|
on South East Asia |
| By: | Karine Marazyan (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at explaining differences in education among foster-children and between foster and biological children in developing countries. Foster-children whose biological parents are alive may provide old-age support for both their host and biological parents. Therefore foster-children have lower returns to education than biological children and should receive less human capital investment in household where both types of children live together. However, in households where foster-children are alone, host parents will over-invest in their education to ensure that the expected old-age support will equal a minimum amount to survive. Using data from Indonesia, we provide some evidence supporting our hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | Household Structure, Child Fostering, Sibling Rivalry |
| Date: | 2008–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00290644_v1&r=sea |
| By: | Karine Marazyan (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at explaining differences in education among foster-children and between foster and biological children in developing countries. Foster-children whose biological parents are alive may provide old-age support for both their host and biological parents. Therefore foster-children have lower returns to education than biological children and should receive less human capital investment in household where both types of children live together. However, in households where foster-children are alone, host parents will over-invest in their education to ensure that the expected old-age support will equal a minimum amount to survive. Using data from Indonesia, we provide some evidence supporting our hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | Household Structure, Child Fostering, Sibling Rivalry |
| Date: | 2008–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:ceswpp:halshs-00290644_v1&r=sea |
| By: | Benjamin A. Olken |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an experiment where 48 Indonesian villages were randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative-based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects chosen by women being located in poorer areas. The results show that direct participation in political decision making can substantially increase satisfaction and legitimacy, even when it has little effect on actual decisions. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14123&r=sea |
| By: | Harlan Dimas (School of Economics-Faculty of Economics Padjadjaran University) |
| Abstract: | Of the many trials faced by city managers in developing countries, one of the most challenging is undoubtedly the Street Vendors (SV) problem. They are a perpetual problem for street and sidewalk users in most Indonesian cities. Their spill-over business onto roadways is the source of traffic congestion. Their informal setting and business refuse (garbage) cause unsightly urban vista. However there is now a gradual shift of perspectives that focus on their economic potentials, offering a smart city manager a host of development opportunities. Hence the current policy of harassment and elimination of SV, as practiced by most municipalities in Indonesia, is counter productive at best and inhuman at worst. This paper discusses the roots of the SV phenomenon (found to be mostly economics) and suggests several SV management solutions sampled from best practices from around the world. |
| Keywords: | Street Vendors Management, Economic Policy, Best Practices, Local (Urban) Economic Development |
| JEL: | P25 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unp:wpaper:200803&r=sea |
| By: | Al-Amin, Abul Quasem; Siwar, Chamhuri; Jaafar, Abdul hamid |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impacts of external price shocks in the Malaysian economy. There are three simulations are carried out with different degrees of external shocks using Malaysian Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis. The model results indicate that the import price shocks, better known as external price shocks by 15% decreases the domestic production of building and construction sector by 25.87%, hotels, restaurants and entertainment sector by 12.04%, industry sector by 12.02%, agriculture sector by 11.01%, and electricity and gas sector by 9.55% from the baseline. On the import side, our simulation results illustrate that as a result of the import price shocks by 15%, imports decreases significantly in all sectors from base level. Among the scenarios, the largest negative impacts goes on industry sectors by 29.67% followed by building and construction sector by 22.42%, hotels, restaurants and entertainment sector by 19.45%, electricity and gas sector by 13.%, agriculture sector by 12.63% and other service sectors by 11.17%. However significant negative impact goes to the investment and fixed capital investment. It also causes the household income, household consumption and household savings down and increases the cost of livings in the economy results in downward social welfare. |
| Keywords: | External Price Shocks; Applied General Equilibrium Analysis; Malaysian economy |
| JEL: | F0 F1 |
| Date: | 2008–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:9308&r=sea |
| By: | TCHANA TCHANA , Fulbert |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses empirically whether banking regulation is effective at preventing banking crises. We use a monthly index of banking system fragility, which captures almost every source of risk in the banking system, to estimate the effect of regulatory measures (entry restriction, reserve requirement, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy requirement) on banking stability in the context of a Markov-switching model. We apply this method to the Indonesian banking system, which has been subject to several regulatory changes over the last couple of decades, and at the same time, has experienced a severe systemic crisis. We draw from this research the following findings: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and also the probability of their occurrence; (ii) larger reserve requirements reduce crisis duration, but increase banking instability; (iii) deposit insurance increases banking system stability and reduces crisis duration. (vi) capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises. |
| Keywords: | Banking Crises; Banking System Fragility Index; Banking Regulation; Markov Switching Regression |
| JEL: | G28 C25 G21 |
| Date: | 2008–06–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:9299&r=sea |