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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | d'Hombres, Beatrice; Rocco, Lorenzo; Suhrcke, Marc; McKee, Martin |
| Abstract: | This paper starts from an empirical assessment of different dimensions of social capital in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The level of social capital is lower in CEE-CIS countries compared to other countries in Europe and beyond. We then use a unique data source to carefully investigate the impact of social capital on individual self-reported health for eight countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine). We rely on three indicators for social capital – individual degree of trust, participation in local organisations, social isolation – and employ alternative procedures to consistently estimate the impact of social capital on health. We attempt to circumvent the endogeneity problems by using instrumental variable estimates. Our results show that, in the overall sample comprising all eight countries, the individual degree of trust is positively and significantly correlated with health, either in pooling estimation or when we rely on IV estimators with community fixed effects. Similarly, social isolation is negatively and significantly associated with health, irrespective of the procedure of estimation. On the other hand, the effect of being member of a Putnamesque organisation is more ambiguous and usually not significantly related to health. Finally, country-estimates suggest that the impact of social capital on health varies across the eight countries. We argue that the positive effect of membership on health is conditional on the quality of the political institutions and civil liberties, while trust and social isolation seem to influence health independently of those institutional factors. |
| Keywords: | Health; social capital; instrumental variables; transition countries |
| JEL: | P20 I12 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:1862&r=soc |
| By: | Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean |
| Abstract: | We analyze social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people value and invest in, for affective or functional reasons. Individuals are at times uncertain about their own 'deep values' and infer them from their past choices, which then come to define 'who they are'. Identity investments increase when information is scarce or when a greater endowment of some asset (wealth, career, family, culture) raises the stakes on viewing it as valuable (escalating commitments). Taboos against transactions or the mere contemplation of tradeoffs arise to protect fragile beliefs about the 'priceless' value of certain assets (life, freedom, love, faith) or things one 'would never do'. Whether such behaviours are welfare-enhancing or reducing depends on whether beliefs are sought for a functional value (sense of direction, self-discipline) or for 'mental consumption' motives (self-esteem, anticipatory feelings). Escalating commitments can thus lead to a 'hedonic treadmill', and competing identities cause dysfunctional failures to invest in high-return activities (education, adapting to globalization, assimilation), or even the destruction of productive assets. In social interactions, norm violations elicit a forceful response (exclusion, harassment) when they threaten a strongly held identity, but further erode morale when it was initially weak. Concerns for pride, dignity or wishful thinking lead to the inefficient breakdown of Coasian bargaining even under symmetric information, as partners seek to self-enhance and shift blame by turning down 'insultingly low' offers. |
| Keywords: | anticipatory utility; bargaining; hedonic treadmill; identity; memory; religion; self-control; self-image; self-serving beliefs; taboos; wishful thinking |
| JEL: | D81 D91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6123&r=soc |
| By: | La Ferrara, Eliana |
| Abstract: | Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man’s heir is not his own child but rather his sister’s son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behaviour according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father’s household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behaviour can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations. |
| Keywords: | inter-vivos transfers; matrilineal inheritance; social norms; strategic bequests |
| JEL: | O16 O17 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6111&r=soc |
| By: | Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We develop a model where information about jobs is essentially obtained through friends and relatives, i.e. strong and weak ties. Workers commute to a business centre to work and to interact with other people. We find that housing prices increase with the level of social interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitted more rapidly and, as a result, individuals are more likely to be employed and to be able to pay higher land rents. We extend this framework to incorporate black and white workers. Because whites obtain a higher wage than blacks, they reside closer to jobs to save on commuting time costs. As a result, black workers experience a higher unemployment rate than white workers because they have little contact with weak ties (especially whites) and thus have limited access to job information, relying mainly on their strong ties, who are themselves likely to be unemployed. The lack of ties that act as diverse sources of information is therefore the main cause of blacks' unemployment. |
| Keywords: | labour market; land rent; social networks; spatial mismatch; weak ties |
| JEL: | A14 J15 R14 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6129&r=soc |
| By: | Eleonora Di Maria (University of Padova); Stefano Micelli (University of Venice) |
| Abstract: | Italian industrial districts are no longer self-contained systems of small firms, where firms' competitiveness is the result of physical proximity and links with global economy are limited to export sales. A new generation of firms is taking the lead, reshaping the form of districts through their innovative strategies focused on R&D, design and ICT. Most of these firms are leaders within their markets and organize their value chains by coupling district knowledge and competencies with opportunities offered by globalization processes. The rise of these open networks contributes to the transformation of industrial districts and the real drivers of the district firm's competitiveness. Based on a survey of 650 Italian SMEs from 41 Italian districts, the paper describes the characteristics of this new firm model, compared to the traditional district one. The paper also discusses implications for districts in terms of innovation dynamics and governance. |
| Keywords: | district firms, open networks, global value chain, innovation, governance |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0038&r=soc |
| By: | Alejandro Portes (Princeton University) |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cmgdev:wp0607&r=soc |
| By: | Muge Ozman |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of technological opportunities and knowledge tacitness on inter-firm network formation, under two different industry regimes. In the first regime environment is stable and the aim of firms is to exploit knowledge. In this case, they attribute more value to repeated interactions with geographically close firms. In the second regime, there is environmental turbulence, which increases the value of access to novel information from distant partners for exploration. The question addressed is, under these regimes how do technological opportunities and knowledge tacitness influence structure of networks? The main contribution of the paper different from previous work is that it explicitly models the effect of history between two firms on networks that form. A simulation model is carried out where firms select partners and learn from them, which further shapes their selection process. The results reveal that in both regimes richer technological opportunities and higher tacitness generates local and global star firms depending on the parameter range. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-07&r=soc |
