nep-rmg New Economics Papers
on Risk Management
Issue of 2010‒12‒23
five papers chosen by
Stan Miles
Thompson Rivers University

  1. "Choice of Collateral Currency" By Masaaki Fujii; Akihiko Takahashi
  2. American Step-Up and Step-Down Credit Default Swaps under Levy Models By Tim Siu-Tang Leung; Kazutoshi Yamazaki
  3. Minimising Risks from Imbalances in European Banking By Sebastian Barnes; Philip R. Lane; Artur Radziwill
  4. Financial spillovers from the US financial markets to the emerging markets during the subprime crisis: the example of Indian equity markets By Gilles Dufrénot; Benjamin Keddad; Alain Sand-Zantman
  5. "Hedging European Derivatives with the Polynomial Variance Swap under Uncertain Volatility Environments" By Akihiko Takahashi; Yukihiro Tsuzuki; Akira Yamazaki

  1. By: Masaaki Fujii (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo); Akihiko Takahashi (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: Collateral has been used for a long time in the cash market and we have also experienced significant increase of its use as an important credit risk mitigation tool in the derivatives market for this decade. Despite its long history in the financial market, its importance for funding has been recognized relatively recently following the explosion of basis spreads in the crisis. This paper has demonstrated the impact of collateralization on derivatives pricing through its funding effects based on the actual data of swap markets. It has also shown the importance of the "choice" of collateral currency. In particular, when a contract allows multiple currencies as eligible collateral as well as its free replacement, the paper has found that the embedded "cheapest-todeliver" option can be quite valuable and significantly change the fair value of a trade. The implications of these findings for risk management have been also discussed.
    Date: 2010–12
  2. By: Tim Siu-Tang Leung; Kazutoshi Yamazaki
    Abstract: This paper studies the valuation of a class of credit default swaps (CDSs) with the embedded option to switch to a different premium and notional principal anytime prior to a credit event. These are early exercisable contracts that give the protection buyer or seller the right to step-up, step-down, or cancel the CDS position. The pricing problem is formulated under a structural credit risk model based on Levy processes. This leads to the analytic and numerical studies of an optimal stopping problem subject to early termination due to default. In a general spectrally negative Levy model, we rigorously derive an analytic solution for the investor's optimal exercise strategy. This allows for instant computation of the credit spread under various specifications. Numerical examples are provided to examine the impacts of default risk and contractual features on the credit spread and exercise strategy.
    Date: 2010–12
  3. By: Sebastian Barnes; Philip R. Lane; Artur Radziwill
    Abstract: The euro area financial system took excessive risks during the global credit boom, which in some countries led to an unsustainable increase in credit, higher asset prices and housing booms. This process helped to fuel large imbalances within the euro area. Banks played a key role in channelling funds from economies with large surpluses to deficit countries, leading in some cases to the accumulation of considerable risks for borrowers and lenders. Weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory architecture contributed to these problems in the euro area, as in other OECD economies. Gaps in microprudential regulation created an environment prone to excessive risk-taking: capital buffers were too small; the quality of capital was inadequate; banks’ models underestimated risks; and risks were shifted off-balance sheet and beyond supervisory oversight. Liquidity risks were not adequately monitored. Systemic risks were allowed to build up as the authorities largely failed to counter the credit cycle. Some large systemic banks contributed to growing imbalances and vulnerability. The decentralised European supervisory architecture was not sufficiently effective in supervising large cross-border institutions. When the financial crisis hit, the co-ordination of cross-border rescues proved problematic and complicated efficient resolution. Stronger regulations are needed to improve financial stability. Effective microprudential regulation is the first line of defence. This should be upgraded by implementing the Basel III capital accord, as has been announced by the EU authorities, and a range of related measures. Some consideration should be given to an accelerated phasing-in. Macroprudential regulation should be significantly developed to mitigate pro-cyclicality and reduce systemic risks posed by large cross-border banks. The creation of the European Systemic Risk Board is welcome. To improve cross-border supervision, the European Banking Authority should have sufficient powers and resources to ensure that a system based on national supervision leads to coherent regulation and effective supervision. In addition, a cross-border crisis-management framework for Europe is needed. Overall, significant steps have already been taken by the EU authorities to address these issues and further reforms are under way. This working paper relates to the 2010 OECD Economic Survey of the Euro area. (<P>Minimiser les risques de déséquilibre au sein du système bancaire européen<BR>Durant la phase d’explosion du crédit à l'échelle mondiale, le système financier de la zone euro a pris des risques excessifs qui ont abouti, dans quelques pays, à une augmentation insoutenable du crédit et