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on Resource Economics |
| By: | Balboni, Clare; Shapiro, Joseph S. |
| Abstract: | How do environmental goods and policies shape spatial patterns of economic activity? How will climate change modify these impacts over the coming decades? How do agglomeration, commuting, and other spatial forces and policies affect environmental quality? We distill theoretical and empirical research linking urban, regional, and spatial economics to the environment. We present stylized facts on spatial environmental economics, describe insights from canonical environmental models and spatial models, and discuss the building blocks for papers and the research frontier in enviro-spatial economics. Most enviro-spatial research remains bifurcated into either primarily environmental or spatial papers. Research is only beginning to realize potential insights from more closely combining spatial and environmental approaches. |
| JEL: | F18 F64 H23 J61 O18 Q50 R11 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19934 |
| By: | Berman, Gabriella; Echavarria, Elizabeth; Spiller, Beia (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates deep-sea mining (DSM) from a policy perspective in light of rising critical mineral demand. It assesses the economic, environmental, social, and governance trade-offs between DSM and terrestrial mining, highlighting unresolved questions about ecological harm, commercial viability, benefit sharing, and the long-term substitution of land-based supply. Because DSM is likely to augment rather than displace terrestrial mining, particularly in the short term, it could have important distributional consequences for mining-dependent communities and producer countries. We also examine the unsettled international governance landscape, including ongoing negotiations at the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and growing unilateral national initiatives. We argue that, given the many uncertainties, policymakers should proceed with caution when setting regulatory frameworks for and making decisions about DSM. Furthermore, prioritizing robust environmental standards, equitable distributional rules, and broader mineral strategies centered on demand reduction, recycling, and reform of terrestrial mining governance is key to ensuring a sustainable transition as DSM rules develop. |
| Date: | 2026–07–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-26-12 |
| By: | Bhattacharya, Shubhro (University of California San Diego); Constantino, Sara (Stanford University); Mishra, Nirajana (Northeastern University); Prakash, Nishith (Northeastern University); Sabarwal, Shwetlena (The World Bank); Samaddar, Dighbijoy (Centre for Social and Behavior Change); Sherif, Raisa (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finances) |
| Abstract: | We study intergenerational spillovers of environmental education using a randomized field experiment with 1, 446 child–parent pairs in Patna, India, assigned to child-only, parent-only, joint, or control arms. Treating either children or parents raises the likelihood that the untreated household member chooses a delayed recycled certificate over an immediate standard one by 25 percentage points—spillovers on this incentivized behavior run symmetrically in both directions. Spillovers on beliefs and attitudes are asymmetric, however: children shift parents' views on climate change, but little spillover runs from parents to children on other measures. Joint participation does not outperform targeting children alone once child-to-parent spillovers are accounted for, suggesting that targeting children is a more scalable, cost-effective way to promote sustainable household behavior. |
| Keywords: | environmental education, intra-household spillovers, intergenerational transmission, pro-environmental behavior, climate risk perceptions, factorial randomized design, India |
| JEL: | C93 D10 I20 O10 Q01 Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18809 |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Aix-Marseille Université); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest, USA); Benteng Zou (DEM, Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | "We study an n-country pollution differential game in which countries differ in their sensitivity to environmental damages while contributing to a common pollution stock. Such heterogeneity implies that countries value environmental quality differently and disagree on the desirable long-run environmental outcome. Within a linear-quadratic framework, we characterize the decentralized equilibrium and compare it to a centralized benchmark that maximizes aggregate welfare. We show that decentralized steady-state pollution is inefficiently high and that its level depends systematically on the distribution of damage sensitivities: intriguingly, holding average damages constant, more evenly distributed damages lead to more long-run pollution. We next show, among others, that while polarized damages reduce equilibrium pollution, they do generate distributional tensions. We therefore suggest a mechanism combining Pigouvian taxation with lump-sum transfers that can found an International Environment Agreement redistributing gains and implementing the first-best allocation despite divergent incentives." |
| Keywords: | "Transboundary pollution; Differential games; Asymmetric players; International Envionmental agreements" |
| JEL: | C62 C71 H23 F53 Q53 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:26-08 |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Aix-Marseille Université); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest, USA); Benteng Zou (DEM, Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | "We study an n-country pollution differential game in which countries differ in their sensitivity to environmental damages while contributing to a common pollution stock. Such heterogeneity implies that countries value environmental quality differently and disagree on the desirable long-run environmental outcome. Within a linear-quadratic framework, we characterize the decentralized equilibrium and compare it to a centralized benchmark that maximizes aggregate welfare. We show that decentralized steady-state pollution is inefficiently high and that its level depends systematically on the distribution of damage sensitivities: intriguingly, holding average damages constant, more evenly distributed damages lead to more long-run pollution. We next show, among others, that while polarized damages reduce equilibrium pollution, they do generate distributional tensions. We therefore suggest a mechanism combining Pigouvian taxation with lump-sum transfers that can found an International Environment Agreement redistributing gains and implementing the first-best allocation despite divergent incentives." |
| Keywords: | "Transboundary pollution; Differential games; Asymmetric players; International Envionmental agreements" |
| JEL: | C62 C71 H23 F53 Q53 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:26-11 |