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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2023‒12‒11
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Cincotta, Costanza (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Thomassen, Øyvind (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We use product-level data from 2000 to 2021 to evaluate Norway’s incentives for consumers to choose electric vehicles. These include taxes on fossil fuels, EV exemption from car purchase taxes, and other incentives, like discounts on road tolls. We find that undoing the incentive with the largest effect, the EV exemption from purchase taxes, would reduce the EV market share to 25 percent from the 66 percent observed in 2021, increase CO2 emissions of new cars sold by 170 percent, reduce their total weight by 22 percent, and reduce the number of new cars sold by 10 percent. |
| Keywords: | Environmental taxes; automobiles |
| JEL: | H23 L62 Q58 |
| Date: | 2023–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2023_019&r=res |
| By: | Gianluca Biggi; Andrea Mina; Federico Tamagni |
| Abstract: | Using a firm-level dataset from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel (2003-2016), this study explores the characteristics of environmentally innovative firms and quantifies the effects of pursuing different types of environmental innovation strategies (resource-saving, pollution-reducing, and regulation-driven innovations) on sales, employment, and productivity dynamics. The results indicate, first, that environmental innovations tend to be highly correlated with firms’ technological capabilities, although to varying degrees across types of environmental innovation, whereas structural characteristics are less significant. Second, we observe heterogeneous effects of different types of environmental innovation on performance outcomes. We find no evidence that any type of environmental innovation fosters sales growth while pollution-reducing and regulation-driven innovations boost employment growth. Moreover, both resource-saving and pollution-reducing innovations bring about productivity advantage. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Innovation; Green Investments, Resource-saving, Pollution-reduction, Envi- ronmental compliance; Firm performance. |
| Date: | 2023–11–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2023/42&r=res |
| By: | Letort, Elodie; Le Gloux, Fanny; Dupraz Pierre |
| Abstract: | Although consumers are increasingly willing to pay for the environment, the private provision of public goods from the consumption of green goods remains limited. We propose in this paper to exploit an additional private attribute of green goods, the health benefits, in order to increase the provision of public good. Health can be seen as a positive internality associated with the consumption of some green goods. We show that correcting this internality by offering labels describing these health benefits can increase the supply of public goods. The level of public good remains underprovided from the perspective of a social planner, but, under certain conditions, may equalize or exceed the optimal level of the public good from the perspective of an environmental agency. A simulation is performed to illustrate the impact of consumer preferences on the provisioning of public good at market equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Demand and Price Analysis, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety |
| Date: | 2023–11–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:inrasl:338910&r=res |
| By: | Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Sappington, David E. M. (University of Florida) |
| Abstract: | In industries with extensive infrastructure needs and pronounced scale economies, consumers can be better served by well-designed regulation than by competition. Regulation that replicates the discipline of competitive markets can enhance the welfare of electricity consumers. However, replicating competitive discipline is challenging when regulators have limited knowledge of relevant industry conditions and when the regulators’ policy instruments are restricted. Incentive regulation attempts to harness the regulated firm’s superior knowledge of industry conditions to achieve regulatory objectives. This paper reviews key principles of incentive regulation, and examines how incentive regulation can be designed to enhance performance in the electricity sector. |
| Keywords: | Incentive Regulation; Electricity |
| JEL: | L51 L94 Q40 Q48 |
| Date: | 2023–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2023_010&r=res |