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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2006‒07‒21
sixteen papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Universita degli Studi di Roma, La Sapienza |
| By: | Raúl López-Pérez |
| Abstract: | This paper explicitly introduces norms in games, assuming that they shape (some) players’ utility and beliefs. People feel badly when they deviate from a binding norm, and the less other players deviate, the more badly they feel. Further, people anger at transgressors and get pleasure from punishing them. I then study how social norms and emotions affect cooperation, coordination, and punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence that alternative models of social preferences cannot explain. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Emotions, Focal Points, Punishment, Reciprocity, Social Norms |
| JEL: | C72 D02 D62 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:292&r=soc |
| By: | Eric M. Uslaner (University of Maryland) |
| Abstract: | Some researchers claim that diverse populations lead to less trust. Generalized trust is a core value that leads to positive outcomes in societies--from greater tolerance of minority groups and immigrants and willingness to do good deeds, to less corruption, more social welfare and education spending, more open markets, and better functioning government. Generalized trust fundamentally rests upon a foundation of respect for diversity, but at the same time arguing that societies have a common culture. It is the idea that people have a shared fate. Generalized trust rests upon a foundation of economic equality. Yet some claim that diversity leads to less trust rather than more trust. Trusting people who are different from yourself is atypical of most people, they claim. I dispute this--arguing that generalized trust is largely unrelated to population diversity. It is not diversity that matters--it is how populations are distributed. I show that trust is lower not in diverse societies, but rather in societies with large minority groups that are segregated from the majority groups. Minority residential segregation leads to less trust because it leads to less interaction across different groups in society--and leads minorities to associate only with each other, to form their own political organizations, and to see their fate as less dependent upon majority groups. I then discuss how economic inequality and the rule of law shape the relationship between trust and minority residential segregation. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Diversity, Corruption |
| JEL: | Z13 O57 D73 |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.69&r=soc |
| By: | Thomas Dohmen (IZA Bonn); Armin Falk (IZA Bonn and University of Bonn); David Huffman (IZA Bonn); Uwe Sunde (IZA Bonn and University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence has convincingly shown the existence of reciprocal inclinations, i.e., a tendency for people to respond in-kind to hostile or kind actions. Little is known, however, about: (i) the prevalence of reciprocity in the population, (ii) individual determinants of reciprocity, (iii) the correlation between positive and negative inclinations within person, and (iv) consequences of reciprocal inclinations for wages, subjective well-being, friendships and other economic and social outcomes. Answering these questions requires moving out of the lab and using a large and representative subject pool, which combines information about subjects’ reciprocal inclinations with extensive socioeconomic background information. In this paper we measure the reciprocal inclinations of 21,000 individuals. We show that most people state reciprocal inclinations, in particular in terms of positive reciprocity. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of reciprocity, and quite surprisingly, only a weak correlation between positive and negative reciprocity for an individual. In terms of determinants, being female, and increasing age, lead to greater positive and less negatively reciprocal tendencies. Taller people are more positively reciprocal, but height has no impact on negative reciprocity. The asymmetric impact of these determinants provides further indication that positive and negative reciprocity are fundamentally different traits, rather than the outcome of a single underlying tendency. In terms of economic implications, we provide the first evidence using a large representative survey that corroborates an important hypothesis arising from laboratory experiments: Positively reciprocal workers are in fact paid more, and exert greater effort, on the job. Moreover, positively reciprocal people are more likely to be employed, report having more close friends, and have a higher overall level of life satisfaction. In this sense, Homo Reciprocans - in the positive domain - is in fact more successful than his or her non-reciprocal fellows. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, trust, SOEP, wage regression, unemployment, happiness |
| JEL: | D63 J3 J6 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2205&r=soc |
| By: | Lorenzo Rocco (Università di Padova); Ottorino Chillem (Università di Padova) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups affects efficiency and group stability. The paper expands on existing literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of profitable options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the efficiency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Rather, stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities. |
| Keywords: | Adverse Selection, Group Stability, Altruism |
| JEL: | D64 D71 D82 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.73&r=soc |
| By: | Olof Johansson Stenman (Göteborg University); Minhaj Mahmud (Keele University, Centre for Economic Research and School of Economic and Management Studies); Peter Martinsson (Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Trust is measured using both survey questions and a standard trust experiment among a random sample of Muslim and Hindu household heads in rural Bangladesh. We found no significant effect of the social distance between Hindus and Muslims in the trust experiment in terms of fractions sent or returned, but the responses to the survey questions do indicate significant differences. Hindus, the minority, trust other people less in general, while Hindus trust Muslims more than Muslims trust Hindus. |
| Keywords: | Social capital; Trust; Social distance; Religion; Trust game; field experiment; Bangladesh. |
| JEL: | C93 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2006/10&r=soc |
