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich); Lorenz Goette (Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) |
| Abstract: | Cooperation between workers is important for firms. Cooperation can be maintained through positive or negative reciprocity between workers. In an environment where cooperation yields high efficiency gains negative reciprocity may, however, result in high costs for firms. Therefore positive reciprocity should be prevailing in these environments. To test this assumption we conduct experiments with Swiss Air Force pilots and a student reference group. We find that pilots’ cooperation is based on stronger positive reciprocal behaviour. We conclude that Swiss Air Force pilots maintain team-work with high levels of positive reciprocity, regardless of the identity of their partner. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Reciprocity |
| JEL: | C9 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:wpaper:0066&r=soc |
| By: | Farina, Francesco; Sbriglia, Patrizia |
| Abstract: | Cooperation is a pervasive social phenomenon but more often than not economic theories have little to say about its causes and consequences. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that cooperative behaviour might be motivated by purely selfish interest when the “social” payoff in a game is increasing. We report the results of a series of experiments on the centipede game. The experiments are organized in two subsequent steps. Subjects first participate in a 2-period trust game, randomly matched with unknown partners. We apply the strategy method in order to elicit their social preferences. On the basis of their pre-game behaviour, individuals are divided into three main social groups: selfish individuals, pure altruists and reciprocators. At the second step of the experiment, subjects play a repeated 6-move centipede game with increasing final payoff. Each subject plays twice in a low stake and in a high centipede game, and he/she is informed about his/her co-player social preferences. We identify the origin of cooperation within homogeneous and heterogeneous social groups. |
| Keywords: | social preferences; altruisms; experiments. |
| JEL: | A10 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3701&r=soc |
| By: | Ellingsen, Tore (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Johannesson, Magnus (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | A distinctive feature of humans compared to other species is the high rate of cooperation with non-kin. One explanation is that humans are motivated by concerns for social esteem. In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact of anticipated verbal feedback on altruistic behavior. We study pairwise interactions in which one subject, the “divider”, decides how to split a sum of money between herself and a recipient. Thereafter, the recipient can send an unrestricted anonymous message to the divider. The subjects’ relationship is anonymous and one-shot to rule out any reputation effects. Compared to a control treatment without feedback messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is a corresponding increase in the fraction of equal splits from about 30% to about 50%. Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the divider, sometimes strongly and in foul language. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise the divider. The results suggest that anticipated verbal rewards and punishments play a role in promoting altruistic behavior among humans. |
| Keywords: | Punishment; Approval; Disapproval; Dictator game; Altruism; Communication; Verbal feedback |
| JEL: | C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2007–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hastef:0668&r=soc |
| By: | Friel Martha; Santagata Walter (University of Turin) |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:eblawp:200710&r=soc |
| By: | Facundo Albornoz; Jayasri Dutta |
| Abstract: | Living in a democratic society has been internationally recognized as a basic human right. While most of the literature tries to identify the effect of democracy on economic prosperity, little work has been done to understand the determinants of economic growth under democracy. This paper examines whether the determinants of economic growth in Latin America are sensitive to political institutions. We find two stark differences between democratic and autocratic growth: (1) democratic government consumption is significantly positive for economic growth. The opposite is true for autocratic government consumption. (2) The impact of human capital is only significant under democracies. |
| Keywords: | Economic Growth, Latin America, Democracy, Autocracy, Government Consumption, human capital |
| JEL: | H50 P16 N46 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:07-06&r=soc |
| By: | Jürgen Eichberger (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics); David Kelsey (University of Exeter, Department of Economics); Burkhard C. Schipper (University of California, Davis, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements. |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity, Optimism, Pessimism, Strategic Games, Oligopoly, Strategic Delegation, Peace-making, Strategic Complements, Choquet Expected Utility |
