|
on Social Norms and Social Capital |
|
Issue of 2006‒08‒05
thirteen papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Universita degli Studi di Roma, La Sapienza |
| By: | J. Atsu Amegashie |
| Abstract: | In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions - affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a dynamic psychological game under incomplete information. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. I discuss how being tolerated but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually beneficial trades, the choice of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its implication for political correctness and affirmative action. |
| Keywords: | guilt, intentions, psychological game, second-order beliefs, social interaction |
| JEL: | C73 J16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1757&r=soc |
| By: | Jens Ludwig (Georgetown University, NBER and IZA Bonn); Jeffrey R. Kling (Brookings Institution and NBER) |
| Abstract: | Understanding whether criminal behavior is "contagious" is important for law enforcement and for policies that affect how people are sorted across social settings. We test the hypothesis that criminal behavior is contagious by using data from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) randomized housing-mobility experiment to examine the extent to which lower localarea crime rates decrease arrest rates among individuals. Our analysis exploits the fact that the effect of treatment group assignment yields different types of neighborhood changes across the five MTO demonstration sites. We use treatment-site interactions to instrument for measures of neighborhood crime rates, poverty and racial segregation in our analysis of individual arrest outcomes. We are unable to detect evidence in support of the contagion hypothesis. Neighborhood racial segregation appears to be the most important explanation for across-neighborhood variation in arrests for violent crimes in our sample, perhaps because drug market activity is more common in high-minority neighborhoods. |
| Keywords: | endogenous effects, social multiplier, arrests, social experiment |
| JEL: | H43 I18 J23 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2213&r=soc |
| By: | Roland G. Fryer, Jr. |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a model of social interactions and endogenous poverty traps. The key idea is captured in a framework in which the likelihood of future social interactions with members of one’s group is partly determined by group-specific investments made by individuals. I prove three main results. First, some individuals expected to make group-specific capital investments are worse off because their observed decision is used as a litmus test of group loyalty — creating a tradeoff between human capital and cooperation among the group. Second, there exist equilibria which exhibit bi-polar human capital investment behavior by individuals of similar ability. Third, as social mobility increases this bi-polarization increases. The models predictions are consistent with the bifurcation of distinctively black names in the mid-1960s, the erosion of black neighborhoods in the 1970s, accusations of ‘acting white,’ and the efficacy of certain programs designed to encourage human capital acquisition. |
| JEL: | J0 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12364&r=soc |
| By: | Maarten Vendrik (Maastricht University and IZA Bonn); Geert Woltjer (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | A central finding in happiness research is that a person’s income relative to the average income in her social reference group is more important for her life satisfaction than the absolute level of her income. This dependence of life satisfaction on relative income can be related to the reference dependence of the value function in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. In this paper we investigate whether the characteristics of the value function like concavity for gains, convexity for losses, and loss aversion apply to the dependence of life satisfaction on relative income. This is tested with a new measure for the reference income for a large German panel for the years 1984-2001. We find concavity of life satisfaction in positive relative income, but unexpectedly strongly significant concavity of life satisfaction in negative relative income as well. The latter result is shown to be robust to extreme distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale. It implies a rising marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more negative values of relative income, and hence loss aversion (in a wide sense). This may be explained in terms of increasing financial obstacles to social participation. |
| Keywords: | life satisfaction, relative income, value function, loss aversion, social participation |
| JEL: | I31 D6 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2218&r=soc |
| By: | Jeffery Carpenter; Samuel Bowles; Herbert Gintis |
| Abstract: | Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams. |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0608&r=soc |
| By: | Alessandro Balestrino |
| Abstract: | We present a model of income tax avoidance with heterogeneous agents, assuming the presence of a comparison income effect and of a psychic cost (disutility) of tax dodging. We analyse the policy preferences of the agents, and identify a median-voter political equilibrium. Paralleling previous results in the optimal taxation literature, we show that the comparison income effect calls for a high degree of progressivity of the income tax; additionally, we find that this tendence is strengthened by the psychic cost of avoidance. We then model the endogenous formation of the stigma attached to the act of avoidance as a "conformism game". We argue that such stigma is motivated by the desire to make redistribution more effective, and that it is enhanced by the income comparison effect. |
| Keywords: | tax avoidance, social norms, conformism, comparison income, median voter |
| JEL: | D72 H26 H31 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1758&r=soc |
| By: | Frank H. Page, Jr. (Department of Finance, University of Alabama); Myrna H. Wooders (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks? To address these questions we introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, the rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The rules of network formation may range from noncooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates not only player preferences and the rules of network formation but also assumptions concerning the degree of farsightedness of players. A specification of the primitives induces an abstract game consisting of (i) a feasible set of networks, and (ii) a path dominance relation defined on the feasible set of networks. Using this induced game we characterize sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist. Finally, we apply our approach and results to characterization of equilibrium of well known models and their rules of network formation, such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). |
