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on Risk Management |
By: | Balint Vargedo (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary)); Csaba Burger (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary)); Donat Kim (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary)) |
Keywords: | sustainable finance, financial stability, capital requirement, green finance, default probability, green transition, central bank mandates. |
JEL: | E58 G21 G33 O16 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnb:wpaper:2025/2 |
By: | Francesca Biagini; Alessandro Gnoatto; Katharina Oberpriller |
Abstract: | We consider the pricing and hedging of counterparty credit risk and funding when there is no possibility to hedge the jump to default of either the bank or the counterparty. This represents the situation which is most often encountered in practice, due to the absence of quoted corporate bonds or CDS contracts written on the counterparty and the difficulty for the bank to buy/sell protection on her own default. We apply local risk-minimization to find the optimal strategy and compute it via a BSDE. |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.12774 |
By: | Fedor Sandomirskiy; Po Hyun Sung; Omer Tamuz; Ben Wincelberg |
Abstract: | We study finite normal-form games under a narrow bracketing assumption: when players play several games simultaneously, they consider each one separately. We show that under mild additional assumptions, players must play either Nash equilibria, logit quantal response equilibria, or their generalizations, which capture players with various risk attitudes. |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.11243 |
By: | Döttling, Robin |
Abstract: | How does the zero lower bound on deposit rates (ZLB) affect how banks respond to capital regulation? I study this question in a model in which households value the liquidity services of deposits yet do not accept negative deposit rates. When deposit rates are constrained by the ZLB, tight capital requirements disproportionately hurt franchise values and are therefore less effective in curbing excessive risk taking. The model delivers a novel rationale for "interest-dependent" capital regulation that is optimally laxer when the ZLB binds and tighter when the ZLB is slack but may bind in the future. |
Date: | 2023–12–19 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:9dxzf_v1 |
By: | World Bank |
Keywords: | Environment-Adaptation to Climate Change Environment-Climate Change Impacts Infrastructure Economics and Finance-Infrastructure Finance Urban Development-Hazard Risk Management Conflict and Development-Disaster Management |
Date: | 2024–05 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:41595 |
By: | Francesco Tisei; Malin Ed |
Keywords: | Environment-Adaptation to Climate Change Environment-Climate Change Impacts Social Protections and Labor-Social Protections & Assistance Urban Development-Hazard Risk Management |
Date: | 2024–05 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:41529 |