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on South East Asia |
| By: | Ippei Fujiwara; Koji Takahashi |
| Abstract: | How are Asian financial markets interlinked and how are they linked to markets in developed countries? What is the main driver of fluctuations in Asian financial markets as well as real economic activities? In order to answer these questions, we estimate the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and gauge the degree of interactions in both financial markets and real economic activities among Asian economies.> ; We first show that the degree of the international spillover in stock markets is like cookie-cutter products, namely, uniform, irrespective of the groups of countries, such as G3, NIEs and ASEAN4. This suggests the importance of the globally common shock in stock markets. We, then, discuss the macro-finance dissonance. In stock and bond markets, the US has been the main driver of fluctuations. Regarding real economic activities, China has emerged as an important source of fluctuations. |
| Keywords: | Financial markets ; Economic conditions - Asia ; Stock market |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:feddgw:92&r=sea |
| By: | Anders Akerman (Department of Economics, Stockholm University); Anna Larsson (Department of Economics, Stockholm University); Alireza Naghavi (University of Bologna and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) |
| Abstract: | Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country’s political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization. |
| Keywords: | Autocracy, Growth, Political Elites, Landowners, Capitalists, Growth Miracles, Trade, Comparative Advantage, Capital Mobility, Property Rights |
| JEL: | F10 F20 P14 P16 O10 O24 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.65&r=sea |
| By: | Efraim Benmelech; Eyal Dvir |
| Abstract: | Does short-term debt increase vulnerability to financial crisis, or does short-term debt reflect -- rather than cause -- the incipient crisis? We study the role that short-term debt played in the collapse of the East Asian financial sector in 1997-1998. We alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of short-term debt by using long-term debt obligations that matured during the crisis. We find that debt obligations issued at least three years before the crisis had a negative, albeit sometimes insignificant, effect on the probability of failure. Our results are consistent with the view that short-term debt reflects, rather than causes, distress in financial institutions. |
| JEL: | F32 F34 G21 G32 G38 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17468&r=sea |
| By: | Lídia Farré (IAE-CSIC, IZA and Barcelona GSE); Francesco Fasani (IAE-CSIC, Barcelona GSE, MOVE-INSIDE and CReAM) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of television on internal migration in Indonesia. We exploit the differential introduction of private television throughout the country and the variation in signal reception due to topography to estimate the causal effect of media exposure. Our estimates reveal important long and short run effects. An increase of one standard deviation in the number of private TV channels received in the area of residence reduces future inter- provincial migration by 1.7-2.7 percentage points, and all migration (inter and intra- provincial) by 4-7.4 percentage points. Short run effects are slightly smaller, but still sizeable and statistically significant. We also show that respondents less exposed to private TV are more likely to consider themselves among the poorest groups of the society. As we discuss in a stylized model of migration choice under imperfect information, these findings are consistent with Indonesia citizens over-estimating the net gains from internal migration. |
| Keywords: | Information; Migration decisions; Television |
| JEL: | J61 L82 O15 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1117&r=sea |
| By: | Lídia Farré; Francesco Fasani |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of television on internal migration in Indonesia. We exploit the differential introduction of private television throughout the country and the variation in signal reception due to topography to estimate the causal effect of media exposure. Our estimates reveal important long and short run effects. An increase of one standard deviation in the number of private TV channels received in the area of residence reduces future inter-provincial migration by 1.7-2.7 percentage points, and all migration (inter and intra-provincial) by 4-7.4 percentage points. Short run effects are slightly smaller, but still sizeable and statistically significant. We also show that respondents less exposed to private TV are more likely to consider themselves among the poorest groups of the society. As we discuss in a stylized model of migration choice under imperfect information, these findings are consistent with Indonesia citizens over-estimating the net gains from internal migration. |
| Keywords: | Information; Migration decisions; Television |
| JEL: | J61 L82 O15 |
| Date: | 2011–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:883.11&r=sea |
| By: | De, Utpal Kumar |
| Abstract: | This paper tried to examine the level of cointegration among various nations across the continents in regard to the globalisation. Also here attempt is made to analyse the nature of inter and intra continental variation in globalisation over time. The proximity and convergence over time in terms of the growth of globalisation is also examined by using a panel data set over a period of 1970 to 2007. The outcome reveals the presence of co-integration among the selected nations despite the fact that the European nations are more co-integrated than the other continents. It is followed by the countries in Africa and Asia. The proximity matrices of overall globalisation and political globalisation provided some important indications that geographical proximity, economic necessities, cultural and political understanding play crucial role in determining the clusters of countries in terms of globalisation or choice of the countries to open with other nations for trade, cultural exchange etc. |
| Keywords: | Globalisation; Proximity; Stationarity; Cointegration; Regional Convergence; Panel Data |
| JEL: | H77 R1 C82 O57 O40 F43 |
| Date: | 2011–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6166&r=sea |
| By: | Rodrik, Dan (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Novelists have a better track record than economists at foretelling the future. Consider then Gary Shteyngart's timely comic novel "Super Sad True Love Story" (Random House, 2010), which provides a rather graphic vision of what lies in store for the world economy. The novel takes place in the near future and is set against the backdrop of a United States that lies in economic and political ruin. The country's bankrupt economy is ruled with a firm hand by the IMF from its new Parthenon-shaped headquarters in Singapore. China and sovereign wealth funds have parceled America's most desirable real estate among themselves. Poor people are designated as LNWI ("low net worth individuals") and are being pushed into ghettoes. Even skilled Americans are desperate to acquire residency status in foreign lands. This is sheer fantasy of course, but one that seems to resonate well with the collective mood. A future in which the U.S and other advanced economies are forced to play second fiddle to the dynamic emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere is rapidly becoming cliche. This vision is based in part on the very rapid pace of economic growth that emerging and developing economies experienced in the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Latin America benefited from a pace of economic development that it had not experienced since the 1970s, and Africa began to close the gap with the advanced countries for the first time since countries in the continent received their independence. Even though most of these countries were hit badly by the crisis, their recovery has also been swift. Optimism on developing countries is matched by pessimism on the rich country front. The United States and Europe have emerged from the crisis with debilitating challenges. They need to address a crushing debt burden and its unpleasant implications for fiscal and monetary policy. They also need to replace growth models which were based in many instances on finance, real estate, and unsustainable levels of borrowing. Japan has long ceased to exhibit any growth dynamism. And the eurozone's future remains highly uncertain--with the economic and political ramifications of its unraveling looking nothing less than scary. In such an environment, rapid growth in the developing world is the only thing that could propel the world economy forward and generate increasing demand for rich-country goods and services--the only silver lining in an otherwise dreary future. The question I address in this paper is whether this gap in performance between the developed and developing worlds can continue, and in particular, whether developing nations can sustain the rapid growth they have experienced of late. I will not have anything to say on the prospects for the advanced economies themselves, assuming, along with conventional wisdom, that their growth will remain sluggish at best. My focus is squarely on the developing and emerging countries and on the likelihood of continued convergence. |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp11-033&r=sea |