| JEL: | C72 D43 D62 D81 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0443&r=soc |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The globalized Western culture of innovation, as propagated by major aid institutions, does not necessarily lead to empowerment or improvement of the well-being of the stakeholders. On the contrary, it often blocks viable indigenous innovation cultures. In African societies and African Diasporas in Latin America, cultures of innovation largely accrue from the informal, not the formal sector. Crucial for their proper understanding is a threefold structural differentiation: between the formal and informal sector, within the informal sector, according to class, gender or religion, and between different transnational social spaces. Different innovation cultures may be complementary, mutually reinforcing, or conflicting, leading in extreme cases even to a 'clash of cultures' at the local level. The repercussions of competing, even antagonistic agencies of innovative strategic groups are demonstrated, analyzing the case of the African poor in Benin and the African Diasporas of Brazil and Haiti. |
| Keywords: | economic development; cultural change; innovations; social structure; African Diaspora; Benin; Brazil; Haiti |
| JEL: | O57 Z1 E26 Z13 Z12 O31 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3704&r=soc |
| By: | Jose Ignacio Gimenez; Jose Alberto Molina; Almudena Sevilla Sanz |
| Abstract: | This paper complements conventional economic analysis and presents a social norms interpretation to explain cross-country differences in partnership formation rates, and the dramatic decrease in partnership formation rates in Southern Europe in particular. We argue that increases in female human capital - by raising the opportunity cost of entering a partnership - had a differential impact on partnership formation rates in Northern and Southern Europe due to the different social norms regarding the household division of labor. Social norms are modeled as a constraint on the allocation of household labor that (if binding) diminishes the gains to enter a partnership. Furthermore, highly educated women are less likely to form a partnership, because the utility loss when a partnership is formed is lower the higher the female opportunity cost. We test the predictions of the model using 7 waves of the European Community Household panel (1995-2001). For each country and year we construct the average of the female to male ratio of childcare time as an indicator of social norms regarding the household division of labor. The empirical findings support the predictions of the model. After controlling for the time and country variation in the data, as well as for permanent individual heterogeneity and other aggregate variables at the country level, the results suggest that more traditional social norms regarding the household division of labor negatively affect a woman`s probability of forming a partnership. Thus, a woman living in a country with a more traditional division of household labor has, ceteris paribus, a lower probability of forming a partnership. Furthermore, as predicted by the theory, social norms have a stronger negative effect for highly educated women. To the extent that female education has increased over the years, and that Southern European countries have more traditional social norms, this latter finding may partly explain the dramatic decrease in partnership formation rates in Southern Europe. |
| Keywords: | Marriage Market, Gender Roles, Household Labor |
| JEL: | E21 I29 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:333&r=soc |
| By: | Lídia Farré (University of Alicante); Francis Vella (Georgetown University and IZA) |
| Abstract: | Using a sample of mother-child pairs from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the Young Adults of the NLSY79 we explore the relationship between a woman’s attitudes towards the role of females in the labor market and the attitudes of her children. We also examine whether this intergenerational cultural link has implications for the labor market behavior of the females in the NLSY79. We find that a woman’s attitudes have a statistically significant effect on her children’s views towards working women. Furthermore we find that this cultural transmission influences female labor market decisions. Our results imply that a woman’s view regarding the role of females in the labor market and family not only affects the labor market force participation decision of her daughter, but also has an equally strong association with the labor force participation of the wife of her son. These results indicate that the transmission of gender role attitudes contributes to the persistence of economic status across generations. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational cultural transmission, gender role attitudes, female labor force participation |
| JEL: | J12 J62 D1 Z1 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2802&r=soc |
| By: | Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the endogenous emergence of democracy and rule of law in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. Decisions about public policies concern the extent of fiscal redistribution and property rights, whose costs depend on the extent of predation in the population. We characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy in which both the political regimes and public policies are endogenously determined. The theory delivers several novel results. Multiple politico-economic equilibria involving different public policies can be sustained conditional on beliefs about property rights enforcement. Democratization is endogenous, but the features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed under conflictual environments. Conflictual transitions lead to failed democracies with potentially worse property rights protection than oligarchies. The novel predictions are in line with existing evidence and with results from newly collected data on constitutional principles. |
| Keywords: | commitment; conflict; consensual democracy; constitutional principles; democratization; inequality; oligarchy |
| JEL: | H10 N10 O10 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6328&r=soc |