| By: | Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We develop a model where the decision to commit a crime in a neighboring area is a positive function of the percentage of same-race individuals residing in that area since they can provide crucial information on crime possibilities. The model then predicts a positive spatial correlation in crime between different contiguous areas; this correlation is higher the closer the distance between the areas. We empirically investigate these relationships using data from the crime statistics that are recorded by the police in Britain. We find results that are consistent with the model. In particular, the agglomeration of a given ethnic minority group is positively related to its crime activity and this effect declines quite sharply with distance between areas. |
| Keywords: | crime; ethnic minorities; social interactions |
| JEL: | C23 K42 R12 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6130&r=soc |
| By: | Judith Hellerstein; David Neumark |
| Abstract: | We study workplace segregation in the United States using a unique matched employer employee data set that we have created. We present measures of workplace segregation by education and language, and by race and ethnicity, and . since skill is often correlated with race and ethnicity we assess the role of education- and language-related skill differentials in generating workplace segregation by race and ethnicity. We define segregation based on the extent to which workers are more or less likely to be in workplaces with members of the same group, and we measure segregation as the observed percentage relative to maximum segregation. Our results indicate that there is considerable segregation by education and language in the workplace. Among whites, for example, observed segregation by education is 17% (of the maximum), and for Hispanics, observed segregation by language ability is 29%. Racial (blackwhite) segregation in the workplace is of a similar magnitude to education segregation (14%), and ethnic (Hispanic-white) segregation is somewhat higher (20%). Only a tiny portion (3%) of racial segregation in the workplace is driven by education differences between blacks and whites, but a substantial fraction of ethnic segregation in the workplace (32%) can be attributed to differences in language proficiency. Finally, additional evidence suggests that segregation by language likely reflects complementarity among workers speaking the same language. |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:07-02&r=soc |
| By: | Iquiapaza, Robert; Amaral, Hudson |
| Abstract: | The corruption is a phenomenon present in different degrees in all countries around the world. In this revision article the objective was to identify the theoretical explanations of corruption and their consequences on the economic development. First, it is verified the difficulty of measurement given its illegal and secret nature. The causes can be multiple, but the literature reveals the inexistence of a solid theoretical approach. However, behavioral models and the principal-agent relationship approaches stand out in economics and political science. There is no doubt in associating the corruption to the lower economic development, that results as a consequence of the introduction of inefficiencies on investments fall in the potential product and increases the interest rate. These characteristics seem to coincide with the reality observed during the actual millennium in the Brazilian economy; without misunderstanding it results in a pernicious combination and generating of social inequalities. |
| Keywords: | Keywords: Economic development; corruption; Economic; Brazil. |
| JEL: | D73 O1 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:1818&r=soc |
| By: | Piergiuseppe Morone; Angela Frasca |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:04-2007&r=soc |
| By: | Alpizar, Francisco (Environment for Development Center, Tropical Agricultural and Higher Education Center (CATIE)); Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based on a natural field experiment conducted at a national park in Costa Rica. Contributions made in public in front of the solicitor are 25% higher than contributions made in private. Giving subjects a small gift before requesting a contribution increases the likelihood of a positive contribution. At the same time, the conditional contribution decreases. The total effect of giving a gift is positive but small, and taking the cost of the gift into account, it is far from profitable. When the subjects are told that the typical contribution of others is $2 (a small contribution), the probability of a contribution increases and the conditional contribution decreases, compared with providing no reference information. Providing a high reference level ($10) increases the conditional contributions. Overall, the total effects have the expected signs, although the magnitudes are smaller than what one might have expected based on existing evidence from laboratory experiments. <p> |
| Keywords: | Voluntary contributions; anonymity; reciprocity; conformity; natural field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 Q50 |
| Date: | 2007–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0245&r=soc |
| By: | Arianna Degan; Antonio Merlo |
| Abstract: | In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. We then consider an application of our theoretical framework and assess whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting in U.S. national elections in the post-war period. We find that by and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and congressional U.S. elections in the data. |
| JEL: | C12 C63 D72 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12922&r=soc |
| By: | Guillermina Jasso (New York University and IZA); Samuel Kotz (George Washington University) |
| Abstract: | Recent work on social status led to derivation of a new continuous distribution based on the exponential. The new variate, termed the ring(2)-exponential, in turn leads to derivation of two closely-related new families of continuous distributions, which we call the mirrorexponential and the ring-exponential. Both the standard exponential and the ring(2)- exponential are special cases of both the new families. In this paper, we first focus on the ring(2)-exponential, describing its derivation and examining its properties, and next introduce the two new families, describing their derivation and initiating exploration of their properties. The mirror-exponential arises naturally in the study of status; the ring-exponential arises from the mathematical structure of the ring(2)-exponential. Both have potential for broad application in diverse contexts across science and engineering, including the physical and social sciences as well as finance, information processing, and communication. Within sociobehavioral contexts, the new mirror-exponential may have application to the problem of approximating the form and inequality of the wage distribution. |
| Keywords: | continuous univariate distributions, Erlang distribution, general Erlang distribution, gamma distribution, general gamma distribution, folded distributions, Gini coefficient, social status, social inequality, wage function, wage distribution, wage inequality |
| JEL: | C02 C16 D31 D6 I3 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2598&r=soc |
| By: | Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert |
| Abstract: | We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies. |
| Keywords: | experience goods; markets; moral hazard; price competition; reputation; Trust |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D40 D80 L10 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6135&r=soc |