| Keywords: | Basins of attraction, network formation games, stable sets, path dominance core, Nash networks |
| JEL: | C71 C72 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0614&r=soc |
| By: | John Ermisch (ISER, University of Essex and IZA Bonn); Diego Gambetta (University of Oxford and Nuffield College) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present the design of a two-stage experiment which aims to measure trusting and trustworthiness in a representative sample of the British population. In the first part we discuss the shortcomings of the most common design of the ‘trust-game’ experiment in eliciting information about clear and cogent notions of trusting and trustworthiness, and in the second part we present an alternative design, which we call the ‘framed binary trust game’. The basic design will be administered to a sample of 200 subjects who were formerly members of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In the third part of the paper, we extend this design to allow the ‘truster’ to purchase some information about the ‘trustee’ so as to make the experiment a better representation of real-life trust decisions. We plan in a second stage to run the extended experiment on a larger sample of about 1000 subjects. |
| Keywords: | trust, trust game, field experiments |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2216&r=soc |
| By: | Walter F. Lalich (Macquarie University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the contribution to the creation of a culturally diverse Sydney landscape by ethnic communities following the arrival of over a million and half non-English speaking settlers since 1948. Through fragmented collective actions, around 450 communal places were established to satisfy collectively perceived needs: places of worship, social and sports clubs, schools, childcare and aged care. Immigrants organised to overcome problems of social deprivation and scarcity of public places. They created needed collective goods on their own, through mutuality and compensated for their own meagre material resources with engendered social capital, time and energy. The diversity and intensity of development reflects differences in the perception of the settlement needs, urgency and aims within diverse ethnic groups. Immigrants enhanced the quality of life and developed a liveable city. Collected data inform on the outcome, developed capacities, investment patterns, annual income and expenditure, usage, management and employment patterns, gender and youth participation, functions and generated activities. |
| Keywords: | Settlement, Ethnic, Collective Goods, Communal Places, Spatial Clusters |
| JEL: | D71 E22 F22 I31 J15 J17 L31 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.47&r=soc |
| By: | Helios Herrera; Cesar Martinelli |
| Date: | 2006–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000225&r=soc |
| By: | Elena Paspalanova (New Bulgarian University) |
| Abstract: | A social event from the near past socio-political policy in Bulgaria – “State policy of changing the names of Turkish population living in Bulgaria” as a major element of the state revival process aiming at exterminating the ethnic differences in Bulgaria – was chosen to study the influence of cultural diversity on memories of that event. The study aims at revealing the hypothesized complex structure of indicators of cultural diversity, which determines memory of the social event. In respect to the controversial event being an object of the memory, the following indices of cultural diversity are chosen: Ethnicity (Bulgarians vs Turks), Religion (Christian Orthodox vs Muslim), Maternal language (Bulgarian vs Turkish), National identity (Bulgarian / Turkish vs European). The research focuses on the “cultural” characteristics of the self as an “experiencer” / “rememberer” as well, namely social orientation (individualistic vs collectivistic). A final set of control variables is the panel of socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, educational level, and monthly income) included in order to clarify the expected multifaceted picture of the cultural diversity influencing the memory of a social event. |
| Keywords: | Controversial Event, Memory, Individualism, Collectivism, Cultural Diversity Indices |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.48&r=soc |
| By: | Alberto Alesina; Paola Giuliano |
| Abstract: | Total fertility declined in states that introduced unilateral divorce, which makes dissolution of marriage easier. Also the ratio of out-of-wedlock fertility over total declined. We suggest an explanation (and provide supportive evidence for it) based upon the effect of divorce laws on the probability of entering and exiting marriage. Women planning to have children marry more easily with an easier "exit option" from marriage. Thus, more children are born in the first years of marriage, while the total marital fertility does not change, probably as a result of an increase in divorces and marital instability. |
| JEL: | J12 J13 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12375&r=soc |
| By: | Thibault Gajdos (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - [INSEE] - [ École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique]); Jean-Marc Tallon (EUREQUA - Equipe de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]) |
| Abstract: | Ever since its introduction by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974], the notion of fairness has been one of the most extensively used notion to evaluate allocations on an ethical basis. Whereas there is an extensive literature on the efficiency properties of allocations in economies with uncertainty the concept of an envy-free allocation has not been widely studied in economies with uncertainty. We introduce two very natural notions of equity in an economy under uncertainty, namely ex ante and ex post equity, show they can contradict efficiency requirements. In particular, the set of ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free allocations may be empty. We nevertheless show that, under special circumstances, one may prove the existence of allocations that are both ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free. Such is the case, in particular, in an economy with individual risk and no aggregate risk. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, uncerainty, envy |
| Date: | 2006–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00086032_v1&r=soc |