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on Resource Economics |
| By: | David Cuberes (Maynooth University); Aitor Lacuesta (Banco de España); Carlos Moreno-Pérez (Banco de España); Daniel Oto-Peralías (Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how land ownership concentration shapes the deployment of large-scale renewable energy projects across six European countries (Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands). Using a 5×5 km grid-cell framework with cadastral parcel data, we show that cells with a higher share of area in large parcels (= 10 ha) are substantially more likely to host mega photovoltaic (PV) plants (= 50 ha), with a standardized semi-elasticity of 68% in the pooled sample, consistent across all six countries. Land concentration also drives aggregate solar deployment: a one-standard-deviation increase raises expected PV hectares within a grid cell by 62%, an effect driven almost entirely by the mega-plant margin. By contrast, the effect on wind parks is weaker and heterogeneous, consistent with wind requiring less contiguous land assembly than solar. A specificity test and decomposition analysis corroborate that the assembly mechanism operates specifically at the mega-plant margin, and a horse race between cadastral concentration and farm operational size establishes that ownership, not farming scale, is the operative mechanism. A finer 500 m grid within-municipality analysis corroborates the effect of land concentration on mega PV plants and further reveals that it is attenuated in irrigated areas, where higher agricultural rents raise landowner reservation values. We rationalize these patterns with a conceptual framework in which solar assembly requires unanimous consent from a set of landowners whose number falls with parcel size, while wind requires only a subset. Our findings reveal that land ownership structure is a decisive factor in the energy transition: fragmentation impedes large-scale deployment, while concentration enables it but channels its benefits toward a few large landowners, potentially deepening rural grievances and local opposition. |
| Keywords: | solar plants, photovoltaic plants, land concentration, energy transition, renewable projects |
| JEL: | O13 Q40 Q15 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:2639e |
| By: | Shuang Zhang; Douglas Almond |
| Abstract: | China launched a nationwide, rate-based carbon market in 2021. Covering the world’s top CO2 emitter, compliance depends on the intensity of carbon emissions rather than an absolute cap. We draw on the theoretical literature of rate-based systems to provide the first empirical evidence on an early adopter. Using plant-level data from satellite imagery and machine learning methods, we find that high-efficiency power plants increased electricity generation and CO2 emissions by approximately 5% relative to low-efficiency plants. Because its carbon market regulates nearly all coal plants in China, we focus on the differential responses by plant efficiency, finding no evidence of a differential reduction in emission intensity (though these estimates are imprecise). Relative to coal plants in Indonesia and the Philippines, which had no carbon market, China’s high-efficiency plants also increased emissions, while the estimate for its low-efficiency plants is small and insignificant. This pattern of responses suggests that emissions increases of high-efficiency plants exceeded substitution away from low-efficiency plants. Underscoring the production stimulus to more efficient Chinese plants, air quality worsened downwind of high- efficiency plants relative to low-efficiency plants, compromising air quality in relatively clean areas of China. If China's goal is to reduce its carbon emissions, then benchmarks will need to be tightened within the existing system or an alternative system that does not simultaneously incentivize electricity production will need to be adopted. |
| JEL: | Q48 Q5 Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35924 |
| By: | Kılınç, Ayşegül; Elkerbout, Milan (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | On July 17, 2026, the European Commission published a proposal to revise the EU emissions trading system (ETS). ETS revisions tend to happen roughly every five years to account for changes in the European Union’s overall climate policy and the global economy. Earlier this year, the European Union confirmed its climate target for 2040 of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 90 percent relative to 1990. In this issue brief, we review some of the key proposed changes to the ETS design, especially as related to allowance allocation and other design elements that are relevant to industrial product regulation. |
| Date: | 2026–10–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:ibrief:ib-26-08 |