à une flambée des prix des actifs et de l'immobilier. Ce processus a contribué au creusement d'importants déséquilibres au sein de la zone euro. Les banques ont joué un rôle majeur dans la transmission des ressources financières des économies affichant des excédents importants vers les pays déficitaires, ce qui a conduit, dans certains cas, à l'accumulation de risques considérables pour les emprunteurs comme pour les prêteurs. Les lacunes du dispositif de réglementation et de surveillance ont contribué à ces problèmes dans la zone euro, comme dans les autres économies de l’OCDE. Les failles de la réglementation microprudentielle ont favorisé la propension à prendre des risques excessifs : les volants de fonds propres des banques étaient trop faibles, la qualité des capitaux n'était pas adaptée, les modèles utilisés par les banques sous-estimaient les risques et ces risques étaient sortis des bilans et échappaient ainsi à la surveillance des autorités de contrôle. De plus, il n’y a pas eu de suivi convenable des risques de liquidité. Comme les autorités n’ont guère su s’opposer à l’expansion du crédit, des risques systémiques ont pu s'accumuler. Certaines grandes banques d'importance systémique ont contribué à l'aggravation des déséquilibres et de la vulnérabilité du système. Le dispositif européen de surveillance décentralisé n’était pas assez efficace pour contrôler les grandes institutions financières transnationales. Lorsque la crise financière a éclaté, la coordination des différents plans de sauvetage nationaux s'est avérée problématique et a contrarié le règlement efficient des faillites des établissements. Il convient de renforcer la réglementation de façon à améliorer la stabilité financière. La première ligne de défense réside dans une réglementation microprudentielle efficace. Cette réglementation doit être améliorée en appliquant l'Accord de Bâle III sur les fonds propres, comme l’ont annoncé les autorités de l’UE, ainsi qu'une série de mesures connexes. Il conviendrait d’envisager une accélération de leur mise en oeuvre. La réglementation macroprudentielle doit être nettement développée de façon à atténuer le caractère procyclique du dispositif et à réduire les risques systémiques que présentent les grands établissements transnationaux. La création du Comité européen du risque systémique est bienvenue. Pour améliorer la surveillance transnationale, l'Autorité bancaire européenne doit être dotée de prérogatives et de ressources suffisantes pour qu’un système fondé sur une surveillance exercée à l’échelle nationale donne naissance à une réglementation cohérente et un contrôle efficace. En outre, il convient de mettre en place un dispositif transfrontalier de gestion des crises à l'échelle de l'Europe. En résumé, les autorités européennes ont déjà pris des mesures substantielles pour s’attaquer à ces questions, et d’autres réformes sont en cours. Ce document de travail porte sur l'Étude économique du Zone euro. (
    Keywords: euro area, financial stability, zone Euro, stabilité financière
    JEL: G15 G21 G28
    Date: 2010–12–09
  4. By: Gilles Dufrénot (Université d’Aix Marseille II, DEFI.); Benjamin Keddad (Université d’Aix Marseille II, DEFI.); Alain Sand-Zantman (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques)
    Abstract: This paper provides evidence of spillover effects from the Indian to the US financial markets. We use VAR and Kalman filter analysis to assess the influence of financial stress indicators like the LIBOR-OIS, CDS, the S&P 500 volatility and the exchange rate of the rupee against the Dollar on two indicators of financial stress in India, namely the illiquidity of stock indices and their volatility. We conduct an analysis bases on both daily and monthly frequency and use a database that consists of both aggregate and disaggregated indexes. Our results points to a signification contagion effect after the period following the Lehman Brothers collapse.
    Keywords: Subprime crisis, Emerging Markets, VAR analysis, financial stress
    JEL: F37 G15 O53
    Date: 2010–11
  5. By: Akihiko Takahashi (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo); Yukihiro Tsuzuki (Mizuho-DL Financial Technology Co., Ltd.); Akira Yamazaki (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a new hedging scheme of European derivatives under uncertain volatility environments, in which a weighted variance swap called the polynomial variance swap is added to the Black-Scholes delta hedging for managing exposure to volatility risk. In general, under these environments one cannot hedge the derivatives completely by using dynamic trading of only an underlying asset owing to volatility risk. Then, for hedging uncertain volatility risk, we design the polynomial variance, which can be dependent on the level of the underlying asset price. It is shown that the polynomial variance swap is not perfect, but more efficient as a hedging tool for the volatility exposure than the standard variance swap. In addition, our hedging scheme has a preferable property that any information on the volatility process of the underlying asset price is unnecessary. To demonstrate robustness of our scheme, we implement Monte Carlo simulation tests with three different settings, and compare the hedging performance of our scheme with that of standard dynamic hedging schemes such as the minimum-variance hedging. As a result, it is found that our scheme outperforms the others in all test cases. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the scheme proposed in this paper continues to be robust against model risks.
    Date: 2010–11

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