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on Resource Economics |
| By: | Federico Carril-Caccia (Department of International and Spanish Economics, University of Granada); Ana Cuadros (University of Jaume I); Juliette Milgram Baleix (Department of International and Spanish Economics, University of Granada) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of environmental regulation (ER) on foreign direct investment (FDI) location decisions, using a gravity model covering the period 2003–2018. We examine how ER in both origin and destination countries influences bilateral FDI flows, distinguishing between greenfield (GF) investments and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). To our knowledge, this is the first study of FDI location decisions to jointly analyse the responses of bilateral M&A and GF projects to ER across a large sample of developed and developing countries and manufacturing industries. Overall, we find no consistent evidence supporting either the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) or the green haven hypothesis (GHH) for total FDI. However, results differ by mode of investment: stricter ER in the origin country encourages outward M&As, but has no significant effect on GF projects. Conversely, ER in host countries appears to exert limited pull effects. Further analysis by sector (clean versus dirty industries) and by country income level reveals important heterogeneity in these effects. For pollution-intensive sectors, tighter regulation in high-income countries is associated with greater outward M&A activity and GF investment directed toward low- and middle-income hosts-an allocation consistent with the PHH. In contrast, in clean industries, GF investment is positively associated with stricter ER in the origin country, lending support to the GHH. Taken together, these results suggest that stricter ER need not deter investment, especially in clean industries or via GF projects; however, in pollution-intensive activities, reallocation through cross-border M&As toward low- and middle-income countries remains a concern. |
| Keywords: | Environmental regulation; Foreign Direct Investment; Pollution Haven Hypothesis; Green Haven Hypothesis; Mergers and Acquisitions; Greenfield investments; Gravity model |
| JEL: | F21 F64 Q58 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drx:wpaper:202608 |
| By: | DeAngeli, Emma (Resources for the Future); Walls, Margaret A. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Extreme precipitation events are increasing in many areas of the United States, leading to a growing number of damaging flood events. Nature-based solutions (NBS), which use natural features or processes to absorb and redirect floodwaters away from developed areas, are often seen as environmentally friendly alternatives to hard infrastructure for flood protection, such as levees and seawalls. Some NBS are small-scale, but stormwater parks are often several acres in size and provide important community co-benefits in the form of outdoor recreation. In this report, we describe the double-duty performed by stormwater parks in three cities in the United States, Atlanta, Houston, and Virginia Beach. We explain how the cities overcame five major challenges to successfully design, construct, and finance the parks. We then discuss the special challenges that small towns face in developing solutions to flooding problems and describe the situation in two Maryland towns where valuable community parks are flooding hot spots. |
| Date: | 2026–04–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-26-07 |
| By: | Raimi, Daniel (Resources for the Future); Joiner, Emily (Resources for the Future); Hubbell, Bryan (Resources for the Future); Lohawala, Nafisa (Resources for the Future); Robertson, Molly (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | The events of 2025 have shaken the global order. Due largely to changes in rhetoric and policy from the United States, key pillars of international economic and security systems have been called into question. The reports we examine here were prepared well before the United States undertook military activities in Venezuela and Iran. They will undoubtably influence modeling and projections in 2026 but are not reflected here. Global expectations around energy and climate, in turn, have been disrupted. A decade after the 2015 Paris Agreement articulated the “stretch goal” of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, it has become clear that achieving this goal is no longer plausible. Global leaders have increasingly focused on energy security and affordability, relegating climate change to a second-tier priority (or lower) in many cases. Still, preventing the worst outcomes of global climate change remains critical, highlighting the importance of continued effort to reduce emissions while ensuring reliable and affordable energy supplies.One way to consider the future of energy and climate is through annual long-term energy outlooks that articulate different trajectories based on varying assumptions about future policies, technologies, costs, and other factors. Outlooks published in 2025 envision a wide range of possible futures but do not chart a plausible path to achieving the 1.5°C target. Specifically, two of the 1.5°C scenarios published in 2025 (BNEF and Equinor) are reproductions of scenarios prepared in previous years, and the 1.5°C scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA) exceeds 1.6°C before returning to 1.5°C by 2100. Therefore, we generally exclude these scenarios, focusing instead on scenarios that reflect the realities of the current moment.The outlooks we include offer useful insight into the future of energy, but they are not easily comparable because of differences in units, assumptions, geographic groupings, and more. Here we harmonize 15 scenarios across eight organizations to produce as close to apples-to-apples estimates as possible. These outlooks and scenarios are shown in Table 1 and discussed in more detail in Section 4.A brief description of our methodology is provided in Section 4, Data and Methods, with select indicators in Section 5, Statistics. For the full methodology and interactive graphing tools, visit www.rff.org/geo.To enhance interpretability, we use consistent symbology in this report’s figures and the online data tool. We group scenarios into three categories based on their underlying assumptions or, in some cases, their trajectory of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Table 2):For reference scenarios, which assume no new policies are enacted by governments or follow similar global emissions trajectories, we use a long-dashed line. This set comprises scenarios from Equinor (Plazas), ExxonMobil, IEA (CPS), IEEJ, OPEC, and Total (Trends).For evolving policies scenarios, which assume that policies and technologies develop according to recent trends or the expert views of the team producing the outlook, we use solid lines. This set comprises bp Current Trajectory, BNEF ETS, and IEA STEPS. We also include Equinor Walls, IEEJ Advanced Technologies, and Total Momentum because they follow similar emissions trajectories.Ambitious climate scenarios are not designed around policies but instead are structured to achieve specific climate targets. For these scenarios (bp Below 2°C, Total Rupture), we use a dotted line. We exclude 1.5°C scenarios. |
| Date: | 2026–04–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:report:rp-26-06 |