| By: | Olof Johansson Stenman (Göteborg University); Minhaj Mahmud (Keele University, Centre for Economic Research and School of Economic and Management Studies); Peter Martinsson (Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between stated expectations and the sent amount in the trust game reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either during or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents' behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people's behaviour. |
| Keywords: | Trust; trust game; social capital; motivations; Bangladesh. |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2006/11&r=soc |
| By: | Nicolas Querou (Queen's University Belfast); Sylvain Beal (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne) |
| Abstract: | We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and the Repeated Nash Equilibrium (RNE), in which different networks may form. We state a sufficient condition under which a given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form totally different networks at each period, or the networks within a given RNE may exhibit a total order relationship. Finally we investigate the question of efficiency for both Bentham and Pareto criteria. |
| Keywords: | Repeated Network Formation Game, Two-sided Link Formation Costs, Bounded Rationality, Automata |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.74&r=soc |
| By: | James Andreoni |
| Date: | 2006–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000166&r=soc |
| By: | Xavier Gine (World Bank); Dean Karlan (Economic Growth Center, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other’s loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor’s access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability “centers” of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients. |
| Keywords: | Microfinance, group liability, joint liability, social capital, micro-enterprises, informal economies |
| JEL: | C93 D71 D82 D91 G21 O12 O16 O17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:940&r=soc |
| By: | Thomas Gall (University of Bonn); Roland Amann (University of Konstanz) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space and bunching for heterogeneous intermediate types. Groups may be heterogeneous in taste types and more heterogeneous types are more likely to participate. The equilibrium allocation does not induce cost-efficient human capital accumulation. Introducing ability tracking may produce beneficial results despite decreasing differences in human capital production. |
| Keywords: | Education, Peer-effects, Matching, Group Formation |
| JEL: | I21 C78 D51 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.79&r=soc |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University, CReAM London and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers an economic analysis of intergenerational transition of ethnic and social trait. We consider the level of social traits chosen by parents and its effect on their children's choice of ethnic and social traits when reaching adulthood. We develop a theory that suggests that parents will chose extreme ethnic and social traits in order to increase the cost that their children will pay if they wish to deviate from their parent's "ideal". The extreme choice of the ethnic social traits of parents has an effect on the segregation of minorities and migrants. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational transition, ethnic trait, social trait, minorities, migrants |
| JEL: | F22 J1 D1 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2199&r=soc |
| By: | Paolo Pin (Università Ca’Foscari Venezia) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents a model of network formation where every connected couple gives a contribution to the aggregate payoff, eventually discounted by their distance, and the resources are split between agents through the Myerson value. As equilibrium concept we adopt a refinement of pairwise stability. The only parameters are the number N of agents and a constant cost k for every agent to maintain any single link. This setup shows a wide multiplicity of equilibria, all of them connected, as k ranges over non trivial cases. We are able to show that, for any N, when the equilibrium is a tree (acyclical connected graph), which happens for high k, and there is no decay, the diameter of such a network never exceeds 8 (i.e. there are no two nodes with distance greater than 8). Adopting no decay and studying only trees, we facilitate the analysis but impose worst–case scenarios: we conjecture that the limit of 8 should apply for any possible non–empty equilibrium with any decay function. |
| Keywords: | Network Formation, Myerson Value |
| JEL: | D85 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.78&r=soc |
| By: | David K. Levine; Thomas R. Palfrey |
| Date: | 2006–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000188&r=soc |
| By: | Ulrich Horst; Jos´e A. Scheinkman |
| Date: | 2006–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000177&r=soc |
| By: | Michèle Belot (University of Essex and ISER); John Ermisch (ISER, University of Essex and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | A common finding in analyses of geographic mobility is a strong association between past movement and current mobility, a phenomenon that has given rise to the so called ‘moverstayer model’. We argue in this paper that one of the driving forces behind this heterogeneity is the strength of local social ties. We use data from the BHPS on the location of the three closest friends and the frequency of contacts. We estimate the processes of friendship formation and residential mobility jointly, allowing for correlation between the two processes. Our results show that the location of the closest friends matters substantially in the mobility decision, and matters more than the frequency of contacts. |
| Keywords: | geographical mobility, social ties, friendship formation |
| JEL: | J61 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2209&r=soc |
| By: | Yaw Opoku-Ankomah; Youssouf Dembélé; Ben Y. Ampomah; Léopold Somé (CSIR Water Research Institute of Ghana.; Environmental and Agricultural Research Institute (INERA); Water Resources Commission of Ghana) |
| Keywords: | Water resource management / water law / water use / colonialism / institutions / conflict / river basins / international cooperation / land ownership / women / water rates / pricing / social participation / decentralization / river basin development / Ghana / Burkina Faso / Volta River Basin |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwt:worppr:h038889&r=soc |