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on Resource Economics |
| By: | Raphaël Chiappini (University of Bordeaux); Enea Gerard (University of Bordeaux) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of environmental regulations on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) using a novel index that distinguishes between the implementation and enforcement of environmental policy across 111 countries from 2001 to 2018. Leveraging bi- lateral FDI data and a structural gravity model, we find robust evidence of a Pollution Haven Effect: stricter environmental regulations in host countries are associated with lower inward FDI. The effect is more pronounced in emerging markets and in environments with higher corruption. Importantly, we show that FDI responds more strongly to policy implementation, capturing formal regulatory commitment, than to enforcement, measured as deviations be- tween predicted and actual emissions. In addition, bilateral FDI patterns are shaped by the environmental stringency gap between source and host countries, consistent with regulatory arbitrage behavior. |
| Keywords: | Environmental regulation, foreign direct investment, Pollution Haven Hypothesis |
| JEL: | F Q |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inf:wpaper:2025.9 |
| By: | Berniell, Inés (University of La Plata); Marchionni, Mariana (Universidad Nacional de la Plata); Pedrazzi, Julián (Universidad Nacional de la Plata); Viollaz, Mariana (CEDLAS-UNLP) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how female political leaders impact environmental outcomes and climate change policy actions using data from mixed-gender mayoral races in Brazil. Using a Regression Discontinuity design, we find that, compared to male mayors, female mayors significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This effect is driven by a reduction in emissions intensity (CO2e/GDP) in the Land Use sector, without changes in municipal economic activity. Part of the reduction in emissions in the Land Use sector is attributable to a decline in deforestation. We examine potential mechanisms that could explain the positive environmental impact of narrowly electing a female mayor over a male counterpart and find that in Amazon municipalities, female elected mayors allocate more space to the environment in their government proposals and are more likely to invest in environmental initiatives. Differences in the enforcement of environmental regulations do not explain the results. |
| Keywords: | Brazil, Amazon, mayoral elections, climate change, gender, Latin America |
| JEL: | J16 D72 Q54 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17920 |
| By: | Metcalfe, Robert; Roth, Sefi |
| Abstract: | Exposure to ambient air pollution has been shown to be detrimental to human health and productivity, and has motivated many policies to reduce such pollution. However, given that humans spend 90% of their time indoors, it is important to understand the degree of exposure to Indoor Air Pollution (IAP), and, if high, ways to reduce it. We design and implement a field experiment in London that monitors households’ IAP and then randomly reveals their IAP in real-time. At baseline, we find that IAP is worse than ambient air pollution when residents are at home and that for 38% of the time, IAP is above World Health Organization standards. Additionally, we observe a large household income-IAP gradient, larger than the income-ambient pollution gradient, highlighting large income disparities in IAP exposure. During our field experiment, we find that the randomized revelation reduces IAP by 17% (1.9 µg/m3 ) overall and 34% (5 µg/m3 ) during occupancy time. We show that the mechanism is households using more natural ventilation as a result of the feedback (i.e., opening up doors and windows). Finally, in terms of welfare, we find that: (i) households have a willingness to pay of £4.8 ($6) for every 1 µg/m3 reduction in indoor PM2.5; (ii) households have a higher willingness to pay for mitigation than for full information; (iii) households have a price elasticity of IAP monitor demand around -0.75; and (iv) a £1 subsidy for an IAP monitor or an air purifier infinite marginal value of public funds, i.e., a Pareto improvement. |
| JEL: | N0 |
| Date: | 2025–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:128514 |