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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2005‒10‒22
seven papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Universitá degli Studi di Roma, La Sapienza |
| By: | François Fontaine (GREMARS, Université Lille 3 and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We provide a matching model where identical workers are embedded in ex-ante identical social networks. Job arrival rate is endogenous and wages are bargained. We study the evolution of networks over time and characterize the equilibrium distribution of unemployment rates across networks. We emphasize that wage dispersion arises endogenously as the consequence of the dynamics of networks, firms’ strategies and wage bargaining. Moreover, contrary to a generally accepted idea, social networks do not necessary induce stickiness in unemployment dynamics. Our endogenous matching technology shows that the effects of networks on the dynamics mostly hinge on search externalities. Our endogenous framework allows us to quantify these effects. |
| Keywords: | social networks, matching, wage dispersion |
| JEL: | E24 J64 J68 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1786&r=soc |
| By: | O. Sorenson; J. Singh; L. Fleming |
| Abstract: | Previous empirical research has established that science appears to stimulate the widespread diffusion of knowledge. The exact mechanism through which science catalyzes knowledge flow, however, remains somewhat ambiguous. This paper investigates whether the observed knowledge diffusion associated with science-based innovation genuinely stems from the norm of openness and incentives for publication, or whether it arises as an artifact of scientists having more dispersed social networks that facilitate the dissemination of tacit knowledge. Our findings support the former possibility: We use patent citation patterns to track knowledge flows, and find that science-based innovations diffuse more widely even after controlling for the underlying social networks of researchers as measured using data on prior collaborations. |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2005-12&r=soc |
| By: | Jacob K. Goeree (California Institute of Technology); Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht and IZA Bonn); Aljaz Ule (CREED, University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the basic Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. We consider treatments where agents' types are common knowledge and treatments where agents' types are private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. We find that with homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not borne but rather develop: in treatments with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all increase over time. Our results suggest that agents' heterogeneity is a major determinant for the predominance of star-like structures in real-life social networks. |
| Keywords: | network formation, stars, heterogeneity, laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D85 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1754&r=soc |
| By: | Jordi Brandts (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona); Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht and IZA Bonn); Frans van Winden (Tinbergen Institute and University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally studies the effects of competition in an environment where people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that, in comparison with no competition, the presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any gains in earnings for the short side of the exchange relation. Moreover, competition has a clearly negative impact on the disposition towards others and on the experienced well-being of those on the long side. Since subjective well-being improves only for those on the short side competition contributes to larger inequalities in experienced well-being. All in all competition does not show up as a positive force in our environment. |
| Keywords: | competition, happiness, well-being, laboratory experiment, emotions, market interaction |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D30 J50 M50 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1769&r=soc |
| By: | Thomas Siedler (Institute for Social and Economic Research); Helmut Rainer (Department of Economics, University of Essex) |
| Abstract: | In most industrialized countries, more people than ever are having to cope with the burden of caring for elderly parents. This paper formulates a model to explain how parental care responsibilities and family structure interact in affecting children’s mobility characteristics. A key insight we obtain is that the mobility of young adults crucially depends on the presence of a sibling. Our explanation is mainly, but not ex-clusively, based on a sibling power effect. Siblings compete in location and employment decisions so as to direct parental care decisions at later stages towards their preferred outcome. Only children are not exposed to this kind of competition. This causes an equilibrium in which siblings not only exhibit higher mobility than only children, but also have better labor market outcomes. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and from the American National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), we find strong evidence that confirms these patterns. The implications of our results are then discussed in the context of current population trends in Europe and the United States. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, children, young people |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ese:iserwp:2005-18&r=soc |
| By: | Rodolphe Blavy; Murat  Yülek; Anupam Basu |
| Abstract: | Based on the experience of selected countries, this paper offers a critical presentation of the development of the microfinance sector in Africa. The paper supports the view that microfinance institutions, especially those engaged in full financial intermediation, complement effectively the banking sector in extending financial services and successfully draw on the rich experience of community-based development and preexisting informal methods of financial intermediation in Africa. Growing linkages between microfinance institutions and the banking system and the dissemination of good practices by nongovernment organizations contribute to the sound development of the sector, supported by regulation and supervision by local authorities. |
| Keywords: | Public finance , Africa , Bank regulations , Savings , Economic models , |
| Date: | 2004–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/174&r=soc |
| By: | William Jack (Georgetown University) and Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University) (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms — institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. A rule-of-succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict - class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision-making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules-of-succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation. Classification-JEL Codes: C73, D72, D78 |
| Keywords: | Social Conflict, Rule of Succession, Dynamic political game |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~05-05-15&r=soc |