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on Resource Economics |
| By: | Deng, Zichen (Dept. of Economics, University of Amsterdam); Niu, Runxi (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | Pollution from regulated sources can cross administrative boundaries; consequently, jurisdiction-based treatment assignment may fail to accurately capture policy exposure at a given receptor. To address this, we construct a predetermined treatment intensity by combining regulatory assignment with pre-policy source characteristics and atmospheric source–receptor linkages, and use it in a continuous treatment difference-in-differences design. A formal framework and simulations clarify when cross-boundary transport attenuates jurisdiction-based comparisons and when the source–receptor design recovers policy effects. Applied to China’s Two Control Zones policy, both designs indicate post-policy reductions in local SO2 emissions. For SO2 dry deposition at receptors, the source–receptor estimate is negative and statistically significant, whereas the jurisdiction-based estimate is also negative but not statistically distinguishable from zero. The same exposure measure reveals declines in crop value per hectare in more exposed villages, which are less apparent in jurisdiction-based comparisons. Crop-specific response patterns are consistent with a sulfur-nutrient channel. |
| Keywords: | spillovers; air pollution; atmospheric transport; source-receptor design; Two-Control Zones; agriculture |
| JEL: | C21 C23 O13 Q53 Q58 |
| Date: | 2026–09–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2026_013 |
| By: | Yohann Berthelin (Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France); Lise Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard (Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | We address the question of whether macroprudential policy can extend its mandate beyond correcting financial frictions to also internalizing environmental externalities. We analyze a dynamic general equilibrium model with two externalities: financial frictions and pollution from using brown capital. Our model features heterogeneous agents with infinite lifetimes, of two kinds of capital, polluting and non-polluting, and of a macroprudential policy represented by differentiated loan-to-value (LTV) through a credit constraint faced by entrepreneurs. First, we derive closed-form expressions for optimal differentiated LTV ratios that replicate the social planner’s allocation. Second, the green LTV internalizes financial frictions only, while the brown LTV additionally accounts for pollution externalities, which can turn negative when environmental costs are sufficiently high, indicating that the first-best allocation instead requires a tax-like penalty on the financing of dirty capital rather than a conventional non-negative loan-to-value ratio. Third, the LTV associated with polluting capital becomes more stringent when environmental quality directly affects agents’ utility rather than total factor productivity. |
| Keywords: | Environmental policy, Macroprudential policy, Environmental transition |
| JEL: | E32 Q50 Q58 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2608 |
| By: | Hanming Fang (University of Pennsylvania and NBER); Jing Wu (Tsinghua University); Vincent Yao (Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | We examine the causal effect of uncertainty in property rights on housing prices and speculative behavior. We take advantage of a distinctive setting in Shenzhen, China, where neighboring residential units that are otherwise similar dier in the strength of their property rights protections. Some units have full property rights (FPR) with a 70-year leasehold, whereas others have only limited property rights (LPR) protections. Using detailed listing data, we find that the sales market prices these protections, while the rental market does not. Our estimates imply that the perceived probability that FPR rights could be questioned at the end of the 70-year term is between 7% and 21%, and that the probability the LPR receives no legal protection in any future year exceeds 50%. We further show that LPR units are more susceptible to speculation, as reflected in higher turnover and greater price volatility. Lastly, we show that the public release of new urban planning codes raises listing prices and lowers turnover and price volatility for LPR properties relative to matched FPR units. |
| Keywords: | Property Rights, Housing Prices, Speculative Activities, Urban Planning Codes |
| JEL: | G11 G12 R30 |
| Date: | 2026–09–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:26-014 |