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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Ethan Cohen-Cole; Giulio Zanella |
| Abstract: | As empirical work in identifying social effects becomes more prevalent, researchers are beginning to struggle with identifying the composition of social interactions within any given reference group. In this paper, we present a simple econometric methodology for the separate identification of multiple social interactions. The setting under which we achieve separation is special, but is likely to be appropriate in many applications. |
| Keywords: | Social choice |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedbqu:qau07-4&r=soc |
| By: | Christian Bjørnskov (Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics, Aarhus C, Denmark); Axel Dreher (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich Switzerland and CESifo, Germany); Justina A.V. Fischer (Hoover Institution, Stanford University Stanford, CA) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of gender discrimination on individual life satisfaction using a cross-section of 66 countries. We employ measures of discrimination of women in the economy, in politics, and in society more generally. According to our results, discrimination in politics is important to individual well-being. Overall, men and women are more satisfied with their lives when societies become more equal. Disaggregated analysis suggests that our results for men are driven by the effect of equality on men with middle and high incomes, and those on the political left. To the contrary, women are more satisfied with increasing equality independent of income and political ideology. Equality in economic and family matters does overall not affect life satisfaction. However, women are more satisfied with their lives when discriminatory practices have been less prevalent in the economy 20 years ago. |
| Keywords: | Gender gap, happiness, well-being, discrimination, life satisfaction |
| JEL: | I31 J16 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-161&r=soc |
| By: | Sebastian J. Georg (BonnEconLab, University of Bonn); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics Jena, Strategic Interaction Unit); Gari Walkowitz (BonnEconLab, University of Bonn); Torsten Weiland (Max Planck Institute of Economics Jena, Strategic Interaction Unit) |
| Abstract: | Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and a passive dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographic scope by involving either one or three different locations in Germany. Observed behavior reflects the robust stylized facts of this class of ultimatum experiments and can be adequately explained by other-regarding preferences. While responder behavior does not condition on co-players' location of residence, self-interest of proposers varies significantly with the latter. Altogether, we do not detect strong discrimination based on geographic distance. |
| Keywords: | ultimatum bargaining, cross-cultural experiments, social preferences |
| JEL: | C78 C91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2007–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-016&r=soc |
| By: | Nori Tarui (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa); Charles Mason (Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming); Stephen Polasky (Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota); Greg Ellis (Department of Economics, University of Washington) |
| Abstract: | We model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non-linear stock dependent costs. We propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase, thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions. We show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource users, this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium. The strategy profile that we propose, which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness, is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies. |
| Keywords: | Common property resource, cooperation, dynamic game, unobservable actions |
| JEL: | D62 Q20 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200712&r=soc |
| By: | A. WILLEM; H. SCARBROUGH; M. BUELENS |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the influence of two competing views of social identity on knowledge integration within organizations. One view sees social identity primarily as a coherent characteristic of organisations, which can leverage knowledge integration by developing loyalty, trust, shared values and implicit norms (Kogut and Zander, 1996). The opposing view considers social identification as multiple and fragmented (Albert, Ashforth and Dutton, 2000; Alvesson, 2000). This fragmented view emphasises the problematic nature of social identity for knowledge integration. The aim of this paper is to examine these competing accounts and to develop insight under what conditions coherent respectively multiple social identities are advantageous for knowledge integration by the comparative analysis of two polar case studies. Our case studies reveal the different effects of a coherent versus multiple identity on knowledge integration and the need for a coherent company-wide social identity to leverage knowledge integration between organizational units. |
| Keywords: | case studies, knowledge integration, multiple identities, organization theory, organization-wide identity, social identity |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:07/464&r=soc |