By: |
Mohamed Boly (World Bank Group);
Jean-Louis Combes (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2022-...] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne, UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne);
Pascale Combes Motel (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2022-...] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne, UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne) |
Abstract: |
We econometrically assess how elections affect environmental performance,
namely climate policy, using a sample of 76 democratic countries from 1990 to
2014. Three key results emerge from our system-GMM estimations. First, CO2
emissions increase in election years, suggesting that incumbents engage in
fiscal manipulation through the composition of public spending rather than its
level. Second, the effect has weakened over recent years and is present only
in established democracies. Third, higher freedom of the press and high income
that can proxy high environmental preferences from citizens reduce the size of
this trade-off between pork-barrel spending and the public good, namely
environmental quality. Deteriorating environmental quality can bring electoral
benefits to politicians. |
Keywords: |
CO2 emissions, Electoral cycles, Environmental policy, Panel data, 2 emissions Electoral cycles Environmental policy Panel data JEL Codes D72 E62 O13 Q54, 2 emissions, Panel data JEL Codes D72, E62, O13, Q54 |
Date: |
2023–09 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04209496&r=res |